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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the association between four accounting-based earnings quality 
proxies and three capital market aspects of UK listed firms after applying the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The three capital market aspects are: the cost of 
equity capital; information symmetry; and analysts’ information environment (number of 
analysts following, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts). It finds evidences that firms with low earnings quality have a higher cost of 
equity capital, higher information asymmetry, lower number of analysts following, a 
higher dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and less accurate analysts’ forecasts than firms 
with high earnings quality. Also, the results show that the innate component of each 
earnings quality proxy, driven by economic fundamentals, has a larger impact on the three 
aspects of capital market than the discretionary component, driven by management 
choices. This is consistent with the theoretical framework of IFRS which the UK adopted 
in 2005 for listed firms. These findings shed light on the important role of earnings quality 
in helping analysts and investors to make better financial investment decisions. Theory 
suggests that this role is achieved by increasing the informativeness of firms’ information 
environment, improving the precision of financial information, reducing estimation risk 
and information asymmetry; these are expected to lead to a lower cost of equity capital.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The primary purpose of financial reporting information in the capital market is understood 
often to be to support participants in making judgements and decisions (Francis et al., 
2006). Therefore, high quality financial information is expected in this context to help 
users (i.e. investors, creditors and analysts) to make useful decisions and judgments and, 
thus, developing the efficiency of the capital market (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2012b). 
This view derives from the notion that use of accounting information in the capital market 
is fundamental. Therefore, the question of whether, how and to what extent earnings 
quality affects key aspects of capital market - the cost of equity capital, information 
asymmetry and analysts’ information environment - is fundamental to understanding why 
and how accounting information matters to the participants in the capital market (Francis 
et al., 2006).  
Whilst previous studies consider earnings quality as an important element for financial 
reporting system of firms, astonishingly, the concept of earnings quality remains quite 
vague and there is no consensus on it. This is regardless of numerous attempts to make it 
more precise and to deliver a theoretical foundation (Francis et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 
2010; Chen et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013; Nelson and Skinner, 2013; Walker, 2013; 
Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). Consequently, the choice of any earnings quality proxy 
depends on determinants such as research question, data availability and the estimation 
model (Francis et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 2010). For example, some questions of 
previous studies test the association between earnings and returns such as value relevance 
research. Other research questions focus only on direct measures of earnings quality 
depending on accounting data (i.e., without reference to stock prices or returns). More 
narrowly, they test the association between earnings and cash flow. Finally, the research 
questions may test the differences between innate and discretionary components of 
earnings quality (Francis et al., 2006). 
From earnings quality perspective, this thesis follows partially Francis et al. (2004) who 
review and examine the most universally used proxies for earnings quality in the previous 
literature, and summarise their findings in terms of seven proxies. These proxies could be 
categorized as either accounting-based or market-based proxies. The accounting-based 
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proxies consist of four proxies: accruals quality; earnings persistence; earnings 
predictability; and earnings smoothness. However, the market-based proxies consist of 
three proxies: value relevance; timeliness; and conservatism. Their findings indicate that 
accounting-based earnings quality proxies explain more of the variation in the cost of 
equity capital than do the market-based earnings quality proxies, with the exception of 
predictability and conservatism. Based on this result, this study focuses only on the 
accounting-based earnings quality proxies for the UK listed firms in the period of 2005 
to 2011, because it has a stronger significant association with the cost of equity capital 
compared to the market-based earnings quality proxies. Also, this study extends Francis 
et al.’s (2004) study by examining the impact of earnings quality on other aspects of 
capital market such as information asymmetry and analysts’ information environment. 
The researcher intends to determine whether each earnings quality proxy matters to 
investors and analysts, and which proxies matter most, as evidenced by the strength of 
the association between the proxy and the aspects of capital market.  
Moving to the aspects of capital market, there are three particular aspects of capital 
markets are affected by earnings quality which have been investigated widely by previous 
studies. These aspects are: firstly, the cost of equity capital, which is considered to be a 
summary indicator of investors’ resource allocation decisions; secondly, information 
asymmetry and; thirdly, analysts’ information environment (number of analysts 
following, dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and  accuracy of analysts’ forecasts) (e.g., 
Francis et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Verdi, 2006; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009; 
McInnis, 2010; Kim and Qi, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2011; Lobo et al., 2012; Ogneva, 
2012; Barth et al., 2013). 
Based on reviewing previous studies, there is a clear debate regarding whether earnings 
quality proxies have a significant impact on the three aspects of capital market: the cost 
of equity capital; information asymmetry; and analysts’ information environment. This 
debate is discussed in the following three subsections. 
1.1.1 Earnings quality and the cost of equity capital 
A growing body of empirical work in the accounting literature has investigated the 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital (e.g., Francis et al., 
2004; Francis et al., 2005; Verdi, 2006; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009; Wong, 2009; 
McInnis, 2010; Kim and Qi, 2010; García Lara et al., 2011; Bhattacharya et al., 2011; 
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Ogneva, 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Mouselli et al., 2012; Mouselli et al., 2013). The main 
hypothesis is that higher earnings quality is associated with a lower cost of equity capital. 
This hypothesis is based on the theory that high quality accounting information reduces 
information risk by reducing information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
traders. This is expected to lower the cost of equity capital (e.g., Easley and O'hara, 2004; 
Lambert et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2012).   
Empirically, many studies investigate the association between the cost of equity capital 
and earnings quality. Some of those studies use different proxies to measure earnings 
quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2004), whilst some use one proxy to measure earnings quality; 
most of them use accruals quality as a unique measure for earnings quality (e.g., Francis 
et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009; Kim and Qi, 2010; Ogneva, 2012). A few 
studies use another unique proxy to measure earnings quality, e.g., McInnis (2010) and 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) use smoothness; Barth et al. (2013) use timeliness; Li (2010b) 
and García Lara et al. (2011) use conservatism. 
Francis et al. (2004) investigate, for US firms, the association between the cost of equity 
capital and seven proxies of earnings quality: accruals quality; earnings persistence; 
earnings predictability; earnings smoothness; value relevance; timeliness; and 
conservatism. Considered separately these proxies, they find a statistically significant 
negative association between the cost of equity capital and each earnings quality proxy; 
the exceptions (or least consistent associations) are found for predictability and 
conservatism. They find, also, that the accounting-based earnings proxies, and 
particularly accruals quality, explain more of the variation in the cost of equity capital 
estimates compared to the market-based proxies. Further, Francis et al. (2005) examine 
the association between both costs of equity and debt capital and one proxy only for 
earnings quality, namely accruals quality for US firms. In this regard, they find that lower 
accruals quality is associated with both higher costs of debt and equity capital.  
Using the Australian market rather than the US market, Gray et al. (2009) re-examine the 
association between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital. They find a 
significantly negative association between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital. 
Using the UK data, Mouselli et al. (2013) examine whether accruals quality is a priced 
risk factor. They find that accruals quality is significant factor in explaining the time-
series variation in excess return. However, Core et al. (2008) claim that Francis et al. 
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(2005) do not provide evidence that accruals quality is a priced risk. They suggest using 
a two-stage cross-sectional regression (2SCSR) method to test whether accruals quality 
is a priced factor (e.g., Fama and MacBeth, 1973). They find no significant association 
between accruals quality and the realised return. However, the results of Core et al. (2008) 
show a significant positive risk premium for only the Fama and French HML1 factor, and 
no significant risk premium for accruals quality, as well as SMB2 factor and market risk 
premium. After controlling for low-priced stocks3, Kim and Qi (2010) re-examine the 
model of Core et al. (2008) and find a significant negative association between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, Ogneva (2012) enters this debate by 
controlling for cash flow shocks4, and finds a significantly negative association between 
accruals quality and the cost of equity capital. 
A few studies use other proxies to estimate earnings quality rather than accruals quality, 
e.g., McInnis (2010) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) use smoothness; Barth et al. (2013) 
use timeliness; Li (2010b) and García Lara et al. (2011) use conservatism. Specifically, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) explore the association between the cost of capital at a national 
level and three national level proxies of earnings manipulation, one of which is earnings 
smoothness. From their investigation, they find that countries with higher earnings 
smoothness have a higher cost of equity capital. However, McInnis (2010) finds no 
association between earnings smoothness and the cost of equity capital. By using 
timeliness (earning transparency), Barth et al. (2013) find that firms with higher earnings 
transparency have a lower cost of capital. By using conservatism, both García Lara et al. 
(2011) and Li (2010b) find a significantly negative association between conditional 
conservatism and the cost of equity capital. 
In summary, earnings quality is considered to be a premier or summary indicator of the 
quality of accounting information. Most empirical studies use exclusively one proxy to 
express earnings quality. The exception is Francis et al. (2004),  who use different proxies 
to estimate earnings quality. In terms of the accruals quality proxy, previous studies 
                                                 
1 HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio (high-minus-low book-to-market 
factor). 
2 SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio (small-minus-big factor). 
3 Low priced returns defined as returns with two adjacent prices less than $5, sometimes referred to as 
“penny stocks”. 
4 The term “cash flow shock” describes revision in expectation of future benefits accruing to equity holders; 
this is adopted from the finance literature (e.g., Campbell and Ammer 1993).  
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agreed that there is a negative association between accruals quality and the cost of equity 
capital. The exception is Core et al. (2008) who counter this argument. Most of the studies 
focus on the US data except Gray et al. (2009) who focus on Australian data, and Mouselli 
et al. (2013) who focus on UK data. In terms of other accounting-based proxies, few 
previous studies examine the association between the cost of equity capital and these other 
proxies i.e., earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness, and those produce mixed 
results.  
1.1.2 Earnings quality and information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry refers to some stakeholders obtaining more insider information 
about underlying firms than others (Callahan et al., 1997; Easley et al., 2002; Iatridis, 
2011). Therefore, information asymmetry leads to three main problems in corporate 
finance: firstly, adverse selection which means a lack of distinction between positive and 
negative investment opportunities, since investors prefer to choose the investment that is 
characterised by lower risk or higher safety. Secondly, moral hazard which means that, if 
the investment plan does not serve the managers’ interest, they will not join it. Thirdly, 
monitoring cost which is used to restrict the ability of manager to fool previous 
shareholders and new shareholders (Callahan et al., 1997; Easley et al., 2002).  
Most of theoretical studies document three streams which demonstrate the impact of the 
quality of accounting information on information asymmetry. In the first stream, the focus 
is on changing the behaviour of uninformed investors; perhaps those investors are 
investing and trading in firms which are well known or that they judge favourably. 
Therefore, if the quality of accounting information of a firm increases, it leads to a 
reduction in the processing cost of public disclosure of such a firm. Consequently, there 
is an increased number of uninformed investors who trade in such a firm’s stocks (Merton, 
1987; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). A higher amount of trading by uninformed investors 
reduces the probability of trading against a privately informed investor (Kyle, 1985). 
Therefore, higher quality of accounting information that is disclosed to the public is 
related to less informed investors; this leads to a reduction in information asymmetry 
(Brown et al., 2004). 
The second stream shows that the high quality of accounting information can reduce the 
information asymmetry by changing the incentives of investors to search for private 
information. Verrecchia (1982) and Diamond (1985) find a negative association between 
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the quality of accounting information and the cost of private information which investors 
seek to acquire. Therefore, the higher quality of accounting information reduces the 
incentives of investors to acquire private information. 
The third stream shows that the quality of accounting information could reduce 
information asymmetry by reducing the information risk (Diamond, 1985; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O'hara, 2004). They show that poor quality of accounting 
information may lead to higher information asymmetry by increasing the information risk 
since less informed investors are in disadvantage level compared to informed investors in 
adjusting their portfolio allocations. Therefore, higher information asymmetry of a firm 
leads investors to ask for extra compensation to hold stock of such firm; this may lead to 
higher cost of equity capital (Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and 
O'hara, 2004). 
A growing body of empirical work in the accounting literature supports this last 
conjecture. In this regard, most empirical studies, which investigate the association 
between the quality of accounting information and information asymmetry, focus more 
on disclosure quality as a proxy for the quality of accounting information rather than 
earnings quality, (e.g., Welker, 1995; Heflin et al., 2005; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). 
Their findings suggest that the disclosure quality has a significantly negative impact on 
information asymmetry. On the other hand, there are few studies investigate the 
association between earnings quality and information asymmetry (e.g., Jayaraman, 2008; 
Ascioglu et al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2013). In particular, Jayaraman (2008) 
investigates the association between earnings smoothness and information asymmetry. 
When compared to firms with poor earnings smoothness, he finds that firms with high 
earnings smoothness have both higher bid-ask spreads and PIN. He concludes that more 
informed trading occurs when earnings are smoother than cash flows. Moreover, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) investigate the association between accruals quality and 
information asymmetry through trading cost. They find a negative association between 
accruals quality and market liquidity (information asymmetry). Both innate and 
discretionary components of earnings quality have a significant effect on information 
asymmetry. However, the innate factors have a greater effect than the discretionary 
components. Finally, Ascioglu et al. (2012) examine the impact of earnings management 
on market liquidity (information asymmetry). They find a significant positive association 
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between earnings management activities, both accounting and real based earnings 
management proxies, with illiquidity. 
In summary, compared with disclosure quality, there are relatively few previous studies 
which investigate the association between earnings quality proxies and information 
asymmetry. These studies focus on accruals quality as a unique proxy of earnings quality. 
In addition, these studies appeared to focus exclusively on US data. 
1.1.3 Earnings quality and analysts’ information environment 
Besides the cost of equity capital and information symmetry, the use of the analysts’ 
information environment as a dependent variable for earnings quality has the advantage 
that analyst forecasts are related only to earnings whereas the cost of equity capital is 
likely to reflect other information beside earnings. Therefore, an investigation of the 
association between earnings quality and analysts’ information environment reflects the 
direct effect of earnings quality on the usefulness of decisions (Dechow et al., 2010). 
This part of the research is interested in two streams of the previous literature: the first 
stream examines the association between the quality of accounting information and the 
number of analysts following a firm. The second stream examines the association 
between the quality of accounting information, and both the dispersion of analysts' 
forecasts and the accuracy of analysts’ forecast (analysts’ properties). For the first stream, 
the accounting literature focuses mainly on the association between analysts following 
and firm disclosure quality; the main hypothesis is whether firms with high disclosure 
quality have a large number of analysts following (e.g., Bhushan, 1989). In this regard, 
previous studies provide mixed results on the association between the quality of 
accounting information and analysts following. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that 
firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger number of analysts 
following. Also, Healy et al. (1999) find a positive association between disclosure quality 
and analysts following. Conversely, Barth et al. (2001) and Lehavy (2009) argue that a 
firm’s poor quality of disclosed accounting information leads to larger numbers of 
analysts following that firm; this is because their reports are likely to become more 
valuable and in greater demand by investors. Further, after controlling for operating 
uncertainty, Lobo et al. (2012) find a negative association between accruals quality and 
analysts following a firm. Overall, the question of whether earnings quality has a 
significant impact on financial analysts following is still unclear.  
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In addition to the impact of the quality of accounting information on analysts following, 
there is, also, an impact on the dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. In this 
regard, whilst there is an extensive literature on dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts, few studies examine the impact of earnings quality on dispersion and accuracy 
of analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Eames and Glover, 2003; Lobo et al., 2012), with the majority 
focusing on the impact of disclosure quality (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 
2003a; Irani and Karamanou, 2003; Vanstraelen et al., 2003).  In particular, Lobo et al. 
(2012) investigate the association between accruals quality and both the dispersion and 
accuracy of analysts' forecasts. They find that firms with lower accruals quality have 
larger analysts’ forecast errors and high forecasts dispersion. However, Eames and Glover 
(2003) test the association between earnings predictability and analysts' forecasts error 
and find no significant association. In accordance with these results, it is clear that using 
different proxies of earnings quality leads to different results. Overall, there are mixed 
results for the association between earnings quality and both dispersion and accuracy of 
analysts' forecasts. 
1.2 Research Motivations 
This study is motivated by six major considerations. Firstly, although the importance of 
earnings quality has been evident, especially in the last decade (e.g., Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003; Dechow and Schrand, 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Walker, 2013; Dichev 
et al., 2013), there are controversies in the literature. Most notably, the association 
between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital is still unclear. Amongst others, 
Francis et al. (2005) argue that there is a significant negative association between the two 
variables, whilst Core et al. (2008) counter this argument using two-stages cross sectional 
regression tests.  
Secondly, earnings are considered to be one of the main inputs in analysts’ valuation 
models, therefore, the quality of earnings is a crucial factor for analysts in making useful 
decisions (Block, 1999; Barker and Imam, 2008; Clatworthy et al., 2012). However, 
previous studies focus too generally on the role of public information on analysts’ 
information environment and, here, there is a lack of evidence in the literature which 
examines the impact of earnings quality on analysts’ information environment. 
Thirdly, beyond the association between accruals quality and the three aspects of capital 
market, there are few studies that investigate the association between other accounting-
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based earnings quality proxies and the three aspects of capital market. Also, the previous 
studies provide little guidance on the comparative impact of earnings quality proxies on 
capital markets aspects, and whether there are given circumstances or particular contexts 
in which one proxy is more vital than other proxies (see Dichev et al., 2013; Perotti and 
Wagenhofer, 2014).  
Fourthly, previous studies provide mixed results about earnings smoothness as a proxy of 
earnings quality (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2004). A number of previous 
studies consider earnings smoothness as a desired quality of earnings, since it reflects 
either the natural consistency in operations or the accruals process’ elimination of 
transitory noise or managers who look favourably on this aspect (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; 
Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Dichev and Tang, 2009). Other previous studies consider the 
opposite explanation, highlighting the opportunistic and misleading “over-smoothing” of 
earnings with regard to the underlying cash flows or economic events (Leuz et al., 2003). 
In order to understand these mixed results, the researcher uses different context rather 
than US, UK (non-US) listed firms and distinguishes between the innate (fundamental) 
and discretionary (artificial) earnings smoothness, to determine the impact of each 
component on decision usefulness and capital market aspects. 
Fifthly, most previous studies, which focus on the impact of earnings quality on the three 
aspects of capital market, are conducted in the US. This limits the generality of findings 
vis-à-vis contexts beyond the US. The quality of accounting information is shaped by the 
interface of different features such as the accounting standards, the legal and political 
system, the tax system,  the development of financial market, capital structure and 
ownership (see Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007).  
In relation to the UK, although the UK and the US share some common features, e.g., 
both have a common law system, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, strong legal 
enforcement and large equity markets (Leuz et al., 2003; Nobes and Parker, 2012), there 
are differences in other areas. Of note is that UK listed firms adopt IFRS whilst US listed 
firms apply US GAAP. In this regard, Dichev et al. (2013) find that 181 CFOs, who are 
working in the US market, rank accounting standards as the second most important 
determinant of earnings quality after the business model. Regardless of the widespread 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, there is comparatively little evidence of the economic 
consequences of IFRS which are less examined and less comprehensive than US GAAP. 
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Previous studies argue, also, that IFRS propose additional discretion and less guidance; 
thus, it provides additional room for earnings management. (e.g., Benston et al., 2006; 
SEC 2008).  
On the other hand, previous studies argue that IFRS are considered as principles-based 
standards and inexpensive to apply than US GAAP, which are likely realised as being too 
detailed and complex (e.g., Ijiri, 2005; Bennett et al., 2006; PwC 2009). A number of 
studies, also, find that the adoption of IFRS improves the general information 
environment. They find that, after the adoption of IFRS compared to various local GAAP, 
there are more analysts following, less dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and greater 
accuracy in analysts’ forecasts (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; 
Wang et al., 2008; Horton et al., 2013).  
In this regard, previous studies suggest that there are significant differences in earnings 
quality reported between the two accounting systems (Haverty, 2006; Ding et al., 2007; 
Hopkins et al., 2008; O'Connell and Sullivan, 2008; Gordon et al., 2008; Henry et al., 
2009). Also, demand for public disclosure and accounting information is likely to vary 
between the said two countries. For example, in the US, retail investors' direct stock 
holdings constitute about half of capital markets but, in the UK, their share is around 18% 
of the market (Investment Company Institute, 2010; Office for National Statistics, 2010). 
Therefore, the researcher considers that, in the context of this study, this different setting 
may lead to different results from those in the US. This because previous studies 
document that earnings management is considered as one of the main determinant of 
explaining the ability of stock market participants e.g., investors and analysts to forecast 
future earnings (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). 
Sixthly, a number of previous studies challenge the hypothesis that the accounting 
standards leads only to high (less) quality of accounting information (e.g., Ball et al., 
2003; Leuz, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). They argue that 
the quality of accounting information are shaped by many other factors, such as the legal 
institutions of a country, the power of the enforcement regime, the forces of capital 
market, ownership and governance structure, and firms operating characteristics. 
Therefore, if these factors remain constant, the accounting standards have limited impact 
on the quality of accounting information (Hail et al., 2010). According to this view, the 
results of this study are expected to be the same as the previous literature that is applied 
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in US, since the accounting standards are the main difference between the US and the UK 
market. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Motivated by this debate, the primary objective of this thesis is to examine the association 
between earnings quality and three capital market aspects in the UK after the adoption of 
IFRS in 2005. In particular, the researcher tests the extent to which what is reported to be 
the higher of four earnings quality proxies, known as accounting-based earnings quality 
proxies (Francis et al., 2004), are associated with a lower cost of equity capital, lower 
information asymmetry, higher number of analysts following, lower dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts and greater accuracy of analysts’ forecasts in the UK market.  
In addition, this thesis tests the relative impact of the four earnings quality proxies on the 
three capital market aspects in order to determine which proxy matter most to investors 
and analysts. Although these proxies are based on different sets of information, this study 
does not provide any hypotheses for that ranking. The proxies, which process more 
information to users, are perhaps in better position than others. Accruals quality is based 
on three subsequent effects of cash flows; earnings persistence and predictability are 
based on net income from the financial statements; and earnings smoothness is based on 
the volatility of earnings and cash flows. 
This thesis aims, also, to determine whether the innate component, which is driven by 
economic fundamentals, and the discretionary component, which is driven by 
management choices, of each earnings quality proxy, impact similarly on the three aspects 
of capital market.  Finally, the thesis is concerned with studying the impact of the financial 
crisis on the association between earnings quality and both the cost of equity capital and 
information asymmetry. 
1.4 Research Philosophy and Methodology 
The researcher regards this study as being set within the positivistic (functionalist) 
paradigm. The notion of such research is to investigate the status quo and search for 
universal regularities and causal relationships between the variables used in the study. 
Therefore, this study employs statistical analysis to test the research hypotheses; these are 
constructed and explained in accordance with a theoretical framework established from 
the relevant literature. Different theories of accounting such as capital need theory and 
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decision usefulness theory are used as explanatory theories in this context to explain the 
association between earnings quality and the three aspects of capital market. 
The sample of this thesis covers all UK non-financial firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange during the period from 2005 to 2011 and in order to avoid any survivorship 
bias, both active and dead equities are included in the sample. The Thomson DataStream 
and the I/B/E/S Databases are used to collect the observations for all variables. Following 
the literature review, this thesis excludes the financial institutions from the sample 
because their financial reporting processes are unlikely to conform to other industries. 
Financial institutions, as regulated industries, use industry specific accounting rules and 
therefore differ in their incentives to produce earnings quality (Peasnell et al., 2005). 
Financial institutions face regulatory monitoring which is tied explicitly to accounting 
data; such regulations create incentives to manage the income statement and balance sheet 
variables of interest to regulators (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). In total, there are 8,175 firm-
year observations which represent 28% of all UK companies available in the DataStream. 
The number of distinct firms each year ranges from 1,074 to 1,224. 
In this study, univariate analyses are performed in order to report the descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the multivariate analysis. Two-tailed t-tests of differences in 
means are performed in order to compare the dependent variables of poor and high decile 
rank of each earnings quality proxy for all firm-year observations. Three multivariate 
regressions, i.e., Fama and MacBeth (1973) average annual regression; Newey and West 
(1987) pooled regression; and panel data with fixed and random effects regression, are 
used to test empirically the hypotheses of the thesis. The dependent variables are the cost 
of equity capital, information asymmetry, analysts following, the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. These dependent variables are regressed 
against four earnings quality proxies e.g., accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness, plus control variables. STATA computer software 
package is used to test the different hypotheses. 
1.5 Research Contributions 
This study contributes to the literature in many ways. Firstly, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this study is amongst the first to examine the impact of earnings quality on 
three aspects of capital market for UK listed firms, particularly after the requirement to 
adopt IFRS in 2005. According to the regulations of the European Union (EU), all 
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publicly traded EU firms were obligated to change from local GAAP to IFRS in 2005. 
Therefore, from 2005 onwards, those firms are required to prepare their financial reports 
consistent with IFRS. The transition to IFRS is considered to be the biggest change to 
financial reporting within the EU in 30 years (Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 
2006). The ostensible objectives of the adoption of IFRS include improving the quality 
of accounting information and achieving greater transparency, accuracy, timeliness and 
comparability of financial reporting (Ball, 2006; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013). Also, 
improving the quality of financial reporting by IFRS may reduce the information risk for 
less-informed (typically small) investors, helping them to compete better with well-
informed (e.g., professional) investors. This may lead to a lower information asymmetry, 
higher number of analysts following, less dispersion across analysts’ forecasts and greater 
accuracy for analysts’ forecasts. All of these results may lead to a lower cost of equity 
capital (Ball, 2006).   
Secondly, this research goes beyond the association between accruals quality and the 
three aspects of capital market and focuses on the impact of other accounting-based 
proxies of earnings quality. Earnings quality is a multi-dimensional concept or construct, 
hence, using one proxy to express earnings quality may not be enough to cover the 
concept. Therefore, investigating the impact of different earnings quality proxies on the 
capital market aspects might help to compare the different effects of values of each proxy 
and, thereby, determine which proxy matters most to users (e.g., investors and analysts).  
Thirdly, these analyses are extended by examining whether there is a different association 
between the capital market aspects and both innate and discretionary components of 
earnings quality. This analysis shed light on the role of IFRS and the UK institutional and 
regulatory factors in increasing the quality and precision of accounting information and 
reduces information asymmetry for both future cash flow and future earnings, thus the 
information risk that associated with discretionary earnings quality is expected to be 
reduced. 
Finally, this study tests the association between earnings quality and both the cost of 
equity capital and information asymmetry during the period of financial crisis in a country 
with strong fiscal sustainability. The findings would shed light on the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on the relationship between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity capital. Also, it shed light on the type of accounting information that matter to 
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investors through the financial crisis in determining the price of cost of equity capital. 
Finally, it would help other participants in the financial reporting process, e.g., policy 
makers and accounting regulators, to prepare defence mechanisms against a crisis. 
1.6 Summary of the Results 
The empirical results of this thesis can be classified into three sections based on the 
dependent variable which is examined: the cost of equity capital; information asymmetry; 
and analysts’ information environment. 
1.6.1 The cost of equity capital 
The results indicate a significantly negative association between each of the accounting-
based earnings quality proxies considered separately and the cost of equity capital that is 
measured by earnings-price ratios in relation to their industry peers (IndEP). The 
exceptions or least consistent associations are found for smoothness. This low significant 
association between the cost of equity capital and earnings smoothness mirrors the 
corresponding conflicting impressions in the research literature (see Dechow et al., 2010; 
Dichev et al., 2013). Also, the results show that the predictability proxy explains more of 
the variation in estimates of the cost of equity followed by accruals quality, then 
persistence and, finally, smoothness. Economically, the largest impact (earnings 
predictability) increases the cost of equity capital by 315 basis points (bp) when we move 
from firms with the best predictability decile to those with the worst decile. Compared 
with the results of Francis et al. (2004), this finding suggests that, especially for earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness, there are differences between IFRS and US 
GAAP in the sense of the impact of earnings quality proxies on the cost of equity capital. 
This finding is consistent with the study of Folsom et al. (2013), who find the principles-
based standards i.e., IFRS are more informative, persistent and predictive of future 
earnings and cash flows than rules-based standards i.e., US GAAP. 
Adding the financial crisis to the test, it increases the explanatory power of the models. 
However, in the period of the financial crisis, the results show a significantly larger 
impact for both earnings predictability and persistence on the cost of equity capital 
relative to the impact of accruals quality and smoothness. This indicates that, through the 
period of the financial crisis, investors paid more attention to the change in earnings rather 
than the relationship between earnings and cash flow. Also, during the period of the 
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financial crisis, the results show a larger impact for market beta on the cost of equity 
capital compared to the full sample period. This suggests that, throughout the crisis, 
investors pay more attention to the change in the whole stock market. The results indicate, 
also, that earnings quality has a larger impact on the cost of equity capital during the 
period of the crisis than before the crisis. This finding suggests that, when making 
decisions on capital allocations during the period of the financial crisis, investors pay 
more attention to the quality of accounting information. 
Regardless of the method used to disentangle the components of earnings quality to innate 
and discretionary components, the results show the effects on the cost of equity capital 
by a unit of innate earnings quality are larger in terms of both magnitude and statistical 
significance than the effects by a unit of discretionary earnings quality. In economic 
terms, the greatest impact of innate accruals quality is the increase in the cost of equity 
capital by 576 bp between the highest and lowest decile rank of innate accruals quality 
firms, whereas the impact of discretionary accruals quality is 198 bp. This finding 
indicates that investors assign to firms, with poor earnings quality due to innate 
component, a higher cost of equity capital when compared to poor earnings quality due 
to a discretionary component. 
1.6.2 Information asymmetry 
The results indicate a significantly negative association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry that is measured by the percentage quoted spread. These results 
may be interpreted as supporting the predictions of analytical models which document a 
significant association between earnings quality and information asymmetry (Lambert et 
al., 2012). Also, the results show that earnings smoothness has the largest impact on 
information asymmetry compared to other earnings quality proxies. Moreover, the results 
show a significant association between innate component of earnings quality and 
information asymmetry. However, the results indicate no significant association between 
the discretionary component of each earnings quality proxy except earnings smoothness 
and information asymmetry. The results indicate that the innate component has a larger 
effect on information asymmetry compared with the discretionary component. During the 
period of the crisis, the results indicate a stronger association between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry when compared to the period before the crisis. This suggests 
that during the period of the crisis, firms seek to provide investors with useful information 
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in order to increase the number of informed investors and, then, reduce information 
asymmetry between investors. 
1.6.3 Analysts’ information environment 
The results indicate that there are significant positive associations between analysts 
following and earnings quality proxies except in the case of earnings smoothness. There 
are significant negative associations between earnings quality proxies and the dispersion 
of analysts' forecasts. With the exception of earnings persistence and smoothness, there 
are significant positive associations between the accuracy of analysts' forecasts and 
earnings quality proxies. These results highlight the importance of earnings quality in 
improving the analysts’ information environment. Of the four earnings quality proxies, 
earnings predictability has the largest impact on the analysts’ information environment. 
These results suggest that financial analysts pay more attention to the sustainable and 
predictable earnings than the association between accruals and cash flow in making their 
decisions. 
Furthermore, the results provide evidence that the innate component has a larger impact 
on analysts’ information environment. This result indicates that the uncertainty due to 
intrinsic economic fundamental such as business environment has a larger impact on 
analysts’ information environment than the uncertainty due to management reporting 
discretion and measurement error. In this regard, the results indicate that the innate 
component of both earnings persistence and earnings smoothness has a significantly 
positive impact on analysts’ forecasts accuracy. However, the discretionary component 
of the same proxies has a significantly negative impact on the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. This finding sheds light on the impact of each component of earnings quality 
on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, and how analysts consider the discretionary 
component of earnings smoothness and persistence under IFRS. 
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter two discusses earnings quality definitions, proxies and different measures for 
each proxy. 
Chapter three discusses the definition and measures of the three aspects of the capital 
market i.e., the cost of equity capital, information asymmetry and analysts’ information 
environment. 
Chapter four discusses the research philosophy followed by the theoretical framework 
which is used to explain the association between earnings quality and the three aspects of 
capital market. 
Chapter five reviews previous studies that investigate the association between earnings 
quality and the considered three aspects of the capital market. It presents, also, a selected 
review of the literature on the differences between IFRS and US GAAP regarding the 
proxies of earnings quality. 
Chapter six outlines the research hypotheses of the study and explains the research 
methodology used to test these hypotheses empirically. 
Chapter seven reports the empirical results of the association between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity capital. It presents a univariate and multivariate analyses and a 
number of sensitivity analyses.  
Chapter eight reports the empirical results of the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry. It presents a univariate and multivariate analyses and a number 
of sensitivity analyses.  
Chapter nine reports the empirical results of the association between earnings quality and 
analysts’ information environment. It presents a univariate and multivariate analyses of 
the three proxies of analysts’ information environment: analysts following, analysts’ 
forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts accuracy. In addition, it also presents a 
number of sensitivity tests.  
Chapter ten concludes the study, presents the main conclusion of the research and 
identifies its limitations and areas of future research.  
18 
 
1.8 Summary 
With particular regard to the UK market after the 2005 adoption of IFRS, this thesis aims 
to investigate the association between earnings quality and three aspects of the capital 
market: the cost of equity capital; information asymmetry; and analysts’ information 
environment. In order to achieve the main objective, the researcher uses both the capital 
need and decision usefulness theories under the functionalist paradigm. 
This chapter provided an overview of research topic of this thesis by providing a general 
background, followed by the research motivation, research objectives and a summary of 
the research philosophy and methodology. Then, the chapter outlined the research 
contributions, and summarised the empirical results. Finally, it outlined the structure of 
the remaining chapters in this thesis. The next chapter discusses earnings quality. 
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Chapter 2:  Earnings Quality 
2.1 Introduction 
Earnings quality in the capital market is of interest to those who participate in any step in 
the process whereby information is created, distributed and used for the purposes of 
capital allocation (Francis et al., 2006). This chapter discusses definitions of earnings 
quality, as the concept of earnings quality remains rather vague and there is no consensus 
on it proxies in previous studies. This chapter also discusses the different measures for 
each proxy in an equity valuation context, as earnings quality as a construct is not the 
same as its proxies and measurement.  
2.2 Earnings Quality Definitions 
A definition of earnings quality could begin with earnings management, which arises 
when judgment in financial reporting is used by managers to adjust financial reports to 
either affect contractual outcomes that rely on reported accounting numbers or to deceive 
number of stakeholders about the fundamental economic performance of a firm 
(Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz et al., 2003). A broader definition is that 
of Walker (2013, p.446) who defines earnings management as “The use of managerial 
discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, earnings reporting choices, and real 
economic decisions to influence how underlying economic events are reflected in one or 
more measures of earnings”. It is clear that earnings management is related to earnings 
quality. That is, one may argue that higher earnings management have lower earnings 
quality. Yet, the lack of earnings management is insufficient to guarantee higher earnings 
quality, as there are certain other factors that might affect the quality of earnings. For 
instance, it could be argued that accountants who follow a poor set of accounting 
standards may produce a lower quality of financial reports. Therefore, taking these other 
contributing factors into consideration will help in drawing a strong connection between 
earnings quality and earnings management (Lo, 2008).  
Earnings quality is considered to be an important feature of the financial reporting system. 
Therefore, high quality financial information is intended in this context to help users (i.e. 
investors, creditors and analysts) to make useful decisions and judgments, thus 
developing the efficiency of the capital market (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2012b). This 
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view derives from the notion that use of accounting information in the capital market is 
fundamental. 
While previous studies consider earnings quality as an important element of firms’ 
financial reporting, surprisingly, the concept of earnings quality remains rather vague and 
there is no consensus on it, regardless of numerous attempts to make it more precise and 
to deliver a theoretical foundation. In particular, the main reason for this problem is that 
the definition of quality may differ according to the perspective of differing groups e.g., 
investors, auditors, analysts, creditors or standard setters (Francis et al., 2004; Francis et 
al., 2006; Dechow et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013; Nelson and Skinner, 
2013; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). This thesis focuses mainly on the view of investors 
and analysts in understanding earnings quality, as their decision and opinions are 
important for the efficiency of capital market (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2012b). The 
researcher classifies the different definitions of earnings quality in an equity valuation 
context into three groups; the first group emphasises the association between earnings 
quality and performance. For example, Dechow et al. (2010, p.344) define earnings 
quality as introducing more information about the performance features of a firm that are 
related to a definite decision made by a specific decision maker. According to Dechow et 
al. (2010), this definition has three characteristics. First, there should be a relationship 
between earnings quality and decision-relevance of the information as the term “earnings 
quality” alone is meaningless; the definition of earnings quality depend on the type of 
decision model. Secondly, the quality of earnings numbers that reported to users relies on 
whether they are informative about the firm’s financial performance. Thirdly, earnings 
quality relies on the capability of the accounting information system to measure the 
performance of a firm accurately (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Instead, explicitly limiting relevant decision to decisions about or involving the 
assessment of current and future performance and firm values, Dechow and Schrand 
(2004, p.5) define high earnings quality as "when the earnings number accurately 
annuitizes the intrinsic value of the firm." They then determine the requirements for high 
quality of earnings as being that they (1) reflect accurately the firm’s current performance, 
(2) are useful predictor of future performance and (3) provide a good indicator for firm 
value evaluation.  
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The second group emphasises the association between earnings quality and future 
operating cash flow. For example, Cohen (2003) defines earnings quality in terms of a 
high association between current earnings and future operating cash flow. Similarly,  
Mikhail et al. (2003, p. 124) define earnings quality as “the amount of variation in future 
cash flows explained by prior earnings (or earnings components)”. Further, Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2012a) define earnings quality as the reduction of the market’s uncertainty 
related to cash flow due to the earnings reported in the current year. 
The third group considers decision usefulness with a narrower set of decisions and instead 
focuses explicitly upon the maintenance of capital, and deduces the definition of earnings 
quality from the theory of economic income. For example, Schipper and Vincent (2003, 
p.98) define earnings quality as “the extent to which reported earnings faithfully represent 
Hicksian income”. According to the IASB Conceptual Framework, faithful representation 
is considered as the second fundamental qualitative characteristic of useful financial 
information to the users. It also determines three sub-characteristics for a perfect faithful 
representation: to be neutral, complete and free from error (IFRS Foundation, 2010). In 
particular, users should feel confident that information represents what it is supposed to 
represent. The objective of the IASB is to maximise these qualities to as great an extent 
as possible. Hicksian income is defined as “the amount that can be consumed (that is, 
paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off from the 
beginning to the end of the period” (Hicks, 1939, p. 176).  
The focus on decision usefulness arises for two reasons. First, there is the IASB 
Conceptual Framework, which identified six "qualitative characteristics" of useful 
financial information. These characteristics show the types of information that are 
possibly most useful to the primary users of financial reports. Two of the qualitative 
characteristics, relevance and faithful representation, are specified as "fundamental 
characteristics". Information is relevant if knowing a given piece of information would 
contribute to differential decision making. High quality information that is relevant 
should help in predicting a future outcome. The remaining four qualitative characteristics 
are described as "enhancing", since they further improve the usefulness of financial 
information that is already relevant and faithfully represented. The enhancing 
characteristics are: comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability (IFRS 
Foundation, 2010; Iatridis, 2011). The second reason is that decision usefulness is 
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commonly used and empirically tractable in accounting research (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003). 
Along with the focus on decision usefulness, which is adopted by the IASB and by various 
academic literature, earnings quality and, more broadly, financial reporting quality are 
important to those who use financial reports for both investment decision making and for 
contracting purposes; thus, the standard setters cite the quality of financial reports as an 
indirect indicator of the financial reporting standards quality (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003; Francis et al., 2006; Dichev et al., 2013). 
To sum up, high earnings quality should have four characteristics: it should, first, 
faithfully represent current performance; second, be an indicator for future earnings and 
performance; third, have a relationship with future operating cash flow, and; fourth, help 
users to make useful decisions. 
2.3 Earning Quality Proxies 
Earnings quality is a multidimensional concept. According to previous studies, no proxy 
is superior for all decision models (Dechow et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013; Singleton-
Green, 2014). Therefore, the choice of any earnings quality proxy depends on certain 
determinants such as research question, data availability and the estimation model 
(Francis et al., 2006). Some research questions in previous studies call for a proxy of 
earnings quality that is associated with investors’ perceptions of earnings. For example, 
research that investigates the value relevance of earnings presumes earnings is useful to 
a particular participant in the market (i.e. investors) whose aggregate judgments and 
decisions are summarised by stock prices and returns. Alternatively, other research 
questions focus only on direct proxies of earnings quality depending on accounting data 
(i.e., without reference to stock prices or returns) such as accruals quality. More narrowly, 
they may test the association between earnings and cash flow. In addition, there other  
research questions focus on the differences among total, innate and discretionary 
components of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2006).    
Previous studies have investigated a number of proxies of earnings quality. These proxies 
can be categorised as either accounting-based, which typically depend on accounting 
information only, or market-based, typically depending on both accounting and market 
data (Francis et al., 2004). In addition, Francis et al. (2006) note that the difference 
between accounting and market-based proxies lies in reference constructs. In particular, 
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accounting-based proxies assume that the functions of earnings is to assign cash flows to 
reporting periods via accruals, whereas the market-based proxies assume that the function 
of earnings is to reflect economic income as shown by stock returns.  
Focusing on the accounting-based characteristics, Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et 
al. (2005) investigate accruals quality by using the mapping between cash flows, earnings 
and accruals. Penman and Zhang (2002) and Richardson et al. (2005) focus on persistence 
of earnings over time. Lipe (1990) uses predictability of future earnings as a reflection of 
earnings quality, while Leuz et al. (2003) investigate the smoothness proxy as a time 
series property of earnings. Turning to market-based proxies, Collins et al. (1997) and 
Francis and Schipper (1999) use the value relevance of earnings. Other market-based 
proxies such as timeliness and conservatism have also been investigated (e.g., Basu, 1997; 
Watts, 2003a; Bushman et al., 2004; Bushman et al., 2011).  
2.3.1 Accruals quality 
The characteristics of decision usefulness such as relevance and faithful representation 
have been captured in the literature through modelling the association among accruals, 
cash flows and earnings. Generally, proxies employ a firm-specific time series, a cross-
sectional industry accrual or cash flow estimation process to model earnings quality (e.g., 
Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005). Accruals are the 
difference between earnings and cash flows, so one of the primary functions of accruals 
is to adjust the recognition of cash flow through periods. In this case, the use of adjusted 
earnings may be a good measure for a firm's performance. Therefore, accruals quality is 
defined as “the extent to which working capital accruals map into cash flow realisations, 
where a poor match signifies low accruals quality” (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, p.36). 
This view of accruals quality is operationalised as the standard deviation of the residuals 
from regressing firm working capital accruals on three types of cash flow from operations: 
preceding, current, and following year of that firm (Dechow and Dichev, 2002).  
Previous studies introduce different models to measure accruals quality. Table 2-1 
summarises the accruals models that have been widely used in the literature. The 
objective of any model is to determine abnormal accruals that represent a distortion. There 
are two types of error when the models measure abnormal accruals. The first type of error 
(or the Type I error) is known as a misclassification error, and occurs when the accruals 
model classifies accruals as abnormal but represents the main performance (normal 
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accruals). The second error (or the Type II error) occurs when the accruals model 
classifies accruals as normal when they are not (Dechow et al., 2010). The researcher 
evaluates each model to determine its capability to detect individually the normal and 
abnormal portions of accruals and alleviate Type I and Type II errors. 
Jones (1991) model explains the variation in accruals (working capital accruals and 
depreciation) as a function of sales growth and property, plant and equipment (PPE). 
Although both these variables of sales growth and PPE are related to firm performance, 
and Jones model proves a correlation among these two variables and accruals, the 
explanatory power of this model is only around 10%, which is considered a low rate to 
explain the variation in accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). One of the assumptions used to 
explain the low explanatory power of the model is discretionary accruals, which appear 
in the residuals of the model, and which managers could use as a veil for fundamental 
performance. In line with this assumption, Dechow and Schrand (2004) document a high 
positive correlation between the residuals and total accruals. Further, Dechow et al. 
(1995) find a negative correlation between residuals and cash flow performance and 
positive correlation between residuals and earnings performance. Nevertheless, Xie 
(2001) finds a lower predictive ability of the residuals than the normal accruals for next-
year earnings. These findings suggest a high Type I error for  Jones (1991). Other studies 
also confirm that Jones (1991) suffers from Type II error (Dechow et al., 2011). The Jones 
(1991) model is shown below: 
 
ܶܣ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ ൌ 	ߙ ቆ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵቇ ൅ ߚଵሺ
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵሻ
൅ ߚଶሺ ܲܲܧ௝,௧ܣݏݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௝,௧
Equation (2-1) 
Where: 
ܶܣ௝,௧         = total accruals of a firm in the current year are calculated as: 
 ܶܣ௝,௧ ൌ ൫∆ܥܣ௝,௧ െ ∆ܥܽݏ ௝݄,௧൯ െ ሺ∆ܥܮ௝,௧ െ ∆ܵܶܦܾ݁ݐ௝,௧ሻ	  
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ= total assets of a firm in the preceding year. 
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧      = change in revenues of a firm between current and preceding years. 
ܲܲܧ௝,௧        = gross value of property, plant and equipment of a firm in current year. 
∆ܥܣ           = changes in current assets of a firm. 
∆ܥܽݏ݄       = changes in cash and cash equivalent of a firm. 
∆ܥܮ           = changes in current liabilities of a firm. 
∆ܵܶܦܾ݁ݐ   = changes in short-term debt of a firm. 
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Dechow et al. (1995) attempt to reduce the Type II error that appears with the Jones model 
by modifying the model through the adjustment of sales growth to be growth in credit 
sales, as they argue that credit sales are often manipulated. This adjustment increases the 
explanatory power of the model and reduces Type II error. However, Dechow et al. (1995) 
model still suffers from a Type I error, to an even greater extent than the original Jones 
model5 (Dechow et al., 2010). Another weakness of the Dechow et al. (1995) model is 
arguably related to the limitation of observations that should be sufficiently large to obtain 
valid coefficient estimates; however, this problem can be solved by estimating the model 
cross-sectionally (Ahrens, 2009). The Dechow et al. (1995) model is set out below: 
 
ܶܣ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ ൌ 	ܭଵ ቆ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵቇ ൅ ܭଶ
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ
൅ ܭଷ ܲܲܧ௝,௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௝,௧
Equation (2-2) 
The Dechow et al. (1995) model has two steps: first, they run the above equation each 
year by industry, and estimate the industry-and-year-specific coefficients (ܭଵ, ܭଶ, ܭଷ) to 
estimate firm-specific normal accruals (i.e. Non-discretionary accruals, NA) as a 
percentage of lagged total assets in the below equation, then they calculate the abnormal 
accruals (AA) in year t, using this equation ܣܣ௝,௧ ൌ ܶܣ௝,௧ ܣݏݏ݁ݐ௝,௧ିଵ⁄ െ ܰܣ௝,௧., ܣܳ௝,௧ ൌ
หܣܣ௝,௧ห, with larger values of หܣܣ௝,௧ห indicating poorer accruals quality. 
 
ܰܣ௝,௧ ൌ 	ܭ෡ଵ ቆ 1ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵቇ ൅ ܭ
෡ଶ ሺ∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧ െ ∆ܣ ௝ܴ,௧ሻܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ
൅ ܭ෡ଷ ܲܲܧ௝,௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ
Equation (2-3) 
Where:	∆ܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = change in Accounts Receivable between year t-1 and year t for a firm.  
Kothari et al. (2005) try to solve the problems that related to both the Jones and modified 
Jones models by countering the concerns of the high correlations between the residuals 
and performance in both models. They add return on assets (ROA) to the Jones model to 
control the normal level of accruals conditioning to ROA. In particular, they identify a 
                                                 
5 The Dechow et al. (1995) model suffers from classifying accruals as abnormal while representing normal 
accruals. 
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firm in the same industry which has a similar rate of ROA to the sample firm and then 
subtract the residuals of that firm (i.e., discretionary accruals) from those of the sample 
firm to produce ‘‘performance-matched’’ residuals (Dechow et al., 2010). However, it is 
better to use this model if correlated performance is an important issue as it is likely to 
add noise to the measure of discretionary accruals. Moreover, if the earnings are being 
managed, this model will extract too much discretion, resulting in low power tests 
(Dechow et al., 2010). In fact, the performance-matching procedure normally gives better 
results than adding ROA as an additional variable (Ahrens, 2009). Kothari et al. (2005) 
model is given below: 
 
ܶܣ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ቆ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵቇ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚଶ ܲܲܧ௝,௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܴܱܣ௧	ሺ௢௥	௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	
Equation (2-4) 
Where: 
ܴܱܣ௧	ሺ௢௥	௧ିଵሻ	    = Return on assets of a firm in current year (or preceding year). 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) assert that the association between accruals and cash flows is 
important. They focus on short-term working capital accruals and omit modelling the 
association between long-term accruals and cash flows. They regress working capital 
accruals on current, previous, and future cash flows, as accruals predicts payments or 
collections of future cash and reverse when cash previously recognised in accruals is paid 
or collected (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). “The explanation powers of this model are 
higher than the other modified jones model; 47% at the firm level, 34% at the industry 
level, and 29% at the pooled level” (Dechow et al., 2010, p. 359). They consider the 
standard deviation of the residuals of this model as a proxy of accruals (earnings) quality. 
They conclude that firms with larger standard deviations have lower accruals (earnings) 
quality, longer operating cycles and more volatile earnings, accruals and cash flows, 
compared to firms with a smaller standard deviation (Dechow et al., 2010). However, this 
model suffers from an important limitation, which is that it cannot determine the 
accounting distortions that occur by long-term accruals (e.g., impairments of PPE and 
goodwill) which could be particularly important to evaluate the earnings quality 
(measurement error) (Dechow et al., 2010). The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is 
shown below: 
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 ∆ܹܥ௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܨܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܨܱ௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܨܱ௧ାଵ ൅ ߝ௧ Equation (2-5) 
Where: 
∆ܹܥ௧= the changes in working capital of a firm between current year and preceding year. ܥܨܱ௧= cash flow from operation of a firm in current year. 
McNichols (2002) documents many limitations of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
First, she points out that the model does not distinguish whether the estimation errors 
happen because of low management experience, high variability in a firm's business 
environment, or intentional earnings management. Second, they assume that the errors 
are uncorrelated to each other and to cash flows. However, previous studies suggest that 
estimation errors are not independent from cash flows or from each other. Third, 
regarding firms that have longer operating cycles, the elements that constitute earnings 
quality do not have to be included in current accruals. Finally, she concludes that the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model may contain measurement errors and may also ignore 
some important aspects, for example, acquisitions or mergers (McNichols, 2002). 
However, McNichols (2002) attempts to solve some of the limitations of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model by proposing a hybrid model after adding the changes in sales 
revenue and PPE to the old model. She argues that adding these variables is important to 
establish expectations of current accruals, over and above the effects of cash flow from 
operation. The results show that the explanatory power of the suggested model is 
increased significantly after adding both variables, thus reducing the measurement error. 
The McNichols model is shown below: 
 
ܶܥܣ௝.௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௝ ൅ ߚଵ,௝
ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ିଵ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶ,௝
ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧
൅ ߚଷ,௝ ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ାଵܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚସ,௝
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚହ,௝
ܲܲܧ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧
൅ ݒ௝,௧ 
Equation (2-6) 
Where: 
 ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧= average total assets of a firm at time t and t-1. 
ܣܳ௝ ൌ 	ߪ	ሺݒො௝,௧ሻ. ܣܳ௝ is the standard deviation of a firm’s residuals, which a large standard 
deviations indicates poor accruals quality. 
Francis et al. (2005) develop the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in two ways. Firstly, 
they follow the suggestion of McNichols (2002) by adding two variables to the model, 
which are sales growth, that reflect performance, and PPE, to add the effect of deprecation 
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to the model, which helps expanding the model to a broader measure of accruals. 
Nevertheless, Francis et al. (2005) do not investigate the impact of these modification on 
decreasing  Type I or Type II. Secondly, they extend the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model by disentangling the standard deviation of the residual (accruals quality) at firm 
level into an innate component that reflects business models and environmental 
development and a discretionary component that reflects the managerial choices (Dechow 
et al., 2010).  
In detail, Francis et al. (2005) regress the accruals model cross-sectionally by industry, 
then compute the standard deviation of the residuals for each firm in year t ൣߪሺݒ௝ሻ௧൧ by 
using the values of the residuals in five years, from year t-4 to year t. The standard 
deviation of the residuals ߪሺݒ௝ሻ௧ represents the accrual quality (AQ), large standard 
deviations of residuals indicating poor accruals quality. The using of industry 
specification assumes that the residual is the same within the industry. Accordingly, 
number of firms might have large residuals due to the variation caused by the 
classification of industry instead of earnings management or errors (Dechow et al., 2010). 
There are two concepts included in this model. The first is the use of operating cash flow 
as a reference construct, meaning that large (small) residuals leads to poor (high) accruals 
quality, due to less (greater) precision in relation to the mapping of current accruals to 
previous, current, and subsequent periods of cash flow. Second, the variability of the 
residuals rather than their magnitude drives the proxy (Francis et al., 2005; Francis et al., 
2006; Gray et al., 2009). This concept implied that systematically large (small) residuals 
in a regression of accruals on cash flows do not create a problem of inference for 
investors, in terms of the ability to predict future earnings, as it is possible to identify and 
adjust the systematic component of the residual. It is conceivable that the standard 
deviation of a series of systematically large positive residuals could be low, signifying 
that there is only a slight inference problem. Hence, the quality of accruals supports the 
view that high-mean, low-variance firms have good quality of earnings (Francis et al., 
2006). 
One limitation of this model is that it uses a comparatively small part of total accruals i.e., 
current accruals, and does not contain the impact of larger, more numerous and arguably 
more complicated accruals, such as pensions, asset retirement obligations, and deferred 
tax assets and liabilities (Francis et al., 2006). However, according to Ecker et al. (2006), 
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estimates of the quality of  non-current accruals have a significant positive correlation 
with estimates of the quality of current accruals. This suggests that current accruals proxy, 
being easier to compute and less data intensive, may be a suitable proxy than the proxy 
of total accruals quality, which although more difficult to operationalize, and which 
comprises both current accruals and non-current accruals. 
Table 2-1: Summary of widely used accruals quality models 
Accrual Model Measurement Notes 
Jones (1991) 
model 
Accruals are a function of sales growth 
and PPE. Total assets deflate all 
variables in preceding year. 
The model suffers from Type I and 
Type II errors. 
Dechow et al. 
(1995) 
Adjusts the Jones model by adding credit 
sales instead of total sales. 
Adds some improvement to 
explanatory power of the Jones 
model and reduces Type II error; 
however, the model still suffers 
from Type I error. 
Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
Uses ROA to match firm-year 
observation with another firm from the 
same year and industry.  
It is preferred to use when 
performance is an issue; however, 
it can decrease the power of the 
test. 
Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) 
Accruals are modelled as a function of 
three types of cash flow from operations: 
past, present, and future year.  
It focuses only on short-term and 
does not address errors in long- 
term accruals. 
McNichols (2002) 
Modifies the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model by adding changing in growth in 
sales and PPE. 
The model offers some 
improvement to the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model. 
Francis et al. 
(2005) 
Estimates the accruals model by 
industry-year. 
The accruals model is decomposed into 
two main components: an innate and a 
discretionary components.  
The model does not capture the 
effects of non-current accruals on 
cash flow from operations. 
Innate estimation errors are the 
predicted component from 
regression. 
Source: Dechow et al. (2010) 
2.3.2 Innate and discretionary components of earnings quality 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) isolate earnings quality into two 
components, an innate component, which reflects business models and operating 
environments, and a discretionary component of earnings quality, which reflects the 
reporting determinants such as accounting choices, implementation decisions, managerial 
error, auditing, governance and enforcement. They hold that separating innate from 
discretionary components has some advantages over the nature of innate determinates, as 
these are presumed to be relatively slow to change. Hence, they show the innate factors 
as predetermined at any given reporting date, although likely to be modified over time. 
They leave indeterminate the time period over which the business model and operating 
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environment can change, as they recognise that some changes can be abrupt (e.g., 
securitising receivables, exiting a line of business), whereas, other factors can change 
gradually (e.g., building a brand, entering a line of business other than through the 
acquisition of an existing business) (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005; 
Francis et al., 2006). 
Empirical studies identify two approaches to isolate innate and discretionary earnings 
quality. Under the first approach, they regress the total earnings quality proxy, which 
includes both innate and discretionary components, on innate factors that they believe it 
describes the business model and operating environment of  firms: for example, firm size, 
standard deviation of both cash flows and sales, operating cycle length, and frequency of 
loss (Francis et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2006). Equation (2-7) describes the first approach.  
 
ߪሺߝ௝ሻ௧ ൌ ߙ௝ ൅ ߚଵ,௝ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߚଶ,௝ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷ,௝ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௝,௧
൅ ߚସ,௝ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௝,௧ ൅ ߚହ,௝ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௝,௧ ൅ ݒ௝,௧ Equation (2-7) 
Where:  
ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௝,௧ is the standard deviation of cash flow from the operation of a firm, 
ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௝,௧ is the standard deviation of the sales of a firm,  
ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௝,௧ is the log of operating cycle, which is calculated as the sum of the days 
accounts receivable and days inventory of a firm,  
ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௝,௧ is the number of years in which a firm reported net income before 
extraordinary items (NIBE) < 0 out of the preceding 10 years.  
The predicted value of ߪሺߝ௝ሻ௧ indicates the innate portion of accruals quality of a firm, as 
it reflects the quality of the earnings system to capture the fundamental performance of a 
firm, and the residual ሺݒ௝,௧ሻ indicates the discretionary accrual quality. 
ܫ݊݊ܽݐ݁ܧܳ௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௝ ൅ ߚଵ,௝ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߚଶ,௝ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷ,௝ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௝,௧
൅ ߚସ,௝ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௝,௧ ൅ ߚହ,௝ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௝,௧ 
Equation 
(2-8) 
It should be noted that the first approach may suffer from type I error because the innate 
factors might reflect estimation errors which leads to decreasing the power of the residual 
to reflect intention. Also, this approach may suffer from type II error because it could lead 
to bias (in an unknown direction) in the discretion proxy (Dechow et al., 2010).  
Moving to the second approach, the innate factors are added as control variables to the 
main regression model in which the total earnings quality is added as dependent variable 
in that model. In the model, the predicted coefficient of earnings quality captures the part 
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of earnings quality that is associated with the test variable and adds gradually to the effects 
captured by the innate factors. This is known as the discretionary portion. For instance, if 
a researcher wishes to know the selection deprecation methods is associated with poorer 
or better earnings quality, this association can be tested by using the following equation: 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܧܳ௝ ൌ 	ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܦ݁݌݊ܯ݁ݐ݄݋݀௝ ൅ ߛ௞ܫ݊݊ܽݐ݁ሺܭሻ௝ ൅ ݒ௝ Equation (2-9) 
Where ܦ݁݌݊ܯ݁ݐ݄݋݀௝=1 if a firm uses straight line depreciation and 0 otherwise, 
ܫ݊݊ܽݐ݁ሺܭሻ௝= vector of innate factors for a firm. 
γଵ ൐ 0	ሺγଵ ൏ 0ሻ suggests that the straight-line depreciation is associated with poor (high) 
earnings quality, after controlling for the innate component of earnings quality. if it 
assumed that all innate factors have been included in	ܫ݊݊ܽݐ݁ሺܭሻ௝, a significant value for 
γଵ indicates the effect of the selection of depreciation method on the discretionary 
component of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2006). 
Another application of the second approach replaces ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܧܳ with a dependent variable 
that captures an outcome of interest, such as the cost of equity capital. In this case, the 
independent variables would include ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܧܳ and the innate factors, and the estimated 
coefficient on ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܧܳ would capture the effect of discretionary earnings quality on the 
dependent variable (Francis et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2006). 
The two approaches used to isolate earnings quality to innate and discretionary 
components are not alternatives, as only the first approach permits direct comparisons 
between the effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality. This is because it gives 
separate estimates of these components, while the second approach does not give a 
separate estimate of the discretionary impact by controlling for the innate effect (Francis 
et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2006). 
Moreover, these two approaches are not the same in terms of their sensitivity to omitted 
innate factors. In the first approach, omitted innate factors result in the misspecification 
model in the regression of total earnings quality on innate factors, as well as more noise 
in the error term. In the second approach, if a dependent variable of interest is regressed 
on TotalEQ and an incomplete set of innate factors, this would result in an upwardly 
biased coefficient estimate on TotalEQ (i.e., an upwardly biased estimate of the effect of 
discretionary earnings quality) to the extent that the omitted innate factors had a positive 
correlation with InnateEQ factors (Francis et al., 2006). 
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This reflection suggests that researchers may wish to use both approaches, if this is 
practical as it would be expected that the first approach would achieve a lower bound 
inference about the effects of discretionary earnings quality, while the second would be 
expected to achieve an upper bound inference (Francis et al., 2006).  
2.3.3 Earnings persistence and predictability 
Earnings persistence and earnings predictability represent the time series proxies of 
earnings quality in the previous literature (Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). Persistence 
refers to the earnings sustainability (Revsine et al., 2005). Also, Miller and Rock (1985) 
define persistence as the present value of the change in expected future earnings because 
of current unexpected earnings. In general, previous studies define earnings persistence 
from a perspective of decision usefulness to help investors in equity valuation by 
measuring the extent to which current earnings persist or recur in the future (Perotti and 
Wagenhofer, 2014). There are two general streams of this research. The first stream 
focuses on the assumption that greater earnings persistence may lead to better inputs to 
equity valuation models; thus, higher earnings quality than does a lower earnings 
persistence (Dechow et al., 2010). The target of these studies is to determine financial 
characteristics related to earnings persistence.  
The second stream of research focuses on addressing the wider case of using earnings to 
improve equity valuation outcomes (Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, the earnings 
amount that reflects the annuity of anticipated future cash flows is possibly be persistent 
and predictable (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Thus, earnings are viewed to be of high 
quality if they are more persistent (sustainable) and predictable (Revsine et al., 2005; 
Penman and Zhang, 2002; Richardson, 2003; Lipe, 1990).  
Moving to predictability, the IASB Conceptual Framework identifies useful information 
as having "predictive value" if it can help users to predict future outcomes (e.g. future 
financial performance) (IFRS Foundation, 2010). In order to have predictive value, 
information does not have to take the form of an explicit forecast, since information on 
past transactions or events may be used as a basis for predications about the future 
(Melville, 2008). Consistent with the Conceptual Framework of the IASB, the academic 
literature uses earnings predictability as metric to measure the capability of current 
earnings and its components of a firm to predict the future earnings. For example, 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) define predictability as the capacity of the entire financial 
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reporting system, including earnings components and other disaggregation of the 
summary earnings number, to enhance the ability of users to forecast the items of their 
interest e.g., future earnings. Therefore, predictive ability captures the relevance of 
earnings in decision-making. Lipe (1990, p. 50) defines predictability as “the ability of 
past earnings to predict future earnings.”  
The difference between earnings persistence and earnings predictability is summed up as 
earnings persistence as reflecting the autocorrelation in earnings; however, earnings 
predictability as a function of the average absolute proportion of  shocks of annual 
earnings (Lipe, 1990). To calculate both of them, Francis et al. (2004) measure earning 
persistence as the slope coefficient from regressing current earnings on preceding 
earnings, while Lipe (1990) measures earnings predictability as the variance of estimating 
residuals from the persistence equation model as proxy of the variance of earnings shocks. 
Earnings persistence and predictability equations are shown below: 
 ܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧ ൌ ∅଴,௝ ൅ ∅ଵ,௝ ܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧ିଵ ൅ ݒ௝,௧ Equation (2-10) 
Where: 
ܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧     = net income before extraordinary items of a firm in current year. 
ܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧ିଵ = net income before extraordinary items of a firm in preceding year. 
 ܲݎ݁ ௝݀,௧ ൌ ටߪଶሺݒො௝,௧ሻ Equation (2-11) 
Where: 
Pred୨,୲= earnings predictability in the current year of a firm. 
σଶሺvො୨,୲ሻ= Estimated error variance of a firm in the current year, calculated from earnings 
persistence equation of such firm. 
2.3.4 Earnings smoothness 
Earnings smoothness represents the variability of earnings compared to the variability of 
cash flows (Francis et al., 2004). Previous studies suggest a measure for earnings 
smoothness that derives from the association between cash flow variability, which is 
driven by underlying business fundamentals, and earnings variability, which is driven by 
both business fundamentals and management choices (Leuz et al., 2003; Francis et al., 
2004). The reason behind the use of variability for both variables is that it is considered 
to be a risk measure; thus, investors search for gradually growing earnings with low 
volatility, as their expected return in this case will be positive. This earnings pattern is 
known as earnings smoothness.  
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Earnings smoothness has been defined as the volatility reduction of reported earnings that 
could exist in the absence of certain actions (Allayannis and Simko, 2009). These actions 
take two forms. The first is taking a real strategic business decisions, for example, exiting 
a business line, effecting product demand through changing the price or cutting costs, 
while the second is the use of accounting discretion to smooth earnings (Allayannis and 
Simko, 2009; Roychowdhury, 2006; Rountree et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2005). 
Previous studies document conflicting results in terms of earnings smoothness (Dichev et 
al., 2013; Dechow et al., 2010). Some of those conclude that smoothness misleads users, 
as the true economic performance is veiled; thus, smoothness indicates poor earnings 
quality (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). They argue that earnings smoothness reflects the extent 
to which financial accounting standards permit managers to artificially reduce earnings 
variability, to obtain certain benefits from the capital market, which are that related to a 
smooth stream of earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). According to this view, high earnings 
smoothness would indicate poorer earnings quality. This view is based on evidence that 
earnings smoothness is associated with predicted factors of low earnings quality, e.g., low 
quality of financial reporting standards and less rigid enforcement regimes. 
On the contrary, in the US context, other studies conclude that smoothness improves both 
persistence and predictability, thus leading to more informative earnings, and hence it 
could be useful to investors for its predictive value, which is considered to be high 
earnings quality (e.g., Barnea et al., 1976; Dechow, 1994; Graham et al., 2005; Tucker 
and Zarowin, 2006; Dichev and Tang, 2008). This alternative view begins with the 
opinion that the purpose of accounting is to determine earnings, which are accounting 
accruals plus operating cash flows, and that the purpose of accruals is to smooth cash 
flows by filtering out some of their volatility (Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). Earnings 
smoothness as an indicator of high earnings quality reflects the idea that managers use 
their private information about future earnings to smooth out transitory fluctuations and 
thereby obtain a more representative (normalised) reported earnings number. To the 
extent that current earnings which are more representative of future earnings are of higher 
quality, smoother earnings indicate higher quality earnings. Results reported by Francis 
et al. (2004) suggest that capital market participants reward smoothing earnings streams 
with reduced costs of equity capital. This finding is consistent with a notion that earnings 
smoothness is desirable (at least for investors) because it reflects higher quality financial 
reporting decisions (Rountree et al., 2008). However, results in Francis et al. (2004) 
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cannot rule out the possibility that investors reward earnings smoothness for reasons 
unrelated to earnings quality (Francis et al., 2006). 
Ahrens (2009) documents a solution for this problem by splitting earnings smoothness 
into two portions. The first portion is natural smoothness, which happens naturally as the 
result of certain production processes on earnings streams, which is considered to be a 
positive signal, as it will be easy to forecast future earnings from previous values, 
meaning high earnings quality. The second portion is intentional smoothness, which 
happens when some firms smooth earnings intentionally to benefit from the advantages 
of such an earnings stream (Eckel, 1981). This may occur in two situations. First, it could 
happen when explanations are given by the management regarding taking actions to 
report smooth earnings, which may happen because they have private information, when 
intentional smoothness might be beneficial (Nelson and Skinner, 2013). Second, it could 
occur when the management wishes to achieve private benefits, and therefore carry out 
smoothing actions without informing the investors. In this case, smoothness might 
mislead stakeholders because the earnings amount will not reflect the real earnings. 
Smoothness has been measured in different ways in the literature, all of which are likely 
to be highly correlated, and also use cash flow as the reference construct for unsmoothed 
earnings, and thereby assuming that cash flows are not subject to earnings management: 
(1) the ratio of firm-level standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items, to 
its standard deviation of operating cash flow, and both deflated by lagged total assets (see 
Equation (2-12)) (Francis et al., 2004); (2) the ratio of firm-level standard deviation of 
operating income, to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, and both 
lagged by total assets (Leuz et al., 2003); (3) the ratio of firm-level standard deviation of 
non-discretionary net income (equal to operating cash flows plus  NA) to the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations (Hunt et al., 2000).  
 ܵ݉݋݋ݐ ௝݄,௧ ൌ
ߪሺܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧/ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵሻ
ߪሺܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧/ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵሻ  Equation (2-12) 
Where: 
ܵ݉݋݋ݐ ௝݄,௧ = earnings smoothness of a firm in current year. 
ߪሺܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧ሻ = standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items of a firm in 
current year. 
ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧  = operating cash flows of a firm in current year. 
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2.3.5 Value relevance 
Value relevance proxy is based on the idea that accounting numbers should explain the 
information that related to stock returns. Together with Ball and Brown (1968), many 
researchers use the approach of usefulness of accounting information to investigate the 
contemporaneous relationship between accounting earnings and stock return. This 
approach is used to evaluate the capability of accounting earnings to interpret stock 
returns in order to measure the relevance of accounting information. Hence, if the 
accounting information presented to investors is significant, then the explanatory power 
of accounting earnings should exhibit a high rate for stock returns (Lev, 1989). Previous 
studies measure value relevance by the explanatory power (R2) of regressing accounting 
earnings on stock returns to investigate the usefulness of financial reporting (Lev and 
Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Francis et al., 2004). In particular, value 
relevance is measured by the adjusted R2 from the following regression: 
 ܴܧ ௝ܶ,௧ ൌ 	 ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵܧܣܴ ௝ܰ,௧ ൅ ߜଶ∆ܧܣܴ ௝ܰ,௧ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	 Equation (2-13) 
Where: 
RET୨,୲ = stock return in of a firm in current year; 
EARN୨,୲ = net income before extraordinary items of a firm in current year t, deflated by 
market value of equity at the end of preceding year of such firm;  
∆EARN୨,୲= change in net income before extraordinary items between current year and 
preceding year, deflated by market value of equity at the end of preceding year of such 
firm. 
2.3.6 Conservatism and timeliness 
Timeliness is similar to value relevance, in sense of the reference construct for both of 
them, which is stock returns, and the measure itself being based on explanatory power 
(R2). Timeliness is defined as the time in which the economic condition of a firm, whether 
good or bad, is reflected in the reported earnings, and is measured as the explanatory 
power of a reverse regression of earnings on returns (Francis et al., 2006). The use of 
timeliness as a measure of earnings quality is based on the same assumptions that support 
value relevance as an earnings quality proxy. Following Ball et al. (2000) and Bushman 
et al. (2004), the measure of timeliness is the adjusted R2 from Equation (2-14). Smaller 
values of Timeliness imply less timely (i.e., lower quality) earnings. Equation (2-14) is 
typically estimated on a firm-specific basis in time series regression. 
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ܧܣܴ ௝ܰ,௧ ൌ 	 ߜ଴ ൅	ߜଵܰܧܩ௝,௧ ൅ ߜଶܴܧ ௝ܶ,௧ ൅ ߜଶܰܧܩ ∗ ܴܧ ௝ܶ,௧
൅ 	ߝ௝,௧	 Equation (2-14) 
Where: 
NEG୨,୲ = 1 if RET୨,୲ <0 and 0 otherwise, all other variables are already defined. 
Moving to conservatism that was given substantial attention in accounting literature in 
the last decade (e.g., Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Ryan, 2006; 
Givoly et al., 2007; Guay and Verrecchia, 2008; Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
Conservatism is defined “in terms of the differential verifiability required for recognition 
of profits versus losses” (Watts, 2003a, p. 207). Therefore, accountants are usually 
prudent and have a tendency to receive a higher degree of verification to realise good 
news as profits compared to realise bad news as losses (Basu, 1997; Artiach and Clarkson, 
2011). From the definitions of timeliness and conservatism, it could be concluded that 
both capture the reliability of earnings for decision-making. 
Despite the significant attention in the literature given to accounting conservatism, the 
accepted definition of conservatism is unclear. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that 
different proxies are used in the literature to measure conservatism reflecting different 
approaches to conservatism. The most notable proxies in the literature are Basu (1997) 
model, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model, Beaver and Ryan (2005) model, Givoly et al. 
(2007) model, Penman and Zhang (2002) model and Khan and Watts (2009) model. Of 
these, the Basu model has received the greatest attention in the literature (Wang et al., 
2009; Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
Moreover, conservatism is classified into conditional or unconditional conservatism. 
Conditional conservatism indicates to the term of conservatism as an asymmetry in the 
response of earnings to bad and good news. In particular, it means that “book values are 
written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up under 
favourable circumstances, with the latter being the conservative behaviour” (Beaver and 
Ryan, 2005, p. 269); for example, the lower of cost or market accounting for inventory or 
the impairment of PPE. Conditional conservatism is also known as ex-post, news-
dependent, or income statement conservatism. In contrast, unconditional conservatism is 
defined as “a systematic bias in book relative to market value arising from aspects of the 
accounting process determined at the inception of assets and liabilities yield expected 
unrecorded goodwill” (Beaver and Ryan, 2005, p. 269); for example, using the LIFO 
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method in the inventory cost system, and using the accelerated depreciation as a 
deprecation method. This is also known as ex-ante, news-independent, or balance sheet 
conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
The most prominent example of conditional conservatism is the Basu (1997) model, 
whereas the both the Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Penman and Zhang (2002) models may 
be considered as proxies of unconditional conservatism. However, it is unclear whether 
the other models e.g., those of Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) or 
Khan and Watts (2009) are conditional or unconditional. It is likely that they could 
capture components of both types of conservatism (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
2.3.7 Other proxies 
Previous studies have constructed other proxies for earnings quality such as earnings 
variability, earnings informativeness (earnings response coefficient), earnings opacity, 
earnings aggressiveness and e-loadings but these have been used less widely in the 
literature. Table 2-2 shows the measurement of these other proxies. 
Table 2-2: Other earnings quality proxies 
Proxy Author Measurement 
Earnings Variability Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
The rolling standard deviation of net income before 
extraordinary items of a firm, deflated by beginning 
total assets of current year for such firm. 
Earnings 
Informativeness 
(or earnings response 
coefficient) 
Teoh and Wong 
(1993) 
 
The estimated slope coefficient on the level or 
change in earnings, or some aggregation of the 
estimated slope coefficients on both the level and 
change in earnings. The dependent variable could 
be a long-term measure (e.g., annual returns) or an 
indicator of a short term market reaction to an 
event, such as a three-day cumulative abnormal 
return surrounding an earnings announcement. 
 
Earnings Opacity Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
An index that combines three measures: earnings 
aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings 
smoothness. 
Earnings 
Aggressiveness 
Bhattacharya et 
al. (2003) 
Total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. 
E-loadings Ecker et al. (2006) 
The slope coefficient from regressing excess returns 
on a factor mimicking portfolio, and adding other 
control variables to the model that affect returns, 
such as firm size, market risk premium and book-to-
market ratio). 
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter discusses the different definitions of earnings quality in an equity valuation 
context, and concludes that high earnings quality should have four characteristics: first, 
earnings should faithfully represent current performance. Second, high earnings quality 
should be an indicator for future earnings and performance. Third, it should have a 
relation to current and future operating cash flow. Fourth, it should help users make useful 
decisions. In addition, there is a clear observation from previous studies that there is no 
proxy for earnings quality that is superior for all decision models. Therefore, this chapter 
classifies the different proxies of earnings quality into two main categories: accounting-
based proxies and market-based proxies. Accounting-based proxies typically depend on 
accounting information only such as accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness. Moving to market-based proxies, these typically 
depend on both accounting and market data such as value relevance, timeliness and 
conservatism (Francis et al., 2004). In addition, there are some other proxies that used in 
literature, although to a lesser extent. These include earnings variability, earnings 
informativeness (or earnings response coefficient), earnings opacity, earnings 
aggressiveness and e-loadings.  
In particular, this chapter discusses the different models that used in previous literature to 
measure each proxy of earnings quality. For example, it provides information about 
different models that have been widely used in the literature to measure accruals quality; 
it starts with the Jones (1991) model, then the Dechow et al. (1995) model, then the 
Kothari et al. (2005), followed by the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002) 
model, and finally Francis et al. (2005) model. The next chapter discusses capital market 
aspects.  
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Chapter 3:  The Aspects of Capital Market Focused upon 
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss three key aspects of capital market affected 
by earnings quality which have been investigated widely by previous studies, and are to 
be focused upon here. Those aspects are classified into two types: first, the cost of equity 
capital, which is considered to be a summary indicator of investors’ resource allocation 
decisions; second, other aspects that are viewed by previous studies as intermediary 
aspects between the quality of accounting information i.e. earnings quality and the cost 
of equity capital, including information asymmetry and analysts’ information 
environment (analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy). 
3.1 The Cost of Equity Capital 
It is expected that managers, investors and researchers need an accurate estimate of their 
firm’s cost of equity capital. For example, managers need an accurate estimate of the cost 
of equity capital for capital budgeting. Investors need an accurate cost of equity capital 
estimate for equity valuation, while academic researchers need this to determine the effect 
of parameters of interest on producers, customers and regulators of accounting 
information on firms’ cost of raising equity funds (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Francis 
et al., 2006; Botosan et al., 2011). Therefore, a broad range of individuals and groups 
have a compelling interest in determining the best way to measure the cost of equity 
capital (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). The cost of equity capital can be defined as the rate 
of return required by investors of a firm for putting their capital at risk in a business (Davis 
et al., 1999). Further, Francis et al. (2006) define the cost of equity capital as the ex-ante 
return demanded by suppliers of equity capital, or, equivalently, the discount rate which, 
when applied to expected cash flows, yields the current stock price.  
3.1.1  The cost of equity capital estimates approaches 
Empirically, the cost of equity capital can be estimated by using two approaches: (1) the 
ex-post cost of equity capital models, which can be estimated by reference to market data 
such as price earnings ratio or realised returns. (2) The ex-ante cost of equity capital 
models, which can be estimated by reference to analysts’ forecasts by either the residual 
income model or dividend discount model. This approach has been used by many 
previous studies (e.g., Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Botosan and 
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Plumlee, 2002; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Easton, 2004). Table 3-1 shows the different 
proxies that used in prior literature to measure the cost of equity capital.  
3.1.1.1 The ex-post cost of equity capital approach 
According to this approach, the cost of equity capital is analysed by reference to a time 
series of realised returns, where the realised return of a firm is defined as the price-scaled 
change in its stock price between two different periods after adjustment for dividends 
(Francis et al., 2006). Prior studies determine two components of realised return: (1) the 
expected return (normal return) and the unexpected return (abnormal return). The 
differences between both components of realised returns are pertinent for analyses of the 
association between earnings quality and realised returns, as earnings quality potentially 
affects both components, but in different ways. In particular, earnings quality will affect 
the expected return component if the former is perceived by investors as proxying for 
information risk (or information precision), and information risk is a priced factor. This 
information precision effect is expected to be linear: poorer (better) earnings quality is 
associated with higher (lower) expected returns. On the other hand, the effect of earnings 
quality on the abnormal return component is expected to be nonlinear, because when 
earnings quality is poor there is a higher incidence of mispricing, which can result in 
either positive abnormal returns or negative abnormal returns. Consequently, the 
association between abnormal returns and earnings quality is U-shaped. These different 
effects present research design issues for empirical investigations of the association 
between earnings quality and realised returns, because those returns contain both the 
expected returns (linear) piece and the abnormal returns (nonlinear) piece (Francis et al., 
2006). 
According to the ex-post approach, there are three proxies of cost of capital: the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that developed by Sharpe (1964); the Three-Factor-Fama 
and French (1992) Model; and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model that introduced 
by Ross (1976). Awkwardly, the average realised returns (ex-post) approach has been 
shown to have weakness points in many situations. For example, after testing CAPM and 
the three-factor based industry cost of capital, Fama and French (1997) find these proxies 
are “unavoidably imprecise”. They determine three disadvantages: 1) difficulties in 
determining the correct asset-pricing model; 2) imprecision in the factor loadings 
estimates; and 3) imprecision in factor risk premia estimates. Therefore, previous studies 
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attempt to use another approach to estimate the cost of equity capital that does not depend 
on average realised returns. Specifically, they use the ex-ante approach to estimate the 
implied cost of equity capital (e.g., Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Easton, 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005). 
3.1.1.2 The ex-ante (implied) cost of equity capital approach 
The ex-ante approach refers to analysts’ forecast-based proxies, in the sense that they 
reflect investors’ (as proxied by analysts’) expectations or forecasts of outcomes such as 
earnings and dividends (Richardson et al., 2010). According to this approach, the implied 
equity cost of capital (ICC) for a firm is defined as the internal rate of return (IRR) that 
equates the stock price of a firm to the present value of all expected earnings available to 
equity-holders (Richardson et al., 2010). One of the main advantages of this approach is 
that it does not have to depend on noisy realised returns or on a particular asset-pricing 
model, but a discounted future-cash-flow model. Thus, the ex-ante approach applies 
standard fundamental valuation methods and uses observed market prices and forecasts 
of earnings to derive the market’s assessment of the equity risk (cost of equity capital) of 
a firm (Richardson et al., 2010). A number of these proxies include derivations from a 
dividend discount formula for stock price (dividend valuation model) or residual income 
model. Because analyst-based estimates of the differences between actual estimates 
would be attributable to differences in the assumptions, demands on the data and samples 
used in the estimation. For this reason, researchers who use the cost of equity capital as a 
market outcome measure tend to test the sensitivity of their results with differences in 
cost of equity capital estimates (Francis et al., 2006). For the residual income model, 
previous studies develop their estimates to the implied cost of equity capital based on the 
residual income of Ohlson (1995). Examples of these are the economy-wide method 
(Claus and Thomas, 2001), and the industry method (Gebhardt et al., 2001). Moving to 
dividend valuation models, previous studies develop their estimates of the cost of equity 
capital from the classic dividend valuation models; for example, the finite horizon model 
(Gordon and Gordon, 1997), the target price model (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002), the 
economy-wide growth model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), the price-earnings 
growth ratio model (PEG) (Easton, 2004). 
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Table 3-1: Formulae of the cost of equity capital models 
Proxy Common name Formula 
Ex-post Approaches 
CAPM The Capital Assets Pricing Model 
ܧሺܴ௜ሻ ൌ ௙ܴ ൅ ߚ௜ሺܴ௠ െ ௙ܴሻ 
Where: 
ܧሺܴ௜ሻ: the rate on a risk-free security plus a risk premium, it 
represents CoEC;  
( ௙ܴ): the risk-free rate of interest from return on market 
(ܴ௠): market return ߚ௜: firm’s beta 
௝ܴ௧ െ ܴ ௧݂ 
Three-Factor 
Model, Fama and 
French (1992) 
௝ܴ௧ െ ܴ ௧݂ ൌ ௝ܽ ൅ ௝ܾሺܴ݉௧ െ ܴ ௧݂ሻ ൅ ݏ௝ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ௝݄ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ 
Where: 
௝ܴ௧ െ ܴ ௧݂ = the excess return at time t of firm j, it represents 
CoEC, 
௝ܴ௧ = Return on a stock at time t of firm j,  
ܴ ௧݂ = Return on the risk free asset at time t, ሺܴ݉௧ െ ܴ ௧݂ሻ = the excess return to market portfolio, Rm, = 
Return of the whole stock market, 
ܵܯܤ௧ = the return to the size factor portfolio at time t, ܪܯܮ௧ = the return to the book-to-market value factor 
portfolio at time t. 
ݎ஺௉் Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
ݎ஺௉் ൌ ܽ௜ ൅෍ߚ௜௝ܨ௝ ൅ ݑ௜
ே
௝ୀ௟
 
Where: 
ݎ௜ is the realised return on asset i, it represents CoEC, ݆ ൌ 1, . . ܰ are orthogonal zero mean systematic risk factors, 
ߚ௜௝ is asset i’s factor loading (beta) with respect to factor ܨ௝ 
The ex-ante Approach: (Residual Income Model) 
ݎ஼் 
Economy-wide 
method (Claus and 
Thomas, 2001) 
଴ܲ ൌ ܤ ଴ܸ ൅ ෍ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஼்ሻି௧൫ሺܧሺܴܱܧ௧ሻ െ ݎ஼்ሻܧሺܤ ௧ܸିଵሻ൯
ହ
௧ୀଵ
൅	ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஼்ሻିହሺݎ஼்െ ݃ሻିଵሺܧሺܴܱܧହሻ െ ݎ஼்ሻܧሺܤ ସܸሻሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻሻ 
Where:  
௧ܲ = price of the share at period t. ݎ஼் = the expected cost of equity capital (CoEC). ܧ଴ሺ. ሻ = the expectations operator. ݀݌ݏ௧ = dividends per share for year t. ܴܱܧ௧= Return on equity in year t. 
ீݎ ௅ௌ 
Industry method 
(Gebhardt et al., 
2001) 
 
଴ܲ ൌ ܤ ଴ܸ ൅ ෍ሺ1 ൅ ீݎ ௅ௌሻି௧൫ሺܧሺܴܱܧ௧ሻ െ ீݎ ௅ௌሻܧሺܤ ௧ܸିଵሻ൯
ଵଵ
௧ୀଵ൅ ሺ1
൅ ீݎ ௅ௌሻିଵଵሺܧሺܴܱܧଵଵሻ െ ீݎ ௅ௌሻܧሺܤ ଵܸଵሻ 
The ex-ante Approach (Dividend valuation Model) 
ݎ஽ூ௏ 
Target price 
method (Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2002) 
଴ܲ ൌ ෍ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஽ூ௏ሻି௧ܧሺ݀݌ݏ௧ሻ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஽ூ௏ሻିହሺ ହܲሻ
ହ
௧ୀଵ
 
ݎை௃ே 
Economy-wide 
growth method 
(Ohlson and 
ݎை௃ே ൌ ܣ ൅ ඨܣଶ ൅ ൬݁݌ݏଵ଴ܲ ൰ ൈ ሺ
݁݌ݏଶ െ ݁݌ݏଵ
݁݌ݏଵ െ ሺߛ െ 1ሻሻ 
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Juettner-Nauroth, 
2005) 
Where: 
ܣ ൌ 12 ൬ߛ െ 1 ൅
݀݌ݏଵ
଴ܲ
൰ and  
݁݌ݏ௧= earnings per share at the period t ߛ = the rate of growth in abnormal earnings post forecast 
horizon. In implementing the model, ߛ is equal to the risk-
free rate less 3%, where the 3 % represents economy-wide 
growth. 
ݎ௉ாீ  
Price earnings 
growth ratio model 
(PEG) (Easton, 
2004) 
ݎ௉ாீ ൌ ඨܧሺ݁݌ݏଶሻ െ ܧሺ݁݌ݏଵሻ଴ܲ  
ݎெ௉ாீ  
Modified price-
earnings-growth 
ratio method 
(Easton, 2004) 
ݎெ௉ாீ ൌ ܣ ൅ ඥܣଶ ൅ ሺܧሺ݁݌ݏଶሻ െ	ሺܧሺ݁݌ݏଵሻሻ/ ଴ܲ ܣ ൌ ܧሺ݀݌ݏଵሻ/2 ଴ܲ 
ீݎ ைோ 
Finite horizon 
model (Gordon and 
Gordon, 1997) 
 
଴ܲ ൌ ෍ሺ1 ൅ ீݎ ைோሻି௧ܧሺ݀݌ݏ௧ሻ
ସ
௧ୀଵ
൅ ሺሺீݎ ைோሺ1
൅ ீݎ ைோሻସሻିଵܧሺ݁݌ݏହሻ 
The mean of different ex-ante proxies 
ݎு௅ 
Mean implied cost 
of capital (Hail and 
Leuz, 2006) 
The mean of rCT, rGLS, rMPEG and rOJN. 
 
ݎ஽௄௅ 
Mean adjusted 
implied cost of 
capital (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2006) 
The mean of rCT, rGLS and rOJN after limiting each implied 
estimate to 0.5 
3.1.2 The cost of equity capital – proxy choice 
Previous studies conduct systematic investigations of different proxies that used to 
measure the cost of equity capital (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Easton and Monahan, 
2005; Botosan et al., 2011; Guay et al., 2011). One of those studies is Botosan et al. 
(2011), which arguably documents the most precise test for evaluating the different 
proxies of the  cost of equity capital against number of criteria (Artiach and Clarkson, 
2011); however, the results of such tests differ from the results of Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005). These sets of criteria include test for validity of construct. In this regard, Botosan 
et al. (2011) follow Carmines and Zeller (1979) in defining construct validity as: 
“Fundamentally, construct validation is concerned with the extent to which a particular 
proxy relates to other proxies consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning 
the concepts (or constructs) being measured.” Carmines and Zeller (1979, p. 23). 
Botosan et al. (2011) test nine models of the ex-ante cost of equity capital (rCT, rDIV, rGLS, 
rGOR, rOJN, rMPEG, rPEGST, rGM and rPEG) against two determinants which are known as risk 
factors and future realised return. They find that all proxies are supported to construct 
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validity tests except rPEGST, and rFF. They find, also, that rDIV is the dominant proxy in 
sense of results intensity. As for the risk factors model, they conclude that rPEG, rPEGST 
and rDIV dominate the other models through embedding their associations with the firm-
specific risk factors. However, to add the future realised return model and the impact of 
analysts’ forecast bias, they use the same model as Easton and Monahan (2005), and find 
that both analyses give support for the validity of rDIV and rPEG only, because these are 
the only proxies that have a strong association with both firm-specific risk and future 
realised returns as predicted by theory. 
Moving to Botosan and Plumlee (2005), they test the construct validity of five proxies of 
the cost of equity capital, rDIV, rPEG, rGOR, rGLS and rGM, against certain criteria such as 
firm-specific risk factors. They argue for using this construct validity, as the different 
proxies of the cost of equity capital could be assessed by the extent to which they have 
associations with the firm-specific risk factors in a theoretically predicable and stable 
manner. They conclude that two proxies that they consider, rDIV and rPEG, are consistently 
and predictably associated with five firm-specific risk factors i.e., market risk, leverage 
risk, information risk, residual risk6 and growth. Therefore, they recommend using these 
two proxies, rDIV and rPEG, to measure the cost of equity capital against dominant proxies 
as opposed to the three alternatives proxies they examine. 
On the other hand, Easton and Monahan (2005) and Guay et al. (2011) test their selected 
proxies against future realised returns. They argue that in equilibrium, the relationship 
between expected return and realised return should be positive. Nevertheless, their 
methods of measuring realised return are different, as Easton and Monahan (2005) use a 
direct method and Guay et al. (2011) use and indirect method. However, both find a 
negative correlation between ex-ante proxies and ex-post observed stock return, and they 
argue that the problem appears to stem from the quality of analysts’ forecasts of earnings 
used to compute the ex-ante proxies. Therefore, they conclude that none of the proxies of 
those that are selected gives valid estimates of the construct of interest; thus, these proxies 
are poor measures of the expected equity returns of a firm. 
                                                 
6 They measured residual risk by firm size and/or book-to-price. 
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3.2 Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry can be defined as a problem of a firm to the level that it generates 
observed “information risk” (Callahan et al., 1997), which is defined as a type of risk for 
which market participants may ask for compensation, hence increasing the cost of capital 
of the firm. Therefore, lower information asymmetry may reduce information risk, and 
thus may lower the cost of capital of the firm (Chatham, 2004). Information asymmetry 
also refers to some stakeholders obtaining more insider information about underlying 
firms than others do (Iatridis, 2011), therefore leading to three main problems in corporate 
finance: first, adverse selection, which means lack in distinguishing between positive and 
negative investment opportunities, as investors prefer to choose the investment that 
characterised by lower risk or higher safety. This problem arises when one party of a 
transaction takes advantage of the ignorance of the other party to pay a low price or to 
charge a high price. Second, moral hazard, which means if the investment plan does not 
serve the interest of managers, they will not join it. Third, monitoring cost which is used 
to restrict the ability of manager to fool previous shareholders and new shareholders. 
Therefore, information asymmetry is considered to be a risk factor for uninformed 
investors. 
Recently, a clear distinction has been made between “insiders”, “informed traders” and 
“uninformed traders”. Insiders are firms’ officers who have fiduciary responsibilities to 
shareholders, while, informed traders are those who wish to gain profit from private 
information not available to uninformed traders (Madhavan, 2000; Chatham, 2004). 
Information asymmetry is costly to firms, because in illiquid markets, investors change 
prices to compensate for holding stocks. Increasing the precision of accounting 
information should lead to a reduction in the likelihood of information asymmetry among 
traders; thus increasing the market liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Therefore, 
for the aim of this thesis, information asymmetry is assumed to be between informed and 
uninformed traders (investors) in the capital market, which previous studies identify as 
market liquidity.  
3.2.1 Proxies of information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry and its proxies have received much attention in the finance 
literature. Previous studies used different proxies to measure information asymmetry; 
these proxies can be classified into four categories: analysts’ forecasts proxies, 
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investments opportunity set proxies, stock return proxies and market microstructure 
proxies (Clarke and Shastri, 2001). 
For analysts’ forecasts proxies, previous studies use both analysts’ forecasts accuracy and 
dispersion as indirect proxies for information asymmetry (e.g., Elton et al., 1984; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). Their argument for using these proxies is based 
on the findings of Blackwell and Dubins (1962) who determine that analysts’ opinions 
are likely to converge as the amount of information available about an unknown quantity 
increases. However, this approach has received much criticism such as: the analysts’ 
forecasts errors being typically biased. An important assumption in previous studies using 
these metrics is that analysts produce unbiased information for investors. However, 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find that analysts under-react to negative information and 
over-react to positive information; consequently, proxies based on forecast errors are 
likely to misstate the degree of information asymmetry. Second, forecast errors might be 
correlated with the riskiness of the firm. That is, some firms may have higher forecast 
errors because they have more volatile earnings, rather than because of higher levels of 
information asymmetry. 
The second approach is investment opportunity set proxies. Previous studies following 
this approach argue that in high growth firms, managers have a greater knowledge about 
the investment opportunities of their firms, and are also aware of the expected future cash 
flow  from firms’ assets (Smith and Watts, 1992). Based on this argument, they use 
proxies related to investment opportunities such as the ratio of market value to book value 
of equity (McLaughlin et al., 1998), the market-to-book ratio (Collins and Kothari, 1989) 
and earning price (EP) ratio (Chung and Charoenwong, 1991). Although those proxies 
might be good as indirect proxies, they have weak points such as the following. (1) The 
book value of assets is subject to considerable measurement error when a firm has long-
lived assets in addition to the frequent use of this ratio to measure firm performance 
(Smith and Watts, 1992). (2) Penman (1996) argues that earnings-price ratio can also be 
interpreted as a proxy of risk or an earnings growth indicator. (3) These proxies used to 
measure information asymmetry need accounting data, which is available only on a 
quarterly or yearly basis. Accordingly, studies use these proxies could be employing a 
“stale” measure of information asymmetry. This problem could be particularly severe for 
high-risk firms where the investment opportunity set can change dramatically across 
quarters. (4) A high market-to-book equity or asset ratio could be an indicator of 
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monopolistic power. In particular, firms may have a high market-to-book because of the 
power to charge a higher price for goods and services and not because of growth 
opportunities. 
The third group is stock return proxies. Previous studies that follow this approach measure 
information asymmetry as the residual volatility in daily stock returns (Bhagat et al., 
1985). They use the residual volatility proxy as a reflection of the uncertainty of firm 
value. However, the main criticism to this approach is that some factors related to firm 
uncertainty, such as rate changes by the Federal Reserve, are revealed simultaneously to 
both insiders and outsiders. Thus, residual volatility is likely to overstate the level of 
information asymmetry about a firm (Clarke et al., 2004). 
The fourth group is market microstructure proxies, an approach which offers an 
information-based explanation of market friction and the price of immediacy. It posits 
that an important element of the spread is the adverse-selection component that covers 
the market makers’ losses to better-informed traders. Using microstructure proxies to 
measure information asymmetry has some potential benefits, such as: the researcher who 
uses microstructure measures not requiring a long time series of data; in addition, it could 
be used for most quoted firms. However, there are weaknesses in the use of microstructure 
proxies such as the following. (1) These proxies measure only trading costs of small 
number of shares, and therefore, this is considered a poor indicator of the extent of 
information asymmetry (O'Hara, 1995). (2) Those proxies provide different estimates 
point of the adverse selection component of the spread. For instance, according to George 
et al. (1991) the adverse selection component is around 10%, whereas Madhavan et al. 
(1997) hold that it is around 40%. (3) Neal and Wheatley (1998) introduce evidence that 
existing proxies of the spread are mis-specified. They show that there is no significant 
difference between the adverse selection component for a sample of closed-end funds and 
a control sample of common stocks. 
Previous studies have developed numerous empirical models to measure information 
asymmetry by using the bid-ask spread (Chung et al., 2004; Affleck-Graves et al., 2000). 
The bid-ask spread is established by the dealer(s) (i.e., specialist or market maker) of a 
firm’s stock and it has a transaction cost in the market. “The dealer affords liquidity to 
the market by being ready to buy at the “bid” price and being ready to sell at the “ask” 
price” (Demsetz, 1968, p. 40). Market makers quote two prices: the ask prices, at which 
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they will sell the stocks, and the bid price, at which they will buy stocks (Madhavan, 
2000). Therefore, at any point in time, the quoted bid-ask spread represents the difference 
between the available lowest quote to sell (the ask) and the available highest quote to buy 
(the bid). Demsetz (1968) argues that the market maker provides a service of ‘predictive 
immediacy’, as a trader who seeks immediacy in the execution of his order can view the 
spread as one component of his transaction cost. The dealer in the security provides 
immediacy by being willing to buy at the bid price and sell at the ask price. In this 
framework, dealers place the bid and ask prices symmetrically around the true price and 
profit from the random arrival of buy and sell orders. The spread represents a measure of 
the value of the liquidity service provided by the dealer (Demsetz, 1968). 
Previous microstructure studies indicate that the bid-ask spread is a function of market 
maker’s adverse selection cost (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Glosten and Harris, 
1988). The adverse selection cost is compensation to the dealer for carrying on the risk 
of dealing with traders who may hold important information. Glosten and Milgrom (1985)  
document that there is a positive association between the trading risk with a participant 
who has private information of a firm, and the size of the spread. Also, Callahan et al. 
(1997) document that bid-ask spread reflects the degree of “information asymmetry risk” 
as perceived by the dealer. In summary, a higher level of information asymmetry leads to 
a larger bid-ask spread.  
3.2.1.1 Bid-ask spread forms 
Different forms of bid-ask spread are used in the previous literature such as quoted spread, 
effective spread, percentage spread, and logarithmic transformations of one or more of 
those. Table 3-2 shows the different forms of bid-ask spread, and the measurement of 
each one of them. However, both Chung et al. (2004) and Affleck-Graves et al. (2000) 
note that there is no agreed number and form of bid-ask spread proxies in the literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 3-2: The different forms of bid-ask spread 
Form Name Equation 
Quoted spread (raw spread) ܳ݋ݑݐ݁݀ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ ൌ ܣݏ ௝݇௧ 	െ 	ܤ݅ ௝݀௧ 
Percentage quoted spread  ሺ%ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൌ ܳ݋ݑݐ݁݀ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧	/	MidpointSpread 
The natural logarithms of spread ܮܱܩሺܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ሻ ൌ lnሺQuoted	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ሻ  
The natural log percentage spread ܮܱܩሺ%ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ሻ ൌ ln	ሺ%ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ሻ 
The effective spread 
݂݂݁݁ܿݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧
ൌ 2൫ܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁௧ െ ܯ݅݀ܲ݋݅݊ݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧൯ 
The percentage effective spread 
%݂݂݁݁ܿݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧
ൌ 2൫ܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁௧ െ ܯ݅݀ܲ݋݅݊ݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧൯ܯ݅݀ܲ݋݅݊ݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧  
The change in spread  ∆ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൌ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ െ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ିଵ 
Where: ܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁௧ is the price of stock in a specific date of a firm. 
3.3 Analysts’ Information Environment 
Financial analysts have been widely studied in the accounting and finance literature. They 
are considered to be primary participants in the capital market and their reports are widely 
used by other capital market participants (e.g., Lys and Sohn, 1990; Schipper, 1991; 
Womack, 1996; Cox and Kleiman, 2002; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Matsumoto et al., 
2011; Jiao et al., 2012). Previous studies suggest that analysts play an important role in 
enhancing the usefulness and informativeness of accounting information by providing 
analyses of this information to investors (Bradley et al., 2014; Jiao et al., 2012). The 
importance of financial analysts is seen to arise particularly from subsequent effects on 
the efficiency of the capital markets. For instance, the number of analysts following a 
certain firm is commonly used as a proxy for a firm’s information environment (e.g., 
O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Walther, 1997; Ayers and 
Freeman, 2003; Irani and Karamanou, 2003). In addition, previous studies use analysts’ 
forecasts consensus as a measure of firm performance evaluation (Degeorge et al., 1999; 
Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2002). Another body of literature uses 
analysts’ forecast dispersion as a measure of uncertainty and estimation risk. They argue 
that firms prefer to decrease the dispersion across analysts, and therefore decrease the 
overall dispersion in capital market earnings expectations, to reduce the cost of equity 
capital of firms indirectly (e.g., Barry and Brown, 1985; Daley et al., 1988b; Ziebart, 
1990; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Barron and Stuerke, 1998; 
Barron et al., 1998; Jiang et al., 2005; Zhang, 2006; Barron et al., 2009). This study 
captures the properties of analysts’ information environment by using three variables: 
analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts accuracy - where 
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more number of analysts following, lower analysts’ forecasts dispersion and greater 
analysts’ forecasts accuracy indicate a richer information environment (Byard et al., 
2011). 
3.3.1 Financial analysts following 
The number of analysts following a certain firm is commonly used as informativeness 
proxy for a firm’s information environment (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Walther, 1997; Ayers and Freeman, 2003; Irani and Karamanou, 2003). 
Financial information quality is regarded as one of the main factors that affecting the 
amount of analyst coverage in firms. Yu (2010) concludes that firms with better 
governance disclosure attract a more number of analysts following. Simpson (2010) 
suggests that regular non-financial disclosure of key performance indicators is useful to 
analysts when they make forecasts. In addition, firms that provide higher quality 
information are more favourable in the eyes of analysts than firms that offer poor quality 
information or firms that only comply with mandatory disclosure requirements (Gelb and 
Zarowin, 2002).  
Given that a higher quality of disclosure helps analysts to collect, analyse and disseminate 
a firm’s private information, it is not surprising to see a strong body of literature 
supporting the view that analysts prefer to cover firms with high quality information (e.g., 
Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
3.3.2 Financial analysts’ forecasts dispersion 
Higher information quality in financial statements is expected to reduce the investors' 
uncertainty, thus reducing the information risk of a specific firm. Barry and Brown (1985) 
focus on analysts' forecast dispersion proxy and argue that analysts' forecast dispersion is 
a proper proxy of uncertainty and estimation risk. Firms have incentives to decrease the 
forecasts dispersion among analysts, and therefore, in capital market, reduce the overall 
dispersion of earnings expectations. Also, there is an evidence suggests that forecast 
dispersion is influenced by the quantity and quality of financial disclosures and that any 
significant change to the access of this financial information could alter forecast 
dispersion (Dechow et al., 1996; Swaminathan, 1991). 
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Previous studies measure financial analysts’ dispersion by using different proxies such as 
(1) the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by stock price (e.g., Hope, 2003b; 
Duru and Reeb, 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). (2) The variance of analysts’ forecasts 
instead of standard deviation (e.g., Morse et al., 1991, Daley et al. 1988). (3) The variation 
coefficient, which is measured the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts deflated by 
the mean or median of earnings per share forecasts of a particular period (e.g., Ajinkya et 
al., 1991; Comiskey et al., 1987; Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Ziebart, 1990; Imhoff and 
Lobo, 1992; Das and Saudagaran, 1998).  
3.3.3 Financial analysts’ forecasts accuracy 
Previous studies use different proxies to measure the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. For 
example, they use the absolute value of forecast errors to evaluate the dynamics and 
quality of forecast errors across time (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Stickel, 1992; 
Chopra, 1998; Dunn and Nathan, 2005). Where forecasts are matched across firms, as in 
Stickel (1992), it is not important to deflate the forecast error. However, where forecast 
errors are compared across firms, the error will be partly a function of the scale effect. 
Therefore, previous studies used to deflate the error. A number of previous studies (e.g., 
Capstaff et al., 1995; Acker and Athanassakos, 1997) chooses  to  deflate  the  forecast  
error  by  actual  earnings.  This approach has the disadvantage of generating outliers 
when the actual earnings are close to zero. This is a less frequent occurrence when the 
share price is used as the denominator and indeed this is the most frequently employed 
measure of forecast error in the current forecast literature (e.g., Ali et al., 1992; 
Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Lim, 2001; Gu and Wu, 2003; Mikhail et al., 2003). 
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3.4 Summary  
This chapter discusses and focuses on three key aspects of the capital market. These 
aspects are classified into two types: first, the cost of equity capital, which is considered 
to be a summary indicator of investors’ resource allocation decisions; second, other 
aspects that are viewed by previous studies as intermediary aspects, e.g., information 
asymmetry and analysts’ information environment. For the cost of equity capital section, 
it discusses the definition of the cost of equity capital and the two main approaches that 
used to measure the cost of equity capital: (1) the ex-post cost of equity capital proxies, 
which can be estimated by reference to market data, and (2) the ex-ante cost of equity 
capital proxies, which can be estimated by reference to analysts’ forecasts by either the 
residual income model or dividend discount model. Moving to the second section, which 
focuses on information asymmetry, this discusses the definition of information symmetry 
and the different approaches used to measure information asymmetry in prior literature; 
for example, the analysts’ forecasts approach, the investments opportunity set approach, 
the stock return approach and market microstructure proxies (Clarke and Shastri, 2001). 
It also discusses the different forms of bid-ask spread. Finally, this chapter discusses 
analysts’ information environment proxies. This section is classified into three sub-
sections, which are analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy. The next chapter discusses the research paradigm and theoretical 
framework of this research. 
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Chapter 4:  Research Paradigm and Theoretical Framework 
4.1  Introduction 
For Denzin and Lincoln (1994), any research design consists of three main steps: first, 
choose the research paradigm, which is regarded as guiding the research process; second 
step, select the appropriate methodology to connect the selected paradigm to the empirical 
work, and; finally, determine the methods of data collection and data analysis. The main 
objective of this chapter is to outline the appropriate paradigm that guides the current 
research methodology and methods employed to test the research hypotheses and achieve 
its purposes. The chapter consists of two main sections. Section 1 presents the research 
paradigm, which focuses on Burrell and Morgan framework, and section 2 discusses 
theoretical framework which consists of a collection of theories that help to explain and 
predict phenomenon in the social sciences. 
4.2 Research Paradigm 
One of the main problem faces by social science researchers is deciding which theoretical 
and philosophical assumptions they will base their research on (Hoque, 2006; Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The research of numerous researchers is based, explicitly or implicitly, 
on a research paradigm, which is a number of philosophical assumptions concerning the 
nature of social science and that of society (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Collis and Hussey 
(2009) define a research paradigm as “a framework that guides how research should be 
conducted, based on people’s philosophies and their assumptions about the world and the 
nature of knowledge” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 55). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) document a general framework for the analysis of social 
theory. They suggest that all social science research can be classified into four key 
paradigms: functionalist; interpretive; radical-humanist; and radical-structuralist (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Those paradigms (framework) are based on two dimensions: the 
subjective-objective dimension that demonstrate the assumptions of the nature of social 
science; and the regulation-radical change dimension that demonstrate the assumptions 
of the nature of society (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
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4.2.1 The subjective-objective dimension  
The first dimension of the Burrell and Morgan framework is the subjective-objective 
dimension, which is based on the assumptions of the nature of social science. These 
assumptions are related to the ontology of the social world (nominalism and realism), 
epistemology (anti-positivism and positivism), human nature (voluntarism and 
determinism), and methodology (ideographic and nomothetic) (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). Those assumptions are shown in Figure 4-1. The ontological nature assumption is 
focused on the nature of reality concerning the social phenomena that are being 
investigated (Creswell, 1998). It concerns whether the “reality” to be investigated is of an 
“objective” nature and exist independently of the individual’s awareness (realism), or is 
a relative concept, a product of individual consciousness and only understood by 
investigating the perceptions of the human actors (nominalism) (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Crotty, 1998).  
The epistemological assumption is focused on the nature of knowledge and how 
researchers understand the world. This includes a test for the association between the 
researcher and what is being researched to determine whether knowledge is something 
which can be acquired objectively, (positivist), or is something which has to be personally 
experienced subjectively acquired (anti-positivist) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009).  
The third assumption is the human nature, which focuses on the association between 
human beings and the environment. The two main dimensions underpinning this concept 
are termed “determinism” and “voluntarism”. The determinist approach is based on the 
idea that human beings and their experience are products of their environment. In contrast, 
the voluntarist approach is based on the idea that human beings and their experience are 
independent, free-willed, creator and controllers of their environment (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  
The final assumption is the methodological assumption, which focuses on how the 
researcher gains knowledge about the world. This assumption is determined by the 
researcher’s choice of the former three assumptions. The two main approaches 
underpinning this assumption are termed "nomothetic" and "ideographic". The 
nomothetic approach is based on seeing the social world as similar to the natural world 
and hence, data can be collected using protocols and procedures that arise from the natural 
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sciences, preferably using quantitative research techniques. Conversely, the ideographic 
approach is based on seeing knowledge as something that has to be personally 
experienced and there is a tendency to prefer collecting data using qualitative research 
techniques (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Figure 4-1: The subjective and objective approaches 
Subjective Approach Assumptions Objective Approach 
Nominalism Ontology Realism 
Anti-positivism Epistemology Positivism 
Voluntarism Human Nature Determinism 
Ideographic Methodology Nomothetic 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) 
4.2.2 The regulation-radical change dimension 
The regulation-radical change is the second dimension of the Burrell and Morgan 
framework, and focuses on the assumptions of the nature of society. It consists of two 
approaches: the regulation approach and radical change approach. This dimension 
describes the nature of society assumption as a view of society either as orderly or subject 
to fundamental conflict (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Chua, 1986). The regulation approach 
is focused on understanding and providing explanations for the status quo. Society is 
viewed as an entity, and the mechanisms by which the social order is maintained are 
investigated. In contrast, the radical approach looks beyond the status quo and is focused 
on finding explanations for the radical change in social systems. It is focused more on 
“what is possible” as distinct from “what is”; with alternatives instead of acceptance of 
the status quo, relative to the radical approach (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 
characteristics of the two approaches are shown in Figure 4-2. 
Figure 4-2: the regulation-radical change dimension 
Regulation approach Radical change approach 
The status quo Radical change 
Social order Structural conflict 
Consensus Model of Domination 
Social integration and cohesion Contradiction 
Solidarity Emancipation 
Need satisfaction Deprivation 
Actuality Potentiality 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 18) 
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4.2.3 The four paradigms 
The two dimensions, the subjective-objective dimension and the regulation-radical 
change dimension, lead to four mutually exclusive paradigms: the functionalist 
(positivism), interpretive, radical-humanist, and radical-structuralist. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) argue that each paradigm views the world in a particular way; thus, these 
paradigms identify four interpretations of the social world based on different 
philosophical assumptions with regard to the nature of science and of society.  
Figure 4-3: Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 
 Radical change  
Subjective 
 
 
Radical-humanist 
 
 
Radical-structuralist 
Objective  
 
Interpretive 
 
 
Functionalist 
 Regulation  
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22)  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that each paradigm represents a particular standpoint 
and identifies a quite separate social-scientific reality, and it is mutually exclusive of other 
paradigms. The origin of the radical paradigms (structuralist and humanist) lie in the 
radical change dimension and hence attempt to go beyond the status quo and essentially 
seek change. The basis of the radical-structuralist paradigm is based on an objective 
perspective. This paradigm attempts to comprehend radical change, as does the radical 
humanist paradigm, although it is subjective. At the other extreme lie the interpretive and 
the functionalist paradigms, which represent the regulation dimension and hence attempt 
to examine the status quo. A subjective perspective of reality is the basis of the 
interpretive paradigm, which attempts to comprehend the status quo “within the realism 
of individual consciousness and subjectivity (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In contrast, 
although the functionalist paradigm views reality as objective and external to the 
individual, it also seeks to discover explanations of the status quo, the social order, 
consensus, social integration, solidarity, and reality from an objective perspective (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). 
58 
 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) all social science researchers fall into one or 
other of the aforementioned four paradigms, based on the philosophical assumptions they 
employ in their research. Indeed, Chua (1986, p. 603) proposes that specific accounting 
theories may also be categorised using these four paradigms7. In accounting research, the 
functionalist paradigm is associated with the positivist approach, while the interpretive 
paradigm is connected to the interpretive approach and both radical paradigms are linked 
with the critical approach in accounting research (Chua, 1986).  This study is carried out 
within the functionalist (positivist) paradigm, as discussed in further detail in the 
following section.  
4.2.4 The functionalist (positivism) paradigm 
The standpoint of the functionalist (positivist) paradigm is connected to the objectivist 
approach (realism, positivism, determinism and nomothetic), and is embedded in the 
sociology of regulation. It is concerned with offering explanations of the status quo, social 
order, consensus, social integration, solidarity and realism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 
26). It frequently addresses problems and emphasises the provision of practical answers 
to practical problems and the generation of useful knowledge.  
Positivist is the paradigm most frequently used by natural science researchers. The 
positivist paradigm in social sciences focuses on the belief that the social world is regular 
and ordered and therefore human behaviour can be studied in a manner similar to that 
used in the natural sciences. According to this paradigm, it is possible to give logical or 
mathematical evidence for each logically justifiable assertion (Walliman, 2011; Collis 
and Hussey, 2014). Currently, social science researchers who carry out research under 
this paradigm still apply logical reasoning; thus, precision and objectivity support their 
approach rather than subjectivity and intuitive interpretation. As those researchers 
consider reality is independent of us, they assume that the act of examining social reality 
does not impact that reality (Creswell, 2014; Collis and Hussey, 2014). 
                                                 
7 However, Chua (1986, p. 603) argues that the Burrell and Morgan framework has many problems. These 
problems stem from their use of mutually exclusive dichotomies, the latent relativism of truth and reason 
which their framework encourages, and the dubious nature of the differences between the radical-
structuralist and humanist paradigms. For a detailed discussion of these difficulties, see Chua (1986, p. 
626). 
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In accounting, positivist research is an offshoot of academic accounting research which 
attempts to elucidate and forecast particular phenomena, such as accounting practices 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Elucidation refers to offering reasons for what occurs in 
specific circumstance, while forecasting predicts the possibility of similar circumstances 
arising somewhere else. Therefore, positivist research attempts to generalise and predict 
cause and effect relationships from the analysis based on hypothesised, general 
relationships (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 56).   
Positivist research seeks facts of or reasons for social phenomena, but without taking into 
account the individual’s subjective state. Only phenomena which can be observed and 
measured are held to be knowledge (Hoque, 2006; Collis and Hussey, 2009). Positivism 
works on the ontological assumption that objective reality exists, although human beings 
may not be aware of it (Chua, 1986; Collis and Hussey, 2009). Positivist research 
therefore aims to seek universal uniformities and causal relationships between the 
variables used in research. Due to the requirement to carry out statistical analysis, the 
positivist approach frequently uses large samples and depends largely on quantitative data 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). Finally, the quantitative accounting research is typically 
associated most closely to the functionalist (positivist) paradigm due to its seeking an 
objective view of the world (Hoque, 2006). As the current research takes an objective 
view of the world, it may be considered to follow the positivist (functionalist) paradigm.  
4.3 Theoretical Framework 
As discussed previously, the major problem confronting an accounting researcher is 
which theoretical framework is most appropriate (Hoque, 2006). A theoretical framework 
is defined as “a collection of theories and models from the literature which underpins a 
positivist study” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 92). The main aim of theory is to explain 
and predict the phenomena addressed by guiding researchers to develop their research 
questions, to select a particular research method and to interpret the results of their 
research  (Mathews and Perera, 1996; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). A theory is a “set of 
interrelated variables, definitions, and propositions that specifies relationships among the 
variables.” (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p.51). Kerlinger (1964, p. 11) provides another 
definition of theory as “a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and 
propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among 
variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena”. Positivist 
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accounting researchers must implicitly decide on which theories they will base their 
research on, as this will determine the entire course of the research project such as the 
research hypotheses and data collection methods; without an appropriate research 
hypothesis, it is difficult for positivist researchers to know which facts or data to 
investigate (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
In accounting information quality research, the issue of explaining the motivations of 
firms for disclosing high quality information to users, e.g., investors and analysts has 
attracted considerable attention. Firms should have incentives to provide high quality 
information to their users e.g., reducing the cost of capital. Most researchers focus on the 
quality of accounting information and they have applied a number of theoretical 
perspectives to explain this phenomenon. To date researchers have tended to select a 
suitable theory that corresponds most closely to their hypothesis (Linsley and Shrives, 
2000). The most common theories employed in previous literature to interpret and explain 
the quality of accounting information are the capital need theory, the signalling theory, 
the stewardship theory and the decision usefulness theory. The explanations for these 
theories are as follows. 
4.3.1 Capital needs theory 
The notion of 'capital needs' has been referred to by a number of previous studies (Meek 
and Gray, 1989). Firms in the capital market compete with each other to raise capital 
through offering different types of shares (Meek et al., 1995). Capital need theory posits 
that the need to raise capital is the main reason for firms to provide high quality of 
information, as they may consider that high quality of financial information will reduce 
the uncertainty among investors and reduce the cost of equity capital (Choi, 1973). Many 
empirical studies have applied this theory to explain variations in the quality of financial 
information that provided by firms (e.g., Cooke, 1993; Firth, 1980; Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003).  
High information quality should lead to more efficient allocation of capital within the 
market and, therefore, help stock market to evaluate and price the shares more accurately. 
Therefore, it is expected that high earnings quality will increase the number of capital 
providers and allow firms to attract new shareholders, thus enabling firms to enjoy a 
healthy demand for shares with liquidity market (Craven and Marston, 1999) and increase 
the ease by which new capital can be raised (Cooke, 1993; Marston and Shrives, 1996). 
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It is also assumed that high quality of financial information will increase transparency 
and reduce information asymmetries across market participants e.g., investors and 
analysts. Therefore, reduce investors uncertainty regarding the timing and expected future 
cash flow and thereby enable investors to make investment decisions; thus, capital may 
be raised cheaply (e.g., Choi, 1973; Cooke, 1993; Firth, 1980; Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003).  
4.3.2 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory was developed by Spence (1973) in the labour market to explain the 
behaviour of this market (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It is a general phenomenon 
applicable in any market with information asymmetry (Morris, 1987), and has been 
employed by many researchers (e.g., Craven and Marston, 1999; Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003) to explain cross-sectional variation in voluntary disclosure levels and 
has also been linked to agency theory (Morris, 1987). Akerlof (1970) states that voluntary 
disclosure is viewed as a form of signalling relating to information asymmetry in the 
market, and signalling theory can address these problems of information asymmetry and 
reduce this asymmetry by the party with more information signalling it to others (Morris, 
1987). If information available to the market is non-specific, then share prices will reflect 
general perceptions of risk and, hence this may result in some mis-pricing, together with 
the phenomenon of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970).  Beatty and Welch (1996) report a 
positive association between the number of risk warnings disclosed in the flotation 
prospectus and mis-pricing at the end of the first day of trading. Financial information 
may be used by firms to signify underlying reality, and to influence external users when 
making decisions of different purposes.  
Large firms may also have the incentive to disclose high quality information in order to 
send a signal to the market to avoid potential lawsuits. Since signalling is a reaction to 
information asymmetry in markets, in this case, firms have information (for example, 
about risks and the way the risks are managed) that investors do not. In such circumstance, 
firms with high quality risk management systems will have an incentive to provide 
specific risk information to the market as a signal as this can then be used to adjust the 
price upwards (Lev and Penman, 1990).  
However, signalling is costly and the cost of signal is higher for the bad type than it is for 
the good type (Spence, 1973). The incentive to make disclosures in order to differentiate 
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a firm from other firms will only continue for as long as the resulting increase in market 
capitalisation exceeds the signalling cost (Morris, 1987). It is argued that only good 
quality firms will use this instrument, because the quality of firms can be later observed 
without difficulty, and firms would be punished by the market if they send wrong signals 
(Morris, 1987). 
4.3.3 Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory proposes that agents can be trusted and are look after the resources 
confided to them well, thus obviating the necessity for monitoring (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). Managers should be accorded 
autonomy based on trust, as they are not opportunistic and their actions are in the owners’ 
best interests. The expenses of monitoring and regulating their actions are thus reduced. 
Stewardship theory holds that stewards act collectively, as they strive to attain the aims 
of the organisation, such as profitability. This, in turn, benefits the principals through the 
positive effects of profits on dividends and share prices (Davis et al., 1997). 
To reflect on accounting information, previous studies determine two main roles of this 
information. First, decision usefulness (valuation) role that reflects the future oriented 
information role by using information to make valuation decisions. Second, the 
stewardship role that reflects the ex-post role of information by using that information to 
control and monitor the management’s use of capital, which need more focus on the past 
actions (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Cascino et al., 2013). In particular, if capital 
provider i.e., the owners use the information for stewardship purposes, they value that 
information if it is informative about managers’ effort (Hölmstrom, 1979; Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987). However, if they use the information for valuation purposes, they value 
that information if it is related to future cash flows in spite of whether the information is 
due to effort of managers (Beyer et al., 2010).  
Overall, the theoretical studies document that although the two roles of accounting 
information are sometimes aligned, and they likely to agree on their implications for the 
meaning of high earnings quality (see Kothari et al., 2010), this is not always the case. 
For example, Lambert (2010) and  Dichev et al. (2013) argue that  there is a clear 
consensus that the two roles are not always aligned, even if information for valuation is 
sometimes useful for stewardship. Also, Gjesdal (1981) demonstrates that the objectives 
of both decision usefulness and stewardship are not always aligned. 
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These differences between the two approaches lead often to different desirable measures 
for earnings quality (Cascino et al., 2013; Dichev et al., 2013). For example, conservatism 
is likely to be desired under stewardship, because of a reluctance to realise bad news, 
while neutrality is generally desired for valuation purposes (Bushman and Indjejikian, 
1993; Dutta and Zhang, 2002; Wu and Zhang, 2009; Kothari et al., 2010). Another 
example, Christensen et al. (2005) indicates that the increasing earnings persistence proxy 
and reducing the reversible components are commonly desired for valuation purposes, 
but not for contracting purposes. 
Therefore, the current research focuses only on valuation approach (decision usefulness), 
as opposed, to a contracting or stewardship approach. The reason for this choice stems 
from the opinion of using accounting information are fundamental for valuation purposes, 
in sense of giving a basis for other uses, i.e., stewardship. Because valuation role are ex-
ante decisions while stewardship assessments are ex-post evaluations of outcomes, 
evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market 
resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting 
matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. 
Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and 
debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting 
information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. 
4.3.4 Decision usefulness theory 
Decision usefulness theory assigns particular type of information for particular users on 
the basis of assumed decision-making needs (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). The using of 
decision usefulness theory could be traced back to 1955 (Berry and Robertson, 2006). At 
this time, there was a direct criticism of financial reporting, on the ground that it was not 
giving enough help to users in making useful decision about economic events (Chambers, 
1955). Thus, there were demands for financial reporting to be more useful to users in their 
decision making (Edwards, 1989).  
The traditional objective of financial reporting is to provide helpful information to users 
to help them make useful decisions. Recently, it has been argued that financial reporting 
should help other groups of users, such as lenders and analysts to make useful decisions, 
since their needs may differ from those of investors (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). The 
current accepted rationale of financial reporting is to provide useful accounting 
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information that meets the decision making needs of all main groups of decision makers 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Thus, the IASB adopted the decision usefulness theory as 
the main criterion of its Conceptual Framework in 2010. Furthermore, prior literature has 
also adopted this theory to underpin their theoretical framework and answer the research 
questions of their studies (e.g., Chambers, 1955; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Glautier and 
Underdown, 2001; Hitz, 2007; Dunne et al., 2008).  
In 2010, the IASB Conceptual Framework identified six "qualitative characteristics" of 
useful financial information. These characteristics show the types of information that are 
possibly most useful to the primary users of financial reports. Two of the qualitative 
characteristics are specified as "fundamental characteristics". These are Relevance and 
Faithful Representation. The remaining four qualitative characteristics are described as 
"enhancing" as they further improve the usefulness of financial information that is already 
relevant and faithfully represented. The enhancing characteristics are: Comparability, 
Verifiability, Timeliness and Understandability (IFRS IFRS Foundation, 2010), Together 
with the IASB Conceptual Framework, the characteristics of useful financial information  
are commonly tractable in accounting research (e.g., Snavely, 1967; Sterling, 1970; 
Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
According to Bebbington et al. (2001), there are two approaches to the decision usefulness 
theory: the decision-makers’ approach and the decision-models approach. The decision-
makers’ approach depends on undertaking research that asks the users what information 
they need. Once that is determined, this knowledge is used to suggest what information 
should be provided to the users of financial statements. Much of this research is 
questionnaire-based. Another variant of the decision-makers approach, which is used in 
the current research, is security price research (capital market research). In brief, capital 
market research works on the assumption that if the capital market responds to 
information (as shown through share price changes that occur around the time of the 
release of particular information), then the information must be useful (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2011).  
The second approach is the decision-models approach, which develops models based 
upon the researches’ perceptions follow. This approach usually assumes that stakeholders 
have identical information needs. Unlike the decision-makers’ approach, in the decision-
65 
 
models approach, the decision makers’ are not asked what is useful for decision-making 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
Returning to capital market research, one of the main ways to assess the impacts of 
financial reporting decisions is to determine what impact releasing information has on 
share price (capital market research). Capital market research explores the role of 
accounting and other financial information in equity markets. That is, it examines how 
the disclosure of particular information influences the aggregate trading activities carried 
out by individuals participating within capital markets. Capital market research often 
involves examining statistical associations between financial information and share prices 
or return. Reactions of investors or other users e.g., financial analysts, are shown by their 
capital market reactions. Favourable reactions to information are presumed to be 
demonstrated by a price increase in the particular security, whereas unfavourable 
reactions to information are evidenced by a price decrease. No price change around the 
time of the release of information implies no reaction to the information (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2011). 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the association between earnings quality 
and investment decisions of users such as investors and financial analysts. Therefore, the 
second variant of the decision-makers approach (capital market research) is the most 
appropriate approach to explain these associations.  
4.3.5 Prior theoretical literature 
Many theoretical studies have used capital need theory and capital market research to 
examine the impact of accounting information on aspects of capital market. Those studies 
posit multiple channels through which accounting information quality, i.e., earnings 
quality could affect the cost of equity capital. The main hypothesis is that higher 
accounting information quality is associated with lower information asymmetry and a 
lower cost of equity capital. This main hypothesis is based on the theory that high quality 
accounting information reduces information risk by reducing information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors, which is expected to lower the cost of equity 
capital. For example, Merton (1987) develops a model in which some investors are less 
informed than others of certain firms. He concludes that firm information of high quantity 
and quality can increase the familiarity of potential investors and ease their purchase of 
its securities; thus, increasing the demand for its securities. This in turn will increase the 
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firm's market value and reduce its cost of capital. In addition, Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) develop a trading model in an illiquid market by large traders with limited risk 
bearing capacity. The purpose was to test the impact of disclosure on market liquidity and 
hence the cost of capital through reducing information asymmetry among market makers. 
They show that policies that reduce the information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors lead to increasing the market liquidity. This diminishes the firm's 
cost of capital, with a larger reduction in the cost of capital for larger firms.  
In another example, Easley and O'hara (2004) propose a theoretical model within which 
information has an impact on the cost of equity capital of a firm through information 
asymmetry. In their framework, the information asymmetry problem clearly arises 
between the different types of investors, be they informed or uninformed. Informed 
investors are likely to hold fewer of the ‘bad-news’ stocks and buy more the ‘good-news’ 
stocks because they have access to all information, public or private. However, 
uninformed investors cannot imitate the informed investors’ portfolio decision because 
they do not have access to the same private information. Uninformed investors can be 
expected ultimately to have a greater portion of the ‘bad-news’ stocks. Hence, to 
compensate, they ask for a higher expected rate of return. Hence, the risk becomes higher 
in accordance with the increase in the proportion of total private information. This in turn 
leads to investors asking for a higher rate of return (the cost of equity capital). Therefore, 
private information is considered here as a systematic risk, which leads investors to 
request compensation. Then, Easley and O'hara (2004) introduce an empirical implication 
of using the information precision and quantity available to investors to influence their 
cost of capital.  
Taking another perspective, Hughes et al. (2007) question the validity of this linkage. 
They extend Easley and O'hara (2004) model by including large economies to the model, 
because they argue that the opportunity of full divarication exists in large economies and 
does not exist in Easley and O'hara (2004) model which uses finite economies. According 
to Hughes et al. (2007), risk premia in conditions of information asymmetry equal the 
products of betas and risk factor premia for large economies. Further, they contend that 
less resolution of uncertainty results from the greater information asymmetry gained by 
holding total information constant. Less resolution of uncertainty leads in turn to higher 
risk factor premia, and hence to higher costs of capital. Moreover, Hughes et al. (2007) 
assert that information asymmetry does not lead to cross-sectional differences in expected 
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returns in the model after controlling beta, although it does affect factor risk premia. 
However, Hughes et al. (2007) note that while an information asymmetry factor does not 
arise endogenously in the model, the model is silent on whether an information 
asymmetry factor exists. 
Further, Lambert et al. (2012) also develop an equilibrium model to test the impact of 
information asymmetry/liquidity on the cost of capital under conditions of imperfect 
competition among investors, along with Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). However, 
their main result is not based on information asymmetry; rather, it is based on information 
imprecision. Consistent with Hughes et al. (2007), they find that the pricing effect 
introduced by Easley and O'hara (2004) is diversifiable. Nevertheless, Lambert et al. 
(2012) conclude that in a setting of perfect competition, the higher the average precision 
of investors’ information available about a firm, the lower the cost of equity capital of 
that firm. The extent to which any differences between the market average precision and 
any single investor’s information precision do not matter depends on the average 
precision being controlled for. 
Based on their model, more precise information, which is received by some investors, 
would partly communicate through price, and then it would reduce the other investors’ 
uncertainty. On the other hand, giving more information to more investors influences the 
cost of equity capital only since the extra information increases the average level of 
information precision (Bhattacharya et al., 2011). 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the research paradigm (philosophy) and theoretical framework that 
inform this study to explain the impact of earnings quality on capital market aspects. The 
first section discussed the two dimensions of the Burrell and Morgan framework, which 
are the subjective-objective dimension and the regulation-radical change dimension. The 
subjective-objective dimension is based on the assumptions of the nature of social 
science. Those assumptions are related to ontology of the social world (nominalism and 
realism), epistemology (anti-positivism and positivism), human nature (voluntarism and 
determinism), and methodology (ideographic and nomothetic) (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). The regulation-radical change, the second dimension of the Burrell and Morgan 
framework, describes the nature of society assumption as either a view of society as 
orderly or subject to fundamental conflict. This dimension consists of two approaches: 
the regulation approach and radical change approach. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Chua, 
1986). 
The current research is undertaken within the functionalist paradigm that represents a 
perspective which related to the objectivist approach (realism, positivism, determinism 
and nomothetic), and is firmly rooted in the sociology of regulation. It is characterised by 
a concern for providing explanations of the status quo, social order, consensus, social 
integration, solidarity and actuality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 26).  
Moving to the theoretical framework, this section discusses the definition of theory. It 
also discusses a number of theories of accounting, which are proposed in the current 
research as explanatory theories, to identify the association between earnings quality and 
capital market aspects. These include capital need theory, signalling theory, decision 
usefulness theory, and stewardship theory. In addition, it discusses the theoretical studies 
that test the association between the quality of accounting information and capital market 
aspects. The main hypothesis of these theoretical studies is that higher accounting 
information quality is associated with lower information asymmetry and lower cost of 
equity capital. This main hypothesis is based on the theory that high quality accounting 
information reduces information risk by reducing information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors, which is expected to decrease the cost of equity 
capital. The next chapter reviews the relevant previous empirical studies. 
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Chapter 5:  Literature Review 
5.1 Introduction  
The main objective of this study is to examine the association between earnings quality 
and three aspects of the UK’s capital market: namely, the cost of equity capital; 
information asymmetry; and analysts’ information environment. Therefore, for the sake 
of clarity for the reader, the researcher classifies previous empirical studies that examine 
these associations into five groups of studies dealing with the main variables of interest 
of this research. The first group addresses the association between earnings quality and 
the cost of equity capital.  This is followed by a discussion of the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry and then the association between earnings 
quality and analysts’ information environment. Next, the chapter discusses the interaction 
between earnings quality and different aspects of capital market. Finally, it discusses the 
association between IFRS and earning quality through two sub-groups: firstly, it discusses 
the differences between IFRS and Domestic Accounting standards (DAS) in terms of 
earnings quality; and, secondly, it discusses the differences between IFRS and US GAAP 
in terms of earnings quality. 
5.2 The Association between Earnings Quality and the Cost of Equity Capital 
Empirical studies discuss the association between earnings quality proxies and the cost 
of equity capital. Whilst various earnings proxies are employed, most interest is shown 
in accruals quality. Therefore, the researcher classifies the previous studies into the 
following three sub-groups: (1) the association between accruals quality and the cost of 
equity capital. (2) The association between other earnings quality proxies and the cost of 
equity capital. (3) The association between the innate and discretionary components of 
earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. 
5.2.1 The association between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital 
Several empirical studies discuss the association between accruals quality and the cost of 
equity capital; however, they produce mixed results –Table 5-1 summarises these results. 
Francis et al. (2004) provide evidence that the cost of equity capital is associated more 
highly with accruals quality than with other earnings proxies. They consider seven 
proxies of earnings: accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value 
relevance, timeliness and conservatism. They use a cross-sectional regression analysis 
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with a sample ranging from 678 to 1,997 US firms per year (an average of 1,471 US firms 
per year and a total of 3,917 distinct firms) over 27 years from 1975 to 2001. Their main 
proxy of the cost of equity capital is based on the target price method (rDIV) (Brav et al., 
2005). In addition, they use two other proxies of the cost of equity capital as robustness 
tests: Easton (2004) PEG measures, rPEG and rMPEG, and the cost of equity proxies based 
on portfolios of realised returns. Their model includes beta, size and book to market ratio 
as control variables. They find a statistically reliable association between each earnings 
proxy considered individually and the cost of equity capital. The exceptions (or the least 
consistent associations) are found for predictability and conservatism8. Also, they find 
that the accounting-based earnings proxies and accruals quality, in particular, explain 
more of the cross-sectional variation in the cost of equity capital estimates than do the 
market-based proxies.  
Consistent with Francis et al. (2004) but examining one proxy for earnings quality, 
namely accruals quality as a proxy for information risk, Francis et al. (2005) revisit the 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. They employ a 
regression analysis by using the decile ranks of accruals quality for the sample of 91,280 
US firm-year observations over the period from 1970 to 2001. They use decile ranks to 
control both outliers and non-linearities. Also, they use time-series standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients, as introduced by Fama and MacBeth (1973), to control for cross-
sectional correlations. They measure accruals quality by using their proxy that extracts 
from the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model. They 
use the price earnings ratio as an inverse measure to capture the investors' ex-ante 
assessment of the cost of equity capital. Also, they employ returns realizations (ex-post)  
as a proxy for the cost of equity by using CAPM (one factor) and the Fama and French 
(1993) (three factor) models. They use growth, beta, leverage and firm size as control 
variables. They find that lower accruals quality is related to higher cost of equity capital 
and larger equity betas.  
There are number of differences in how Francis et al. (2005) model made the association 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital when compared to Francis et al. 
(2004) model.  Francis et al. (2005) focused only on accruals quality instead of all other 
                                                 
8 Conservatism is measured using the Basu (1997) model. 
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proxies that Francis et al. (2004) used to measure earnings quality. In this instance, 
accruals quality is the decile rank variable defined based on McNichols’ (2002) 
modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model, the modified model includes two 
additional independent variables (change in revenue and plant, property and equipment) 
and estimated cross-sectionally by industry rather than using Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. The earnings-price ratio (adjusted by subtracting the industry median of profitable 
firms) and asset pricing models such as CAPM and Fama and French models (ex-post) 
are used instead of the ex-ante cost of equity estimates derived from Value Line analyst 
information. Also, it added two control variables which were Growth (the log of 1 plus 
growth in book value over five years) and Leverage (ratio of interest-bearing debt to total 
assets) and excluded book to market ratio. Furthermore, the control variable, Size, was 
redefined (log of total assets, instead of log of market value). The time period, over which 
the rolling window variables were constructed, were shortened from ten to five years. 
This was possible because the model estimated cross-sectionally by industry instead of 
using a firm-specific regression. Francis et al. (2005) addressed the issue of innate 
variables differently from Francis et al. (2004). They decomposed accruals quality into 
innate and discretionary components, instead of inserting innate variables into the model 
in addition to the accruals quality construct. 
In contrast to other studies, which show evidence of the significant association between 
earnings quality and the cost of equity capital, Core et al. (2008) argue that both Francis 
et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2005) do not provide evidence that accruals quality is a 
priced risk. They suggest that a better specified test of whether a proposed risk factor is 
priced requires a two-stage cross-sectional regression (2SCSR) method, which in the first 
stage, it computes factor betas, and, in the second stage, it computes the factor risk 
premiums (e.g., Fama and MacBeth, 1973). They suggest, also, that realised returns 
premium ought to be significantly positive. By using both cross-sectional and time-series 
regressions, they examine whether accruals quality is a priced risk factor. They use a 
sample of 93,093 US firm-year observations between 1970 and 2001. They measure 
accruals quality by using the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s 
(2002) model as used by Francis et al. (2005) and they measure the cost of equity capital 
by using Fama and French (1992) model and the target price method (rDIV) as a robustness 
test. Similar to Francis et al. (2004) model, their model includes beta, firm size and book 
to market ratio as control variables. They note that, for the purpose of determining a new 
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pricing factor related to accruals quality, the returns-based tests, as reported by Francis et 
al. (2005), are incomplete. They show that, although on average positive, the loadings on 
the accruals quality factor do not describe the cross-sectional variation in returns. Also, 
they indicate that, as a characteristic, accruals quality does not predict future (one-year-
ahead) realised returns. Moreover, they report a significant positive risk premium for the 
Fama and French HML factor, an insignificant risk premium for Fama and French SMB 
factor, and an insignificant or negative market risk premium Overall, the results are 
inconsistent with accruals quality being priced by the market. 
However, Kim and Qi (2010) re-examine the association between earnings quality and 
the cost of equity capital as Core et al. (2008) had tested it, but after controlling for low-
priced returns. Rather than excluding low-priced returns in the test assets, they control for 
low-price returns by including an indicator dummy variable in the equation, which equals 
1 if the return is calculated with the adjacent prices less than $59, and 0 otherwise.  
They use two-stage cross-sectional regression tests (2SCSR) for a sample of 103,682 US 
firm-year observations from 1970 to 2006. They use accruals quality as a proxy of 
earnings quality and they measure it using McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow 
and Dichev’s (2002) model as used by Francis et al. (2005). By using Fama and French 
(1992) assigned beta, they obtain even stronger results that accruals quality is priced. 
When the assigned individual stock betas are obtained from 100 size portfolios and 64 
size-BTM-AQ portfolios, the accruals quality risk factor is statistically significant even 
without controlling for low-priced returns. Amongst the many risk factors which the tests 
considered, the accruals quality risk factor is the only one which is economically and 
statistically significant. This changed drastically after controlling for low-priced returns. 
Thus, it is evidence that low-priced returns had a significant influence on Core et al. 
(2008) results. 
Building on the definition of realised return by Campbell and Shiller (1988), who define 
it  as a combination of true expected return, expected return news and cash flow news, 
Ogneva (2012) enters this debate and examine the association between accruals quality 
and the cost of equity capital after controlling for the effects of cash flows shocks. She 
                                                 
9 The benchmark of $5 as low price was used in 1992 by the NYSE when it reduced the minimum 
tick size to sixteenths for stocks under $5. 
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argues that Core et al. (2008) are incapable of finding an association between accruals 
quality and future realised returns as their inverse proxy of accruals quality - the residual 
accrual volatility proxy introduced by Dechow and Dichev (2002) – is correlated 
negatively with future cash flow shocks, i.e., firms with low measured accruals quality 
experience negative cash flow shocks in the future. Because of this correlation, namely, 
the higher expected returns related to poor accruals quality, firms are offset systematically 
the negative returns arising from adverse cash flow shocks which, thereby, lead to no 
association between future realised returns and measured accruals quality. She controls 
the effects of cash flows shocks by using two sets of analyses; firstly, she includes directly 
cash flow shocks as an additional control variable in the cross-sectional regression. 
Secondly, she modifies the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to control indirectly the 
effects of cash flow shocks and to construct a proxy of accruals quality with less 
correlation to future cash flow shocks. She performs a two-stage regression analysis – as 
did Core et al. (2008) and Kim and Qi (2010) - with a sample of 81,340 US firm-year 
observations covering the period from 1971 to 2006. She measures accruals quality by 
using the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model as used 
by Francis et al. (2005) but with a one year lag in order to prevent the look-ahead bias in 
asset pricing tests. She measures the cost of equity capital by using the three factors of 
the Fama and French (1992) Model.  
She finds that poor accruals quality leads to higher realised return (the cost of equity 
capital proxy) after controlling cash flow shocks, by either adding future cash flow 
variables directly in the regression, or by using accruals quality proxy that has a lesser 
correlation with future cash flow shocks (indirect method). 
This growing literature is supported further by Gray et al. (2009) who use the same 
methods as Francis et al. (2005) but with a different sample (Australian market) because 
they argue that a different setting might lead to different final results. They elaborate on 
the two differences between the US and Australian markets as follows: (1) Australian 
firms are highly reliant on private debt compared to public debt. Therefore, the level of 
information asymmetry through debt holders is perhaps lower in Australia when 
compared to America (the cost of debt excepted impact); (2) Australian firms follow a 
Continuous Disclosure Regime (CDR) designed ostensibly to improve the corporate 
disclosure quality to the public; in order to decrease the information asymmetry amongst 
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investors; and to increase the information precision average on the firms’ excepted cash 
flows (the cost of equity excepted impact). 
Specifically, Gray et al. (2009) investigate the association between accruals quality and 
the cost of equity and debt capital. They use a (2SCSR) test for a sample of 509 Australian 
firms (2,057 firm-year observations) covers the period from 1992 to 2005. They follow 
Francis et al. (2005) in measuring the variables and, consequently, they measure accruals 
quality by employing the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s 
(2002) model as used by Francis et al. (2005). They measure the cost of equity capital by 
using an industry-adjusted earnings-to-price ratio (IndEP) and asset pricing models. They 
determine growth, leverage, beta and firm size as control variables for the cost of equity 
capital. They find a significant negative association in Australia between accruals quality 
and the cost of equity capital.  
Using the UK market and a two stage cross-sectional regression, Mouselli et al. (2013) 
examine whether accruals quality is a priced risk factor. They use a sample of all 
nonfinancial UK listed firm between 1991 and 2006. They measure accruals quality by 
using Dechow et al. (1995) model. When they add accruals quality as a factor in Fama 
and French three-factor model, they find that accruals quality is significant in explaining 
the time-series variation in excess return. When, they use a two stage cross-sectional 
regression, they find no significant association for UK stocks. 
Consistent with Francis et al. (2004) but with an expansion of the proxies used to measure 
earnings quality, and also, the Australian market as used different sample, Wong (2009) 
investigates the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. The 
total sample is 1,534 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2006. Ten proxies are used to 
measure earnings quality, seven of them as Francis et al. (2004): accruals quality, 
persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness and conservatism, 
plus three other proxies: total accruals, unexpected accruals and cash to profit proxies. 
The cost of equity capital is measured by three different sets of proxies: firstly, the 
historical earnings-price ratio; secondly, analyst forecast earnings to price i.e., the PEG 
ratio (Easton, 2004); and, thirdly, five valuation models which are CAPM, the dividend 
discount model (2 versions), the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and the 
residual income model. Furthermore, she partitions the data into profitable and loss firms 
to better understand the differential earnings quality effects of profitable and loss firms. 
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Growth, size, leverage, BTM and beta are used as control variables for the cost of equity 
capital.  
Wong (2009) finds that accruals quality is associated negatively with the cost of equity 
capital when the cost of equity capital is proxied by the earnings-price ratio and ex-ante 
cost of equity proxies and it is driven mainly by profitable firms. When all ten measures 
of earnings quality are included in the model, accruals quality loses statistical 
significance. Other earnings quality measures are found to be statistically significant 
depending on the proxies of the cost of equity capital. When the cost of equity is proxied 
by the historical earnings-price ratio, there are strong association effects for total accruals 
and predictability. However, when the cost of equity is measured by analyst forecast 
earnings-price ratios (PEG model), the models show that relevance is associated 
significantly with the cost of equity capital. Finally, when the cost of equity estimates are 
derived from ex-ante valuation models, there are similar results for the proxies of 
relevance and persistence (but of the opposite sign). In contrast with previous US and 
Australian evidence, accruals quality is insignificant. 
Extending this strand of research into emerging markets, Othman (2012) examines the 
association between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital for a sample of 461 
Malaysian listed firms over the period from 2000 to 2007. She measures accruals quality 
by using the Cohen (2008) model, which obtained from the residuals of regressing future 
operating cash flows on the preceding period  of earnings components. The Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) Model is used to measure the cost of equity capital. He uses as 
control variables beta, book to market ratio, leverage, dummy variable for institutional 
investors, dummy variable for independent outside directors and firm size. For the 
robustness test, they use abnormal accruals to test the financial reporting quality, as well 
as using dividend yield as a proxy for the cost of equity capital. He finds a significant 
association between accruals quality, the number of shareholders, industrial competition, 
capital intensity and leverage. He finds, also, a significant reduction in the cost of equity 
capital for firms with higher accruals quality even after controlling for the influence of 
the corporate governance mechanisms of institutional ownership, independent outside 
directors, and firm-specific factors. 
Moreover, another stream of literature investigate the association between accruals 
quality and the cost of equity capital and adding a mediator variable e.g. Aboody et al. 
76 
 
(2005) add insider trading; Francis et al. (2008) add voluntary disclosure; Li et al. (2009) 
add audit quality; and Mouselli et al. (2012) add disclosure quality. 
Specifically, Aboody et al. (2005) investigate the association among earning quality, 
insider trading and the cost of equity capital. They use a time series regression of a sample 
of 989,530 US firm-month observations through the period from 1985 to 2003. They use 
two proxies to measure earnings quality: abnormal accruals measured by using the 
modified Jones 1991 model (Dechow et al., 1995) and by using the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. They use the three factors of the Fama and French (1993) model to measure 
the cost of equity capital. They use beta, size and book-to-market ratio as control 
variables. They find that the risk of information asymmetry, proxied by accruals quality, 
is priced and insider trading is an important element in establishing this effect. 
Francis et al. (2008) try to extend their previous studies by adding a new variable, 
voluntary disclosure, to the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity 
capital. They examine two associations: (1) the association between voluntary disclosure 
quality and earnings quality, and (2) the association between voluntary disclosures quality 
and the cost of equity capital. They use cross-sectional analysis for a sample of 677 firms 
for the fiscal year 2001. They use a constructed disclosure index as a measure of voluntary 
disclosure. They measure the cost of equity capital by using the target price method (rDIV). 
They use the following four different proxies for earnings quality because they argue that 
there is no agreed proxy for earnings quality: (1) accruals quality, measured by using the 
McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model as used by 
Francis et al. (2005). (2) Earnings variability, measured by the standard deviation of the 
firm’s earning over sample period (1992-2001). (3) Absolute abnormal accruals measured 
by the modified Jones (1991) model. (4) Composite proxy based on the scores from these 
three proxies. They use beta, size, BTM ratio, analysts following, number of segments 
and firm performance as control variables.  
They find a significant positive complementary association between earnings quality and 
voluntary disclosure; this means that firms with high earnings quality have more 
expansive voluntary disclosures when compared to firms with poor earnings quality. In 
condition tests, they find a significant negative association between voluntary disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, they find that the effect of voluntary disclosure 
on the cost of equity capital decreased considerably or disappears entirely once it 
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conditions on earnings quality are applied. These results is robust for the alternative 
proxies of the cost of equity capital (including rPEG), and alternative proxies of earnings 
quality. However, the results are not robust for voluntary disclosure alternative proxies 
(e.g., management forecasts, conference calls or press relations).  
Li et al. (2009) examine the impact of audit quality on the association between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity capital. They use a sample of 1,067 Australian firm-year 
observations from 1999 to 2004. They use accruals quality (total accruals) as a measure 
of earnings quality and use the Easton (2004) model as a measure of cost of equity capital. 
They measure audit quality by two proxies:  auditor effort based on unexpected audit fees 
and the choice of a city level industry specialist auditor. They use growth, size, leverage 
and beta as control variables. They find that, with assurance from higher quality auditing, 
earnings made up of larger accruals are perceived to have lower cost of equity capital 
when compared to those earnings, which generate higher future cash flows.  
Mouselli et al. (2012) examine the association between disclosure quality and accruals 
quality and examine whether they are complements or substitutes in explaining the time-
series variation in portfolio returns. They use a sample of all UK non-financial firms that 
are listed on the London stock exchange during the period from July 1997 to June 2004 
for 5723 firm-year observations. They follow Hussainey et al. (2003) study to measure 
disclosure quality (See: Hussainey et al., 2003, p. 277:280). They measure accruals 
quality by using the absolute abnormal accruals for Dechow et al. (1995). They use the 
Fama and French (1992) model for portfolio returns. 
They find a significant positive association between disclosure quality and accruals 
quality; this suggests that firms with poor disclosure quality have higher earnings 
management and poor accruals quality. For asset pricing tests, they find that both 
disclosure quality and accruals quality have a significant impact on explaining time series 
variation in the excess return of similar sets of portfolio; this suggests that they have 
similar information and confirms the substitute nature of both of them.  
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Table 5-1: Summary of studies on the relationship between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital 
Author(s) Sample Country AQ measure CoEC measure 
Francis et al. (2004) 3,917 firms (1975-2001). USA 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Target price method (rDIV), Easton (2004) 
model and the cost of equity proxies based 
on portfolios of realised returns. 
Francis et al. (2005) 91,280 firm-year observations (1970-2001). USA 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
IndEP , Three Factors of the Fama and 
French (1992), and 
Easton (2004) model 
Core et al. (2008) 93,093 firm-year observations (1971-2002). USA 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
Three Factors of the Fama and French 
(1992), Target price method (rDIV) 
Kim and Qi (2010) 103,682 firm-year observations (1970 – 2006) USA 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
Three Factors of the Fama and French 
(1992) 
Ogneva (2012) 81,340 firm-year observations (1971-2006). USA 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
Three Factors of the Fama and French 
(1992) 
Gray et al. (2009) 1992-2005 Australia The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
IndEP, Three Factors of the Fama and 
French (1992) 
Wong (2009) 1,534 firm-year observations (1992-2006). Australia 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
The modified Jones (1991) model and 
unexpected accruals and cash to profit 
The earnings price ratio, PEG ratio (Easton 
2004), the dividend discount model, the 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model 
and residual earnings model. 
Othman (2012) 461 firms (2000-2007) Malaysia Accruals quality extracted from Cohen (2008) model 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model 
Aboody et al. (2005) 989,530 firm-month observations (1985 - 2003). USA 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
Three Factors of the Fama and French 
(1992)  
Francis et al. (2008) 677 firms. (1992-2000). USA The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
Three Factors of the Fama and French 
(1992), Target price method (rDIV) 
Li et al. (2009) 1,067 firm-year observations (1999 -2004). Australia 
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
Easton (2004) 
Mouselli et al. 
(2012)  
5,723 firm-year observations 
(1997-2004). UK 
The modified Jones (1991) model by 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
Fama and French (1993) model 
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5.2.2 The association between other earnings quality proxies and the cost of equity 
capital 
The first sub-group discusses the most direct empirical evidence of the association 
between other earnings quality proxies and the cost of equity capital that comes from 
Francis et al. (2004). Generally, other previous studies used only one proxy to explain 
earnings quality e.g. McInnis (2010) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) used smoothness; 
Barth et al. (2013) used timeliness; Li (2010b) and García Lara et al. (2011) used 
conservatism, Table 5-2 summarises these studies. 
By using smoothness as a proxy for earnings quality, McInnis (2010) investigates the 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. He uses a cross-
sectional regression analysis for 682,435 firm-month observations for 6,076 unique US 
firms over a period from 1975 to 2006. Earnings smoothness is measured as the standard 
deviation of earnings deflated by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations 
(both deflated by average total assets). He uses Value Line analysts’ forecasted target 
prices as a proxy for the cost of equity capital. He uses firm size, beta and book to market 
ratio as control variables.  
McInnis (2010) finds an insignificant association between earnings smoothness and 
average stock returns at either the firm or the portfolio level. He offers evidence that the 
main reason of the significant association between earnings smoothness and the implied 
cost of equity capital is optimistic bias in analysts’ long-term earnings projections.  
Also, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) examine the association between the country level cost 
of capital and earnings opacity; this consists of three additional constructs10: earnings 
aggressiveness; loss avoidance; and earnings smoothness. They analyse financial 
statements from 34 countries for the period from 1984 to 1998 (58,653 firm-year 
observations). They use accruals to measure earnings aggressiveness. They measure the 
loss avoidance by determining firms with small positive earnings and firms with small 
negative earnings by calculating net income divided by lagged total assets. If the results 
                                                 
10 They define the earnings opacity of a country as “the extent to which the distribution of reported earnings 
of firms in that country fails to provide information about the distribution of the true, but unobservable, 
economic earnings of firms in that country” (Bhattacharya et al. 2003, p. 642) 
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between 0 and 1 percent that means small positive earnings, and if the results between 0 
and -1 percent that means small negative earnings. Then, there is a calculation of the ratio 
of the number of firms with small positive earnings minus the number of firms with small 
negative earnings scaled by their sum. The higher that ratio for a country, the higher the 
loss avoidance proxy. For the earnings smoothness measure, they follow Leuz et al. 
(2003) by using the cross sectional correlation between the change in accruals and the 
change in cash flows, both deflated by lagged total assets. They measures the cost of 
equity capital by using estimates from dividend yields and the international asset pricing 
model (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995). They use three factors as control variables: 
accounting standards, enforcement of accounting standards and managerial motivation. 
They find that countries with high earnings smoothness have a higher cost of equity 
capital. However, this association turns to be insignificant when they change the measure 
of the cost of equity capital by using an international factor-pricing model. Since their 
study does no focus on earnings smoothness, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) offer no reasons 
for their different results. 
By using earnings transparency (timeliness) as a proxy for earnings quality, Barth et al. 
(2013) investigate the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital 
estimates based on Fama-French and momentum factors (Four factors model). They use 
a sample of 51,612 firm-year observations for 6,237 US firms over a 27-year period 
(1974-2000). They measure earnings transparency by the explanatory power of earnings 
and the change in earnings for contemporaneous returns. They defend their view on 
focusing on the explanatory power because it captures jointly the association between 
earnings and the firm’s underlying economics, and investors’ understanding of this 
relationship. They use leverage, growth, and the magnitude of the earnings response 
coefficient in the returns-earnings relationship as control variables. They find that firms 
with more transparent earnings have a lower cost of equity capital as reflected in 
subsequent excess returns and subsequent portfolio mean returns. They find, also, that 
firms with high transparent earnings have a lower expected cost of equity capital. 
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By focusing on the contracting benefits of conservatism and exploring its impacts on the 
equity capital markets around the world11; Li (2010b) investigates, at the country level, 
the impact of conditional conservatism and timeliness on the cost of debt and equity 
capital. She uses an empirical design based on the classical Basu (1997) model and ex-
ante measures of the cost of equity capital. Specifically, they measure conservatism by 
using a modified Basu (1997) model in the country-level, and they measure timeliness by 
using incremental R2 of good news and bad news. Also, she uses the non-price-based 
model proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) as a robustness measure for 
conservatism. The following four models are used to measure the cost of equity capital: 
Claus and Thomas (2001); Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005);  
and Easton (2004). However, she uses the average of the four proxies as the proxy for the 
cost of equity capital in order to reduce biases and measurement errors in the regression 
analysis (Hail and Leuz, 2006). In addition, she uses ex-post stock returns proxy, as an 
alternative proxy for the cost of equity capital. This does not rely on analyst forecasts 
since it is computed as one-year-ahead realised buy-and-hold stock returns, adjusted for 
stock splits and dividends. She uses a sample of 430 country-year observations or 62,292 
firm-years covering 31 countries and 16 years, from 1991 to 2006. She uses two types of 
control variables. Firstly, she uses firm specific control variables such as BTM, leverage, 
return variability, earnings variability, size, sales growth. Secondly, she uses country 
specific control variables such as legal origin; the effectiveness of a country’s legal 
systems and securities regulations; the country creditor right index; and the level of 
market integration.  After controlling the differences in legal institutions and securities 
regulations, she finds that firms from countries with high conservative financial reporting 
systems have significantly lower cost of equity capital. 
By using formal asset pricing model to measure the cost of equity capital, and by using 
firm-level measure of conditional conservatism (as in Callen et al., 2010), García Lara et 
al. (2011) investigate, for a sample of 54,389 US firm-year observations for the period  
from 1975 to 2003, the association between conditional conservatism and the cost of 
equity capital by two-stage cross-sectional regressions (2SCSR). They argue that 
                                                 
11 Watts (2003a) determines four reasons for existence of conservatism: contracting benefits, litigation 
costs, taxation benefits and political pressures for standard setters and regulators.  
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conditional conservatism would increase bad news reporting precision and, thereby, 
reduce information uncertainty and the volatility of future stock prices. They measure a 
conditional conservatism by using firm-specific measure drawn from (Callen et al., 2010) 
and then introduce it in a linear fashion into an excess returns model, which is controlled, 
also, for the known risk factors, beta, firm size, BTM, and momentum12 (Fama and 
French, 1993; Barth et al., 2013). They measure the cost of equity capital by using asset-
pricing tests such as Fama and French (1992) model and with implied cost of equity 
capital that introduced by Brav et al. (2005) as a robustness test. They find a significant 
negative association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital. This 
association is robust to the use of different testing methodologies and measurement 
procedures. They indicate, also, that without properly enforced conservatism in 
accounting, firm disclosure is less precise and this might lead to greater uncertainty, 
greater volatility of future prices, lower market values and, finally, an increased cost of 
equity capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 They measure momentum by the buy-and-hold return for 11-month period ending 1 month prior to the 
end of the year. They argue for the addition of momentum as a control variable because high conservatism 
firms are more likely to have negative returns, and they want to ensure that the results are not an artefact of 
momentum. 
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Table 5-2: Summary of studies on the relationship between other earnings quality 
proxies and the cost of equity capital 
Author(s) Sample Country Earnings quality Proxy 
CoEC Proxy 
McInnis 
(2010) 
682,435 firm-month 
observations (1975-
2006) 
USA 
Earnings 
smoothness 
 
Value Line analysts’ 
forecasted target prices 
 
Bhattacharya 
et al. (2003) 
58,653 firm-year 
observations (1984-
1998) 
34 
countries 
Earnings 
aggressiveness, 
loss avoidance, 
and earnings 
smoothness 
 
the classical constant 
growth dividend 
discount model and 
Bekaert and Harvey 
(1995) international 
asset pricing model 
Barth et al. 
(2013) 
51,612 firm-year 
observations (1974-
2000) 
USA 
Earning 
transparency 
(Timeliness) 
Fama-French and 
momentum factors 
(Four factors model) 
Li (2010b) 
62,292 firm-year 
observations (1991-
2006) 
 
31 
Countries 
Conservatism 
and Timeliness 
 
Claus and Thomas 
(2001), Gebhardt et al. 
(2001), Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005), 
and Easton (2004) 
García Lara 
et al. (2011) 
54,389 firm-year 
observations (1975-
2003) 
USA Conditional conservatism Fama and French (1993) 
5.2.3 The association between the cost of equity capital and both innate and 
discretionary components 
Most of the literature, which examines the association between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital do not distinguish between the two components of earnings quality. 
These are the innate component, which is driven by economic fundamentals, and the 
discretionary component, which is driven by management choices. However, the earnings 
management literature suggests a difference between the imprecision of earnings quality 
arising from both components. Most of the literature that isolates earnings quality into the 
innate and discretionary components, tests the association between these components and 
the cost of equity capital. For example, Francis et al. (2005) investigate whether the innate 
component of accruals quality - representing economic fundamentals - and discretionary 
component of accruals - reflecting managerial choices- have the same cost of equity 
capital effects. Consistent with their predictions, they find that the innate component has 
substantially larger effects on the cost of equity capital than does the discretionary 
component (up to two to five times the effect). They point out, also, that information risk 
having lower effects on the cost of equity capital when it is due to discretionary decision 
than when it is due to firm-specific operating and environmental characteristics.  
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Two points con be concluded from the results of Francis et al. (2005). Firstly, the finding 
is consistent with the notion that the information uncertainty which results from operating 
a business (the innate component), is fundamental in the sense of dominating reporting 
uncertainty (the discretionary component). This can change easily from period to period 
and is largely the result of relatively short-term management decisions. This finding is 
consistent, also, with Guay et al. (1996) who document that in broad samples and over 
long time periods, accruals would contain a mixture of quality-increasing and quality-
decreasing accruals (Francis et al., 2006). 
Secondly, in the context of models in which information quality has the potential to have 
capital market effects, discretionary earnings quality lends itself more readily to an 
information asymmetry interpretation than does innate quality. In particular, a manager 
making a financial reporting decision as to how to account for an event or transaction 
would know the underlying economics of the event or transaction being reported. (It is 
possible that some or much of this information is known, also, to well informed analysts 
and investors). The manager can reduce the information disadvantage of uninformed 
investors (i.e., he can reduce information uncertainty) by selecting a more revealing 
accounting implementation. In contrast, the innate portion of earnings quality reflects 
economic fundamentals — volatility emanating from business models and operating 
environments — about which the manager, and potentially well informed investors, have 
a much smaller information advantage relative to market participants generally. As a 
result, it seems more (less) difficult to conceptualize the innate (discretionary) component 
of earnings quality as capturing an information asymmetry type notion. Viewed in this 
way, the differential capital market effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality 
have the potential to inform the debate about whether information asymmetry drives 
expected returns effects (Easley and O'hara, 2004) or whether the average level of 
information precision drives the observed expected returns effects (Lambert et al., 2007), 
with information asymmetry effects being largely diversifiable (Hughes et al., 2007). 
Several studies report effects similar to those in Francis et al. (2005) regarding a 
substantially larger cost of capital effect of the innate portion of earnings quality 
compared to the discretionary portion. For example, Gray et al. (2009) use realised cost 
of debt, industry adjusted price earnings ratios and asset pricing regressions to test for the 
cost of capital effects of accruals quality in the Australian market. When they split 
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accruals quality into an innate portion and a discretionary portion, they find strong 
evidence that innate accruals quality is priced, whereas the discretionary portion has small 
and insignificant pricing effects. Gray et al. (2009) argue that the reason, for the 
discretionary earnings quality having an insignificant cost of capital effect, is because of 
the Australian institutional and regulatory factors which limit disclosure discretion. 
However, Gray et al. (2009) results are unlike Francis et al. (2005) in some other points 
such as when total accruals is disentangled to innate and discretionary components. The 
cost of debt is affected significantly by the firm’s innate accruals quality but there is a 
lack of a relationship between discretionary accruals and the cost of debt. This is 
consistent with their argument about the Australian environment. Also, another different 
result from Francis et al. (2005) is that the association between innate accruals quality 
and the cost of equity capital is driven merely by the innate accruals component, and there 
is no evidence that discretionary accruals affects the cost of equity capital.  
Similarly, Cohen (2008) finds that total earnings quality (he uses four proxies for earnings 
quality) is priced significantly. He uses an instrumental variable technique to account for 
the portion of the choice of earnings quality (by using predicted values from a regression 
of earnings quality on variables likely to influence managerial choice). He finds the 
pricing effects for this portion of choice are insignificant. The finding of the discretionary 
component is consistent with the finding of Francis et al. (2005). Also, Liu and Wysocki 
(2008) find that, when one controls for innate determinants of earnings quality as 
measured by accruals quality, the remaining pricing effect is modest. In fact, they find 
that the pricing effect of accruals quality is insignificant when the sample is restricted to 
NYSE firms and one includes all innate determinants and all the other earnings quality 
and information asymmetry measures in the same regression. 
Francis et al. (2008) investigate, also, the association between voluntary disclosure and 
the both component of accruals quality. They find an association merely between 
voluntary disclosure and innate earnings quality and not with the discretionary earnings 
quality. These findings are consistent with the view that earnings quality is a determinant 
of voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, Demirkan et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between discretionary accruals 
quality, agency problems (diversification) and the cost of equity capital. In particular, 
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they investigate whether discretionary accruals quality changes amongst single-segment 
and multiple-segment firms and whether the discretionary accruals quality has an inverse 
effect on their cost of equity capital.  
They find that, when compared to multiple-segment firms, the discretionary accruals 
quality has a more significant effect on single-segment firms. Also, they find, when 
compared to multiple-segment firms, that innate component of accruals is of poorer 
quality in single-segment firms. Moreover, if discretionary accruals component is 
constant, they find that multiple-segment firms have higher cost of capital than single-
segment firms do. However, if the innate component of accruals remains constant, they 
find that, when compared to single-segment firms, the cost of equity capital is lower for 
multiple-segment firms. 
5.2.4 Summary of first group of literature 
Based on the analysis of previous studies of the first group, the following points could be 
reached: (1) the literature indicates contrary views. Most notably, the association between 
accruals quality and the cost of equity capital remains unclear. Amongst others, Francis 
et al. (2005) argue that there is a significant negative association between the two 
variables, whilst Core et al. (2008) counter this argument by using two-stages cross 
sectional regression tests. However, the researcher could interpret the results of Core et 
al. (2008) as the research designs that fail to show significance for other asset pricing 
models, such as the CAPM or the 3-factor model. Also, they fail to show significance for 
an earnings quality factor. (2) Beyond the association between accruals quality and the 
cost of equity capital, there is insufficient research investigating the association between 
other accounting-based earnings quality proxies and the cost of equity capital. (3) There 
is a debate about the impact of other earnings quality proxies on the cost of equity capital, 
e.g., McInnis (2010) find no association between earnings quality measured by earnings 
smoothness and the cost of equity capital. However, other studies find a significant 
association between earnings quality measured by either value relevance or conservatism 
and the cost of equity capital. (4) The effect of earnings quality is not stronger or greater 
than the effect of other cost for equity capital determinants (nor would previous studies 
expect it to be). (5) The weight of the existing empirical evidence suggests, also, that the 
bulk of the cost of equity capital effect by earnings quality appears to be associated with 
the portion of earnings quality that is associated with innate component; the earnings 
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quality effects associated with the discretionary or reporting determinants are less 
important. (6) According to the researcher's knowledge, there is no study investigates 
individually the association between either predictability or persistence and the cost of 
equity capital. (7) Most previous studies, focusing on the impact of earnings quality on 
the cost of equity capital, have been conducted in the US. This limits the generality of 
findings vis-à-vis contexts beyond the US.  
(8) There is a clear agreement to use the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and 
Dichev’s (2002) model as a proxy of accruals quality. (9) Previous studies did not agree 
about the measure of the cost of equity capital, a number of them used ex-post measures 
and the remainder use the ex-ante measures. (10) Most studies use beta, size, leverage 
and growth as control variables for the cost of equity capital regression, and few studies 
replace both leverage and growth with BTM. (11) Previous studies use different tools to 
test the association between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital (Average 
annual regression (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) vs. pooled OLS regression vs. two stages 
cross sectional regression (2SCSR)). 
5.3 The Association between Earnings Quality and Information Asymmetry 
Most empirical studies that investigate the association between accounting information 
quality and information asymmetry, focus more on disclosure quality as a proxy for the 
quality of accounting information rather than earnings quality, (e.g., Heflin et al., 2005; 
Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). Specifically, Heflin et al. (2005) investigate the association 
between disclosure quality and information asymmetry.  They measure disclosure quality 
by analysts’ evaluations of firms’ various disclosure activities as compiled by the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR scores). They measure 
information asymmetry by using depth-adjusted effective bid-ask spreads. They find a 
negative association between effective trading costs and disclosure ratings. They find, 
also, a positive association between disclosure quality and market liquidity.  
Also, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) investigate the association between the disclosure 
quality and information asymmetry. They measure disclosure quality by using AIMR 
scores, and they measure information asymmetry by using the probability of informed 
trade (PIN). They use a sample containing mainly large firms that are assessed by AIMR 
between 1986 and 1996. They find a negative association between disclosure quality and 
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information asymmetry. In addition, they find a negative association between PIN and 
the quality of annual reports and investor relations activities. In contrast, they find a 
significant positive association between information asymmetry that measured by PIN 
and the quarterly report disclosure quality. Finally, their findings suggest that disclosure 
quality affects information symmetry at the market by mitigating the likelihood of 
investors finding any private information, and trading based on such private information.  
However, few studies investigate the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry (e.g., Jayaraman, 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Ascioglu et al., 
2012). In particular, Jayaraman (2008) investigates the association between earnings 
smoothness and information asymmetry. He measures information asymmetry by both 
bid-ask spread and PIN. Earnings smoothness is measured as the difference between 
earnings volatility and cash flow volatility. Two distinct samples are used based on the 
measure of information asymmetry. The sample consists of 69,218 (18,625) firm year 
observations for the bid-ask spread (PIN) covering the period from 1988 to 2005 (1988 
to 2001). He finds, when compared to firms with poor earnings smoothness, that firms 
with high earnings smoothness have both higher bid-ask spreads and PIN. He concludes 
that more informed trading occurs when earnings are smoother than cash flows. Also, he 
deconstructs earnings smoothness into innate and discretionary components, and finds 
that the discretionary component is associated with more informed trading and, therefore, 
high information asymmetry. This suggests that, on average, managers’ exercise 
proactive discretion in the form of income smoothing to the vast amount of different 
information and reinforces the association between earnings smoothness (the accruals 
component) and informed trading. 
Moreover, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) investigate the association between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry through trading cost (liquidity). They use a sample of 11,893 
US firm-year observations for the period from 1998 to 2005. The adverse selection of 
bid-ask spread is used as a measure of information asymmetry. As employed by Francis 
et al. (2005), they use the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s 
(2002) model as a measure of earnings quality. Also, two other measures of earnings 
quality are used as sensitivity tests; these are the coefficient on the accruals quality factor 
mimicking portfolio (e-loading) introduced by Ecker et al. (2006), and the magnitude of 
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industry-adjusted operating accruals scaled by total assets. They use market 
capitalization, stock prices, trading volume and stock return volatility as control variables.  
They find a negative association between accruals quality and market liquidity. Both 
innate and discretionary components of earnings quality have a significant effect on 
information asymmetry. However, the innate factors have a greater effect than the 
discretionary components.  
Ascioglu et al. (2012) examine the impact of earnings management on market liquidity 
(information asymmetry). They use three measures for liquidity: the Amihud (2002) 
measure of illiquidity; the Kim and Verrecchia (2001) measure of disclosure quality; and 
the PIN. The sample consists of 326 NYSE firms from 1996 to 2001. They measure 
earnings management by using four measures: the McNichols’ (2002) modification of 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model; dummy variable of tendency of managers to 
avoiding reporting losses; and Roychowdhury (2006) provides two measures to examine 
real earnings management and the level of abnormal discretionary expenses. They use the 
daily average closing price, standard deviation of daily returns, and average trading 
volume turnover as control variables for liquidity. 
They find a significant association between earnings management activities, both 
accounting and real based earnings management proxies, with illiquidity as measured by 
either the Amihud (2002) model or the Kim and Verrecchia (2001) proxies. Specifically, 
they find a positive association between both absolute abnormal accruals and absolute 
level of discretionary expenditures with illiquidity. Finally, they find support that greater 
illiquidity related to firms with small reported earnings.  
Based on the analysis of the previous studies of the second group, the researcher reached 
the following conclusions: (1) there are relatively few previous studies that investigate 
the association between earnings quality proxies and information asymmetry, and most 
of them used accruals quality as a proxy of earnings quality. (2) Previous studies appear 
to focus exclusively on US data. (3) Previous studies agree to use bid-ask spread and PIN 
as proxies for information asymmetry. (4) The majority of the studies use size, trading 
volume and standard deviation of stock returns as control variables for information 
asymmetry.  
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5.4 The Association between Earnings Quality and Analysts’ Information 
Environment 
Previous studies provide mixed evidence on the association between accounting 
information quality and analysts’ information environment. The accounting literature 
focuses mainly on the association between firm disclosure quality and analysts following, 
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Healy et al. (1999) indicate 
that those firms with higher disclosure quality have greater numbers of analysts following 
them. Conversely, Barth et al. (2001) argue that, perhaps, the services of financial analysts 
become more valuable and in greater demand when the quality of accounting reports 
about the firm’s value is at lower level. In a broader setting, Lehavy (2009) find that more 
analysts followed firms with less readable 10-K’s, but they spend more effort and provide 
reports with more information content. Both studies suggest poor quality accounting 
reports lead to a greater number of analysts following these firms. 
In particular, Lang and Lundholm (1996) investigate the association between the 
disclosure practices of firms and both the analysts following and the properties of the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. They use a sample of 751 firms (2,272 firm-years 
observations) for the period from 1985 to 1989. The informativeness of firms’ disclosures 
is measured by Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee (FAF) 
ratings. The analysis in the FAF report (1985-1989) consists of evaluations of the 
informativeness of a firm’s disclosures through three dimensions: annual reports; 
quarterly and other reports; and investor relations and related aspects. There are four 
dependent variables, which are measured as follows: (1) number of analysts following 
measured by the number of analysts providing annual earnings forecast. (2) Forecast 
dispersion measured by the inter-analyst standard deviation of forecasts scaled by stock 
price. (3) Forecast accuracy measured by the negative of the absolute value of the analyst 
forecast error scaled by stock price. (4) Revision volatility measured by the standard 
deviation of median forecast changes, scaled by the stock price as of the beginning of the 
fiscal year. For analysts following regression, they use, as control variables, firm size, the 
standard deviation of return on equity and the historical returns-earnings correlation. For 
the forecast dispersion, accuracy and revision volatility regressions, they use firm size, 
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returns-earnings correlation, standard deviation of ROE, earnings surprise13 and the per 
cent of new forecasts as control variables. 
They find that firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger number of 
analysts following, higher financial analysts' forecasts accuracy, less financial analysts' 
dispersion and, finally, less forecast revisions volatility. In particular, analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion reduces with the greater quality of annual report disclosure and better 
investors’ relations. However, there is no relationship between analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion and the quality of the other corporate communications e.g., press release and 
quarterly reports. They find, also, that the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts improves with 
better quality of other corporate communications and investor relations. However, there 
is no significant relation between the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and the quality of 
annual reports disclosure. They suggest, also, that the potential benefits of disclosure are 
increasing numbers of investors following the firm, mitigating estimation risk and 
reducing information asymmetry. 
Moving to the association between earnings quality and analysts’ information 
environment, Bradshaw et al. (2001) investigate the association between firms with high 
accruals and two types of professional investor intermediaries which are analysts and 
auditors. They aim to establish whether they give investors suitable information related 
to the future earnings problems of firms, which have poor accruals quality. Firstly, they 
investigate the earnings forecasts of sell-side analysts. Secondly, they examine the 
behaviour of independent auditors. They use a sample of 66,762 firm-year observations 
for the period from 1988 to 1998. They measure accruals quality by using a refine version 
of the Sloan (1996) model. They conduct their analyst forecast tests across fiscal months 
by using the median I/B/E/S forecast of the current year annual earnings. They investigate 
whether analysts impound fully the information in last year’s accruals in their forecasts 
of this year’s forecast errors. For auditor opinion and auditor changes, they collect data 
from the COMPUSTAT database; this provides six codes for the audit opinion: unaudited; 
unqualified; qualified; no opinion; unqualified with explanatory language; and adverse. 
                                                 
13 They measure earnings surprise by the random walk forecast error deflated by price. 
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The results show that both analysts and auditors do not indicate in their reports any future 
earnings problems related to poor accruals quality. 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) investigate the association between the recognition of 
unexpected accruals and the presence of the two asymmetries in distributions of forecast 
errors. They recommend that firm reporting choices play a significant role in determining 
analysts’ forecast errors. They use a sample of 33,548 observations for the period from 
1985 to 1998. They measure unexpected accruals (earnings management) by using the 
modified Jones (1991) model by Dechow et al. (1995). They find that large negative 
unexpected accruals, which are largely negative and are included in reported earnings, go 
hand in hand with cross-section observations, which generate the tail asymmetry. They 
find, also, that, in the distributions of forecast error, the middle asymmetry is eliminated 
when the reported earnings component of the earnings surprise is taken away from the 
unexpected accruals. 
By presenting earnings level as an essential control variable for earnings in the association 
between forecast error and earnings predictability, Eames and Glover (2003) investigate 
the relationship between analysts’ forecast error and earnings predictability. They use a 
sample of 1,335 firms (29,432 firm-year observations) through the period from 1987 to 
1999. They measure earnings predictability as the standard deviation of the percentage 
change in quarterly earnings from one year to another. Also, they measure the earnings 
level as the realised earnings for the current year deflated by lag in the value of the equity 
market. They use, as control variables, firm size, earnings level and value line timeliness 
ranking. After controlling the level of earnings, they find an insignificant association 
between earnings predictability and error in analysts’ forecasts. 
After controlling for operating uncertainty, Lobo et al. (2012) investigate the association 
between accruals quality and analysts following. They measure accruals quality by using 
the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model as used by 
Francis et al. (2005). They measure analysts following as the number of analysts with 
annual earnings forecasts for the current fiscal year. As control variables for the analysts 
following the firm, they use firm size, return volatility, market to book ratio, operating 
cash flow volatility, annual trading volume and annual stock return during the fiscal year. 
They use a sample of 3,432 US firms of the period from 1983 to 2004. 
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They find higher accruals quality leads to more coverage by financial analysts. However, 
they find that firms with high accruals quality have more analyst forecast errors and 
forecast dispersion. Also, they submit evidence that analysts provide more private 
information in response to earnings announcements from firms with lower accruals 
quality. Specifically, they find that the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is higher for firms 
with lower accruals quality immediately after an earnings announcement. This suggests 
that analysts use the earnings announcements as opportunities to introduce additional 
pieces of private information for these firms. They find, also, that, compared to the 
discretionary component, the innate component has a greater impact on financial analyst 
coverage. Moreover, they find a lower consensus (more private information) for firms 
with both lower innate and discretionary accruals quality. In addition, analyst forecast 
revisions contain more private information for firms with both lower innate and 
discretionary accruals, and greater volatility in cash flow.  
Based on the analysis of previous studies in the third group, the researcher reached the 
following conclusions: (1) there is a limited number of studies, which investigate the 
association between earnings quality proxies and analysts’ information environment 
proxies. These studies, also, produced mixed results. (2) All previous studies focus 
exclusively on US data. (3) Most of these studies use accruals quality as a unique proxy 
for earnings quality. The exception was Eames and Glover (2003) study, which uses 
earnings predictability as a proxy for earnings quality and find no association between 
earnings predictability and the analysts’ information environment.  
5.5 The Interaction between Earnings Quality and Different Capital Market 
Aspects  
In this group, the researcher investigates the previous studies, which test the association 
between earnings quality proxies and, in the same study, the three aspects of capital 
market: the cost of equity capital; information asymmetry; and analysts’ information 
environment. A number of studies use accruals quality as a unique proxy for earnings 
quality (e.g., Cohen, 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2011). Some other use conservatism as a 
unique proxy for earnings quality (e.g., García Lara et al., 2014; Artiach and Clarkson, 
2011). However, Verdi (2006) and Ng (2011) use multiple proxy to measure earnings 
quality. Moreover, all of the following studies use regression model to test their 
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hypotheses except Bhattacharya et al. (2011), who use path analysis to test their 
hypotheses. 
Cohen (2008) investigates the determinants and economic consequences of earnings 
quality. He uses a sample of 18,264 US firm-year observations of 2,857 firms for the 
period from 1987 to 2003. He uses two proxies to measure earnings quality. The first 
proxy depends on Barth et al. (2001) model in which he runs a regression of future 
operating cash flows earnings components of on previous period. The second proxy is 
McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model as used by 
Francis (2005). He uses three proxies for capital market consequences: (1) the cost of 
equity capital, (2) the standard deviation of stock returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk. For 
the cost of equity capital, he uses four proxies which are Claus and Thomas (2001); 
Gebhardt et al. (2001); Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) as implemented in Gode and 
Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004). He averages the four proxies to mitigate any 
measurement error in the cost of equity capital proxies. He measures stock return 
volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock returns computed over the 12 months 
following June of year t. In order to measure idiosyncratic risk, he starts, firstly, with total 
risk that is measured as standard deviation of stock returns; this includes both systematic 
and idiosyncratic components. Then, he measures idiosyncratic risk, as the residual 
variance from regressing stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index over a 
12-month period. 
He finds that firms with higher earnings quality have lower idiosyncratic risk. 
Nevertheless, he does not find evidence that firms with higher earnings quality have 
certainly a lower cost of equity capital. These results document that, although there is a 
significant association between earnings quality and total firm risk, this association is led 
by the idiosyncratic diversifiable risk component rather than the systematic, 
undiversifiable, risk component. 
By using path analysis instead of regression; Bhattacharya et al. (2011) investigate the 
direct and indirect association between earnings quality (a proxy for information risk), 
and the cost of equity capital. They use information asymmetry as a mediator variable for 
the indirect association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. In 
addition, they use beta as an additional mediator variable. The sample consists of 920 to 
1,040 firms per year, for a total of 12,648 firm-years observations during the period from 
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1993 to 2005. They measure the cost of equity capital by using two measures: (1) the 
Value line forecast based measure used by Botosan and Plumlee (2005); and (2) a realised 
returns based measure. They measure earnings quality by using three measures: (1) the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, (2) the modified Jones (1991) model; and (3) a 
combined proxy for the above two models and earnings variability. They measure 
information asymmetry by two measures: the adverse selection component of the bid-as 
measured in the study of Huang and Stoll (1996), and PIN. They use beta, size and book 
to market factors as control variables.  
For all earnings quality proxies, they find a significant negative association between 
earnings quality and the cost of equity capital for two paths, the direct path and the indirect 
path that used information asymmetry as a mediator variable between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity capital. In addition, by using indirect path that mediated by beta, 
they find a significant association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. 
Empirically, the results show that the direct path is much more important than the indirect 
path(s).  
By studying the information consequences of conservatism in accounting for financial 
analysts, debt holders and stockholders, García Lara et al. (2014) investigate the 
following associations: Firstly, they investigate the association between current changes 
in conservatism and both past and future changes in information asymmetry. Secondly, 
they investigate the association between conservatism and past and future stock return 
volatility. Thirdly, they investigate the relationship between conservatism and the 
precision of analysts’ forecasts. Fourthly, they investigate the association between 
conservatism and credit risk. Finally, they analyse the effect of changes in conservatism 
on changes in the expected cost of capital. They use a sample of 32,641 US firm-year 
observations for the period from 1976 to 2006. They measure conservatism by using the 
firm specific proxy as developed by Callen et al. (2010), based on the Vuolteenaho (2002) 
return deconstruction model. Also, they measure conservatism by using Khan and Watts 
(2009) model as a robustness proxy. They measure information asymmetry as the bid-ask 
spread; this is defined as the natural log of one plus the average daily bid-ask spread over 
the fiscal year scaled by the midpoint of the spread, as a percentage.  
They measure, as a percentage, stock return volatility as the natural log of one plus the 
standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns ending at the end of the fiscal year. 
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For credit risk variable, it equals one if credit risk increases; zero if there is no change; 
and minus one if credit risk decreases. They measure the cost of equity capital by using 
Fama and French (1993) three factor model supplemented by the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor. For control variables, they use for information asymmetry: a) 
litigation; b) leverage; c) size; d) market-to-book ratio; e) beta; and f) current period bid-
ask spread. They use for returns volatility a) litigation; b) leverage; c) size; d) market-to-
book; e) beta; and f) current returns volatility. However, for the cost of equity capital, 
they use a) returns volatility; b) bid-ask spread; c) leverage; d) beta; e) size; f) market-to-
book; and g) litigation. For credit risk, they use a) returns volatility; b) bid-ask spread; c) 
leverage; d) beta; e) size; f) market-to-book; and g) litigation. 
They find that an increase in firm-level conservatism leads to a reduction in information 
asymmetry, a reduction in stock returns volatility, an improvement of the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts, a reduction in credit risk, and a reduction in expected cost of equity 
capital. Therefore, they conclude that conservatism improve the information environment 
of the firm. 
By adopting signalling theory; Artiach and Clarkson (2011) examine the association 
among conservatism, the cost of equity capital and information asymmetry. They base 
their analysis on the pooled sample of 1,782 US firm-year observations during the period 
from 1985 to 1994 and, then, they supplement this analysis by conducting a year-by-year 
analysis, also, a rank regression analysis. They measure information asymmetry by using 
a direct disclosure measure based on the analyst ratings data published in the AIMR 
reports. For sensitivity purposes, they consider, also, two alternative proxies. Firstly, they 
employed idiosyncratic volatility as an indirect measure and, secondly, as the extent of 
analysts following (Botosan, 1997). They measure conservatism by using the Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) model and for sensitivity, they use the Khan and Watts (2009) model. They 
measure the cost of equity capital by using both the Easton (2004) PEG model (rPEG) and 
the Gebhardt et al. (2001) industry model as a sensitivity test. They use beta, BTM and 
size as control variables for the cost of equity capital.  
They find a negative association between firm-level conservatism and the cost of equity 
capital. Also, they posit that the strength of this association is conditional upon the firm’s 
information environment; this is strongest if there is high information asymmetry and is 
weakest (possibly negligible) if there is low information asymmetry. Moreover, the 
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strength of the association drops steadily when there is an increase in the disclosure proxy. 
Also, they find that the results are robust to alternative proxies for three main variables: 
the cost of equity capital; conservatism; and information asymmetry.  
By using Principal Components Analysis (PCA), Verdi (2006) extends Francis et al. 
(2004) by investigating the association between information risk and the cost of equity 
capital. He argues that the PCA solution is steady over the samples’ of 18 years; this 
reinforces the confidence that the information constructs are stable over time. 
Furthermore, to the extent that each of the individual proxies measure the underlying 
construct with error, the aggregation technique can reduce measurement error and lead to 
more reliable estimates. He uses a sample of 11,890 firm-year observations during the 
period from 1983 to 2001. He aggregates 14 information risk indicators into three 
constructs: (1) uncertainty such as accruals quality, persistence, predictability, earnings 
smoothness, firm volatility and share turnover. (2) Information asymmetry such as a bid-
ask spreads, share depth, firm age, the number of analysts following the firm, trade 
volume and share turnover. (3) Value relevance and timeliness. He tests, also, whether an 
increase in the information risk along the three identified dimensions increases the cost 
of equity capital. In addition, he benchmark the information constructs against the 
individual indicators to test whether the aggregated factors perform better than the 
individual proxies, and whether the results are consistent across individual indicators 
loading on the same factor. He uses beta, book to market ratio, firm size and industry 
membership as control variables for the cost of equity capital. 
He finds a significant positive association between uncertainty and the cost of equity 
capital. However, this association is reversed in sign and becomes insignificant when he 
uses a proxy of the cost of equity capital as derived by Gebhardt et al. (2001). Also, he 
finds a significant negative association between information asymmetry and the cost of 
equity capital. On the other hand, there is no association between both value relevance 
and timeliness and the cost of equity capital. By employing uncertainty and value 
relevance, the analysis is robust to the use of the alternative cost of equity capital 
measures as investigated by Guay et al. (2011). In contrast, there is a sensitive association 
between the cost of equity capital and information asymmetry when he uses the 
alternative measures of the cost of equity capital derived from Guay et al. (2011). These 
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findings highlight the lack of consistency in the association between proxies for 
information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.  
By using liquidity risk as a mediator variable, Ng (2011) investigates the association 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. The final sample consists of 
306,624 firm-months from January 1983 to December 2008. Earnings quality is measured 
by different proxies, such as relevance and reliability of reported earning; management 
earnings forecasts frequency and accuracy; and analyst earnings forecasts coverage and 
consensus. Relevance is measured as R2 of earnings from a time series regression of stock 
returns on levels of and changes in the firm’s earnings. Reliability is measured by accruals 
quality, which measured by the McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev’s 
(2002) model. Management forecasts from the First Call database are employed to 
measure voluntary earnings disclosures, management forecasts accuracy and frequency 
of annual and quarterly earnings per share (EPS). The measure of the number of analysts 
following and analysts’ forecasts consensus are measured based on analysts’ forecast of 
annual EPS for the current fiscal year end from I/B/E/S database. He measures coverage 
in year t by the average monthly number of analysts following the firm from t-4 to the t. 
He measures consensus by dividing the standard deviation of EPS forecasts over the mean 
of EPS forecasts. He measures liquidity risk by using liquidity beta and he measures 
market risk by using market beta. He measures both of them by using monthly stock 
returns over the past five years.   
The results show evidences that higher earnings quality leads to lower liquidity risk and 
further lower cost of equity capital. The results show, also, a negative association between 
information quality and market risk. Finally, the results show that a smaller impact of 
earnings quality on the cost of equity capital through market risk than through liquidity 
risk. 
Based on the analysis of previous studies in the fourth group, the researcher reached the 
conclusion of the same findings, shown in the former three groups, for example, (1) there 
are a few previous studies that investigate the association between earnings quality 
proxies and different aspects of capital market. (2) Most of studies focus exclusively on 
US data. (3) Most of studies use accruals quality as a unique proxy for earnings quality. 
(4) There are mixed results for the association between earnings quality and different 
aspects of capital market.  
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5.6 The Association between IFRS and Earnings Quality 
The main objective of this section is to explore the previous studies that examine, in terms 
of earnings quality, the differences between IFRS and other accounting standards. 
Therefore, the researcher classifies this section into two sub-groups: firstly, it discusses 
the differences between IFRS and DAS in terms of earnings quality; and, secondly, it 
discusses the differences between IFRS and US GAAP in terms of earnings quality.  
In 1973, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was established in 
order to set International Accounting Standards (IAS) and to promote their acceptance 
globally.  Generally, the original IAS were descriptive in nature and covered many 
alternative treatments. As a consequence of this flexibility and an ongoing lack of 
comparability among countries, in the late 1980s, there was much criticism of the IAS. 
Because of this criticism, the IASC began the Comparability Project in 1987. As a result 
of this project, the revised IAS, which came into force in 1995, reduced considerably the 
alternative treatments and increased the requirements on respect of disclosure (Nobes and 
Parker, 2012). In the second half of 1995, the IASC and the International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO) approved the accounting issues, which needed to be 
addressed, so the IOSCO would endorsed the IAS. The subsequent Core Standards 
Project resulted, once again in the IAS being revised substantially. In May 2000, the 
IOSCO send their endorsement of the IAS to the IASC that was supplemented by 
“reconciliation where necessary to address outstanding substantive issues at a national or 
regional level” (IOSCO, 2000). The Core Standards Project had brought about a wider 
worldwide recognition of the IAS (Leuz, 2003; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). 
According to the European Union (EU) regulations, all publicly traded EU firms were 
obligated in 2005 to change from local GAAP to IFRS. Therefore, from 2005 onwards, 
those firms were required to ensure that their financial reports were consistent with IFRS. 
The transition to IFRS was to be considered the biggest change in 30 years to financial 
reporting within the EU (Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). The ostensible 
objectives of adopting IFRS included improvements to the quality of accounting 
information and, thereby, the accomplishment of greater transparency, accuracy, 
timeliness and comparability of financial reporting across EU countries (Ball, 2006; 
Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013).  
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There are two main groups of literature in the debate on the relationship between IFRS 
and the quality of accounting information. The first group compare IFRS with Domestic 
Accounting Standards (DAS) in terms of earnings quality. The second group compares 
IFRS with US GAAP in terms of earnings quality. 
5.6.1 IFRS versus DAS: the conflicting views 
This group has two main schools of thoughts, the proponents of the view that the adoption 
of IFRS enhances the quality of financial reporting to users, and the opponents to this 
view. 
5.6.1.1 The proponents 
The proponents contend that the adoption of IFRS enhance the quality of financial 
reporting to users i.e., investors compared to DAS. They support this notion by arguing 
that IFRS reduce the discretion in financial reporting and more capital market oriented. 
Therefore, it is more relevant and more comprehensive to investors than most DAS (e.g., 
Ding et al., 2007).  
Consistent with the argument of Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012b), who document that level 
of earnings management could be reduced and financial reporting quality could be 
improved by tightening the accounting standards, a number of studies argue that, 
compared to many DAS, IFRS reduce the amount of reporting discretion. For example, 
Gassen and Sellhorn (2006)  find that, during the period from 1998 to 2004, IFRS firms 
have more earnings persistence, less earnings predictability, and more conditionally 
earnings conservatism than German GAAP firms. Chen et al. (2010) find that, after IFRS 
was applied in EU countries, there are a modest improvement of the quality of accounting 
information as measured by less managing earnings, a smaller magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality. Also, Barth et al. (2008) find that, 
during the period from 1994 to 2003 (1,896 firm-year observations), there was a 
significant improvement in accounting quality after the voluntary adoption of IFRS in 21 
countries. Iatridis (2010) finds that, for UK sample, IFRS has a positive impact on the 
quality of accounting information measured by less earnings management, more timely 
loss recognition and to more value relevant accounting information. Christensen et al. 
(2009) find that earnings reconciliation from UK GAAP to IFRS conveys information, 
and the market reacts positively to IFRS reconciliation announcements. 
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In addition, previous studies test the impact of IFRS on the investor responsiveness to 
earnings. They find that, after adoption of IFRS compare to DAS, there is an improvement 
in the general information environment, a greater number of analysts following the firm, 
less analysts’ forecasts dispersion and greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy (Ashbaugh and 
Pincus, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Tan et 
al., 2011; Jiao et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2013). Also, they find that, 
after its adoption, IFRS have a positive impact on other capital market aspects. These 
include better liquidity (Daske et al., 2008; Shibly and Dumontier, 2014; Daske et al., 
2013), and the synchronous movement of stock prices (Beuselinck et al., 2010). 
Moreover, a number of papers investigate the association between the adoption of IFRS 
and the cost of equity capital (Ball, 2006; Daske et al., 2008; Li 2010a). Most of them 
measure the cost of equity capital by using the ex-ante (implied) proxies. For example, Li 
(2010a) examines the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU on the costs 
of equity of firms from 18 European countries. Generally, she finds reductions in the cost 
of equity capital for firms in countries where the adoption of IFRS is mandatory. 
Furthermore, Li (2010a) finds that a significant reduction in cost of equity capital 
occurred only in countries where there is strong legal enforcement. However, other 
studies fail to find a significant negative effect of the adoption of IFRS on the cost of 
equity capital (e.g., Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Daske, 2006). Collectively, these studies 
suggest that firms that apply IFRS have better quality of earnings than DAS and a 
significant impact on the investor responsiveness to earnings. 
5.6.1.2 The opponents 
The opponents of this view argue that the form and contents of accounting standards are 
controlled by the characteristics of each country’s institutional framework and its 
business environment. Therefore, many countries with distinct economic systems and 
business cultures use different accounting standards and it is that case that the use of IFRS 
does not enhance necessarily the quality of accounting information (Chen et al., 2010). 
Those opponents studies (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006) challenge the premise that the accounting standards alone lead 
to more (less) accounting information quality. They argue that the quality of accounting 
information  is shaped by many other factors. These include legal institutions of countries; 
the power of the enforcement regime; the forces of capital market (e.g., the need to raise 
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outside capital); ownership and governance structure; and firms operating characteristics. 
For example, Ball et al. (2003) argue that, in four East Asian countries, namely, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the financial reporting is commonly in low quality. 
This was despite their standards being derived from common law countries and 
International Accounting Standards that are widely viewed as higher quality than code 
law standards. They conclude that this is due to other adverse factors and not the 
accounting standards per se (Ball et al., 2003; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Therefore, if 
these factors remain the same, the accounting standard will have limited impact on the 
quality of accounting information (Hail et al., 2010).  
In addition, a number of opponents argue that, following the adoption of IFRS, there had 
been no change or reduction in the quality of accounting information. For example, Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find that German firms, which adopt IFRS voluntary, 
have more discretionary accruals and a lower negative correlation between cash flows 
from operations and accruals than firms which report under the German GAAP. Similarly, 
by using a sample of Swedish publicly listed firms between 2003  and 2006, Paananen 
(2008) find that after the adoption of IFRS in Sweden, there was a reduction in earnings 
quality as measured by earnings smoothness, managing earnings towards targets, timely 
loss recognition and value relevance. Moreover, by using 1,146 firm-year observations 
from Australia, France, and the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2006, Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) investigate the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on earnings 
management. They find that, after the adoption of IFRS in these countries, there was no 
reduction in earnings management and it even increases in France. By using 
questionnaires and case studies, Beattie et al. (2011) find that the adoption of IFRS in the 
UK is not believed to have enhanced the quality of accounting information. More 
recently, Ahmed et al. (2013) find a significant increase in both earnings smoothness and 
aggressive reporting compared to benchmark firms that apply DAS. 
Moreover, the effect of IFRS on the cost of equity capital is also examined in prior studies. 
Fox et al. (2013) use the interviews technique for 32 people involved in the financial 
reporting process in three countries: the UK, Ireland and Italy through the period of 
January 2006 to May 2007. They find that the most of interviewee show their scepticism 
regarding that IFRS would affect the cost of equity capital.  
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In summary, in terms of the quality of accounting information, the empirical studies of 
the comparison between IFRS and DAS produce mixed results. Therefore, it seems unsafe 
to attempt to draw conclusions on the impact of the adoption of IFRS on both earnings 
quality proxies and capital market aspects. Previous literature suggests that, on average, 
IFRS’ positive impact does not occur equally in all countries. Also, it is important to have 
strict enforcement mechanisms and reporting incentives in order to benefit from the 
adoption of IFRS. 
5.6.2 IFRS versus US GAAP 
The second group of literature focuses on the comparison of IFRS and US GAAP in terms 
of the quality of earnings. Previous studies suggest that there are significant differences 
between earnings reported under IFRS and US GAAP (e.g., Haverty, 2006; Ding et al., 
2007; Hopkins et al., 2008; O'Connell and Sullivan, 2008; Henry et al., 2009). They 
document that earnings reported under IFRS may differ from earnings reported under US 
GAAP because of differences in reporting flexibility. Specifically, IFRS are viewed 
commonly as being more principles-based, whilst US GAAP, are more rules based (Ijiri, 
2005; Bennett et al., 2006; Agoglia et al., 2011). Moreover, they argue that IFRS propose 
additional discretion and less guidance and, therefore, additional room for earnings 
management. Also, they are less examined and less comprehensive than the US GAAP 
(e.g., Benston et al., 2006; SEC 2008). For example, Evans et al. (2012) use a web-based 
case to compare the earnings management behaviour of firms under the US GAAP vs. 
IFRS. They find that, under IFRS, financial officers perceive higher levels of allowable 
reporting discretion than financial officers do under US GAAP, and the perception of 
higher levels of allowable reporting discretion leads to a greater likelihood of earnings 
management and a relative preference for accounting over real earnings management. 
In this regard, the researcher organises the second group of literature into three sub-
groups: (1) studies which used cross-countries methodology to compare between IFRS 
and US GAAP (e.g., Barth et al., 2008; Atwood et al., 2011). (2) Studies which used the 
German market to compare between IFRS and US GAAP because they are allowed to 
choose between them (e.g., Lin et al. 2012, Bartov et al., 2005; Van der Meulen et al., 
2007), (3) Studies that use reconciliation form between US GAAP and IFRS (e.g., Harris 
and Muller, 1999; Gordon et al., 2008; Eng et al., 2014). 
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The first sub-group focuses on studies used cross countries methodology (e.g., Barth et 
al., 2008; Atwood et al., 2011). In particular, Barth et al. (2008) examine the association 
between the applied financial accounting standards (US GAAP or IFRS) and earnings 
quality. They identify earnings quality as accounting amounts that demonstrate less 
earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and higher value relevance. They 
base their results on two comparisons of accounting quality. Firstly, they use a sample of 
non-US firms, which applied IAS and matched them with American firms, which applied 
US GAAP in order to compare the amounts of earnings quality. Secondly, they use the 
following two samples, one for non-US firms, which reconcile earnings and book value 
of equity determined under domestic standards, i.e., neither IAS nor US GAAP; and the 
one for those US firms, which used Form 20-F to reconcile earnings and book value of 
equity determined under the US GAAP. They do so to compare the respective amounts 
of earnings quality between IFRS firms and those US 20-F firms under US GAAP. The 
sample covers firms from 24 countries adopted the IAS between 1995 and 2006.  
Their results demonstrate that, commonly in terms of earnings management and timely 
loss recognition, US GAAP firms have higher amounts of earnings quality than IFRS 
firms. However, there in terms of either value relevance for stock returns or frequency of 
small positive net income, there are no significant differences between US GAAP and 
IFRS firms. In addition, the difference in earnings quality between US GAAP and IFRS 
firms is largely attributable to firms locate in countries of German/French legal origin. 
They find, also, that the IAS earnings quality amounts does not differ from those of US 
GAAP accounting amounts, which are reconciled from domestic standards and reported 
by non-US firms, which are cross-listed on US markets. They suggest that, although the 
IAS earnings quality amounts are lower than those reported by US firms using US GAAP, 
they are of comparable quality to reconciled US GAAP amounts as reported by cross-
listed firms. 
Also, Atwood et al. (2011) examine the differences in both earnings persistence and the 
association between current earnings and future cash flows between firms which applied 
IFRS, firms which applied US GAAP and firms applied Domestic Accounting Standards 
(DAS). Their sample consists of 58,832 firm-year observations collected from 33 
countries during the period from 2002 to 2008. They find no significant difference in the 
persistence of positive earnings between firms reporting under IFRS and those reporting 
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under the US GAAP. However, losses reported under US GAAP are more persistent than 
losses reported under IFRS. Notwithstanding, they find that, compared to earnings 
reported under the US GAAP, earnings reported under IFRS related less closely to future 
cash flows. Moreover, they find that the association between earnings and future cash 
flows, reported under IFRS, is similar to the association between earnings and future cash 
flows which reported under DAS.  
The second sub-group consists of previous studies focusing on German firms since they 
are allowed to choose between IFRS and US GAAP. For example, Lin et al. (2012) use a 
sample of German high-tech firms, which switched from US GAAP to IFRS (switching 
firms), to test the changes in the accounting quality for these firms. They find that, 
compared to those under US GAAP, accounting amounts under IFRS commonly shows 
more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, and less value relevance. Also, 
they indicate that the accounting quality of the switching firms is reduced after the 
transition to IFRS because the US GAAP application exhibits a higher quality of 
accounting information than that applied under IFRS. 
Also, Bartov et al. (2005) find that German firms that applying the US GAAP have the 
highest earnings response coefficients when compared to firms that applying either IAS 
or German standards. However, as such, this finding is indirect evidence for differences 
in the amounts of accounting quality because earnings response coefficients are affected 
by factors, e.g., risk which is considered not necessarily as a proxy of accounting quality.  
Similarly, Van der Meulen et al. (2007) show empirical evidence about the differences of 
earnings quality between US GAAP and IFRS. During a period from 2000 to 2002, they 
use a sample of 325 firm-year observations for 129 German new-economy firms. They 
examine four earnings quality proxies: value relevance; timeliness (as market-based 
proxies); earnings predictability; and accrual quality (as accounting-based proxies). As 
regards predictability, they find a significant difference between US GAAP and IFRS. 
However, this difference in earnings predictability does not seem to be fully valued by 
investors because there is no significant difference between the US GAAP and IFRS 
regarding the value relevance proxy. Also, they suggest that a number of technical 
differences between IFRS and US GAAP might be too complex to be captured fully by 
public investors. 
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The third sub-group focuses on reconciliations from non-US to US GAAP (SEC Form 
20-F, Item 17 or 18). For example, for a sample of 31 companies from 1992 to 1996, 
Harris and Muller (1999) investigate whether US GAAP reconciliation amounts provide 
information beyond IAS amounts, whether investors value these amounts differently, and 
whether IAS or US GAAP is more highly associated with market values, stock prices, 
and returns. After controlling for IAS amounts for market value and return models, they 
find that US GAAP earnings reconciliation amounts are value relevant. In tests to 
examine which accounting method, IAS or US GAAP, produces amounts that are most 
highly associated with prices-per-share and security returns, they find, when compared to 
US GAAP amounts, a higher significant association between IAS amounts and stock 
prices. However, they find, when compared to IAS amounts, a higher significant 
association between US GAAP amounts and market values. Finally, their test of the 
association between market values and either IAS or US GAAP produces mixed results. 
Moreover, Gordon et al. (2008) uses a reconciliation form to investigate differences in 
earnings quality proxies between US GAAP and IFRS for a sample of 328 foreign firms 
that list in the US market and report under IFRS from 1/1/2006 to 08/01/2008. These 
firms were subject to the same level of US regulatory scrutiny, but varying degrees of 
regulatory scrutiny in their home countries. They examining three questions: firstly, are 
earnings under IFRS lower/higher than earnings under US GAAP? Secondly, are earnings 
under IFRS less/more informative than earnings under US GAAP? Thirdly, they examine 
the sensitivity of the comparison of earnings proxies under the two accounting standards 
to home country incentives, institutions, and regulatory factors. Specifically, they 
investigate whether under IFRS or US GAAP these firms’ managers faced different 
regulatory and reporting incentives. They use the following nine measures of earnings 
quality proxies: accruals quality; earnings persistence; earnings predictability; cash 
persistence; cash predictability; smoothness; value relevance; timeliness and 
conservatism.  
For the first question, they find that, with the exception of relevance proxy, which is 
significantly higher under US GAAP than under IFRS, there are no differences in both 
accounting standards from using these earnings proxies. In addressing the second research 
question, they use three tests to compare the informativeness provided from both IFRS 
and US GAAP. Firstly, they test whether accruals – under IFRS and US GAAP 
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considered individually – show incremental informativeness above and beyond cash 
flows. They find that both IFRS accruals and US GAAP accruals are incrementally 
informative above and beyond cash flows. Secondly, they investigate whether the 
earnings reconciliation, defined as the difference between IFRS accruals and US GAAP 
accruals, is incrementally informative. They find that the earnings reconciliation shows 
incremental information content over cash flows and accruals, whether accruals are 
determined by IFRS or US GAAP. Third, following Dechow (1994) they test for relative 
information content of IFRS versus US GAAP. They find that US GAAP earnings exhibit 
higher relative information content than IFRS earnings. 
On the subject of the third research question, they expand their initial analysis and 
consider whether institutions and financial reporting incentives affect the earnings proxies 
differently under IFRS or US GAAP. Since their sample contains the population of IFRS 
reporting, non-US and US-listed firms, they consider the variations in institutions and 
financial reporting incentives across their firms’ home country jurisdictions. They 
consider the following country-level institutional characteristics and reporting incentives: 
legal origin, auditor, analysts following, investor protection, and enforcement. They find 
significant evidence of differences for some earnings attributes such as accruals quality, 
earnings predictability and value relevance under IFRS vis-à-vis US GAAP in countries 
with common law, strong auditors, more analysts following, and low investor protection 
e.g., the UK. 
Eng et al. (2014) investigate whether accounting amounts reported under IFRS by firms 
cross-listed in the US as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are comparable to those 
reported under US GAAP. They compare the two samples on the basis of four earnings 
quality proxies e.g., value relevance, timeliness, accrual quality, and earnings 
predictability. They compare the four proxies for the same firms before 2007 when they 
reconciled to US GAAP and after 2007 when they began reporting under IFRS (pre- and 
post-IFRS for US ADRs14. They use a sample of 204 firm-year observations; 110 firm-
year observations for ADRs that switched to filing under IFRS after 2007 and 94 firm-
                                                 
14 The SEC now allows foreign firms listing in the United States to use IFRS for their financial reports 
without reconciliation to US GAAP. Namely, reconciliation was no longer necessary when the financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS. 
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year observations for ADRs that continued to report or reconcile to US GAAP after 2007. 
They find that under US GAAP value relevance, timeliness, and accrual quality of 
accounting numbers are not significantly different than those under IFRS. As regards 
earnings predictability, the two systems are comparable after 2007. Overall, the evidence 
does not indicate any significant differences in earnings quality between reporting under 
US GAAP and IFRS.  
In addition to the three sub-groups, there are a few studies test the difference between 
IFRS and US GAAP from the aspects of capital market e.g., information asymmetry. For 
example, Leuz (2003) investigates whether firms that apply IFRS versus US GAAP, 
exhibit differences in information asymmetry. The sample consists of 264 firms listed in 
the Germany’s New Market from 1999 to 2000. This study benefits from the requirement 
in the Germany's New Market that firms trading there have to choose between IFRS and 
US GAAP for the purposes of financial reporting; despite following the same regulatory 
environment. Therefore, other institutional factors such as enforcement of accounting 
standards and listing requirements are still constant. In this setting, the results show no 
significant differences between the two types of standards. However, the impact of US 
GAAP reporting on information asymmetry is less than 3% of the impact of IFRS 
reporting. This finding is consistent with two interpretations. Firstly, this result suggests 
that IFRS and US GAAP are comparable standards in terms of their impact on reducing 
information asymmetry. However, the second interpretation has another point of view; 
despite differences in the two standards, firms have the same information asymmetry as 
firms which face the same market forces and institutional factors, resulting in similar 
reporting incentives. 
Finally, the summary of the results of the second group studies follows the same 
categories: (1) for the cross-country group, the studies conclude that earnings 
management, accruals quality and timely loss recognition are different between IFRS and 
US GAAP. However, there is no significant difference between IFRS and US GAAP in 
both persistence and value relevance. (2) For German firms’ studies, the conclusion is 
that there are significant differences between IFRS and US GAAP in earning 
management, accruals quality and predictability. However, there is no significant 
difference in value relevance; this was in agreement with the results of first group. In 
addition, they document that US GAAP exhibit higher earnings quality than IFRS; 
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however, the samples comprise only German firms and, therefore, inferences from them 
are not generalizable to firms in other countries. (3) For reconciliations form group, they 
find, with the exception of value relevance, no significant difference between IFRS and 
US GAAP in all earnings proxies. However, there are significant differences between 
both accounting systems, and this is in disagreement with other groups. 
Overall, there is somewhat mixed evidence on whether there are significant differences 
between the two standards in terms of earnings quality, and it is difficult to determine 
which of the two standpoints has the upper hand. Although, previous studies suggest that 
firms, which apply IFRS, have positive impacts on the capital market, IFRS propose more 
discretion and less guidance and, therefore, additional room for earnings management. 
Also, they are less examined and less comprehensive than US GAAP. Nevertheless, those 
results have to be interpreted carefully because of concerns about self-selection bias. In 
addition, there is no clear study examines the differences between UK firms (applying 
IFRS since 2005) and US firms (applying US GAAP).  
5.7 Summary 
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss the previous empirical studies that 
examine the association between different earnings quality proxies. More specifically, in 
order to determine the gap in this literature, this chapter examines accounting-based 
earnings quality proxies, and three aspects of capital market, namely, the cost of equity 
capital, information asymmetry and analysts’ information environment. This chapter is 
classified into five sections: the first group addresses the association between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity capital.  This is followed by a discussion of the association 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry and, then, the association between 
earnings quality and analysts’ information environment. Next, it discusses the interaction 
between earnings quality and different aspects of capital market. Finally, it discusses the 
association between IFRS and the quality of earnings. According to the analyses of 
previous studies, the following points could be concluded: 
(1) There are controversies in the literature that examine the association between earnings 
quality and the three aspects of capital market. (2) Most of previous studies use accruals 
quality as a unique proxy for earnings quality; therefore, there are few studies that use the 
other earnings quality proxies in the literature. (3) There are few studies, which examine 
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the association between earnings quality and different proxies of analysts’ information 
environment and, consequently, a lack of relevant literature. (4) The earnings quality 
effect is not stronger or greater than the effect of other cost for equity capital determinants 
(nor would previous studies have expected it to be). (5) The weight of the existing 
empirical evidence also suggests that the bulk of capital market aspects effect of earnings 
quality appears to be associated with the component of earnings quality that is associated 
with the innate component; the earnings quality effects associated with the discretionary 
or reporting determinants are less important. (6) Most previous studies focusing on the 
impact of earnings quality on the aspects of capital market have been conducted in the 
US. This limits the generality of findings vis-à-vis contexts beyond the US. (7) As regards 
earning quality, there is somewhat mixed evidence on whether there are significant 
difference between the US GAAP and IFRS. It is difficult to select which of the two 
viewpoints has the upper hand. However, on balance, the researcher suggests that firms, 
which apply IFRS experience positive capital market effects. Also, although IFRS are 
less comprehensive than US GAAP, IFRS propose more discretion, which lead to more 
earnings management. Notwithstanding, there is a need to interpret those results carefully 
because of concerns about self-selection. In addition, there is no clear study examines the 
differences between UK firms (apply IFRS since 2005) and US firms (apply US GAAP). 
All of these findings point to the importance of this study. The next chapter discusses the 
research hypotheses and methodology. 
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Chapter 6:  Research Design: Hypotheses and Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher discusses the research hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between earnings quality and capital market aspects. Then, moving to the methodological 
issues that are engaged in order to empirically test the hypotheses of the research. 
Methodology section begins with the measurement of earnings quality proxies. Next, 
discussing the main variables of capital market aspects: the cost of equity capital; 
information asymmetry; and the analysts’ information environment along with the 
measures for each one of these variables. Next, discussing the control variables of each 
dependent variable. Then, moving to the research sample and the criteria used to 
determine this sample, including the data collection sources. Finally, it discusses the 
regression methods that used to test the research hypotheses and the assumptions of their 
validity.  
6.2 Research Hypotheses  
Collis and Hussey (2014) define research hypothesis as “an idea or proposition that is 
developed from the theory, which you can test for against empirical evidence using 
statistics.” (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p.51). Based on the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature, this study examines the association between accounting-based 
earnings quality proxies and three capital market aspects in the UK market.  
In particular, the theoretical and empirical studies in the accounting literature, as 
discussed before in chapter four and five, have investigated the associations between 
earnings quality and both the cost of equity capital and information asymmetry. The main 
hypothesis is that higher earnings quality is associated with lower information asymmetry 
and lower cost of equity capital. This hypothesis is based on the theory that high quality 
accounting information reduces information risk by reducing information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors, which in turn, is expected to lower the cost 
of equity capital. 
Theoretically, Easley and O'hara (2004) model examines how either private or public 
information affects the cost of capital of a firm. In their framework, the information 
asymmetry's source is between informed and uninformed investors. They argue that a 
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higher level of private information leads to higher levels of information asymmetry which 
increases the risk faced by uninformed investors when compared to informed investors. 
This risk is non-diversifiable which leads to uninformed investors asking for higher 
returns. Consequently, they conclude that firms can use the quantity and precision of 
information available to investors in order to affect their cost of capital.  
Continuing,  Lambert et al. (2012) investigate how the accounting information influences 
the cost of capital. In this regard, they find that the pricing effect as demonstrated by 
Easley and O'hara (2004), is diversifiable. Nevertheless, Lambert et al. (2012) document 
opportunities whereby the financial information quality could impact the cost of capital. 
In details, Lambert et al. (2012) design a setting based on the CAPM model. They choose 
their sample based on the correlation and covariance of firms’ cash flows and, then they 
add the information of accounting reports as noisy information about future cash flows. 
They find that the quality of accounting information has both direct and indirect effects 
on cash flows of firm. For the direct effect, they find that the higher quality of accounting 
information leads to reducing the assessed variance and covariance of the cash flows of 
firms. Then, they show that in large economies, the ‘variance’ effect is diversifiable, but 
the ‘covariance’ effect is non-diversifiable. Moving to the indirect effect, they find that 
the higher quality accounting information leads to unambiguous reduction of the cost of 
capital. Based on this result, they conclude, theoretically, that the quality of accounting 
information has a negative association with the cost of equity capital in the cross section, 
even with diversification opportunities. 
In summary, both Easley and O'hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2012) conclude that lower 
information quality leads to higher information risk which translates into non-
diversifiable risk and leads to a higher cost of capital. 
Empirically, in terms of the cost of equity capital, many studies investigate the association 
between the cost of equity capital and earnings quality. Most use accruals quality as a 
unique measure for earnings quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Ogneva, 
2012; Gray et al., 2009; Kim and Qi, 2010). A few studies use another unique proxy to 
measure earnings quality (e.g., McInnis, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2011; García Lara et 
al., 2011; Barth et al., 2013). Some use a number of different proxies to measure earnings 
quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Wong, 2009). In terms of the accruals quality proxy, 
previous studies agreed that there is a negative association between accruals quality and 
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the cost of equity capital except Core et al. (2008) who counter this argument. Most of 
the studies focus on US data except Gray et al. (2009) who focus on Australian data and 
Mouselli et al. (2013) who focus in the UK data. In terms of other accounting-based 
proxies, there are few studies that examine the association between these other proxies 
i.e., persistence, predictability and smoothness and the cost of equity capital with also 
mixed results. Therefore, the following hypothesis investigates whether there is a 
negative association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital in the UK 
after applying IFRS; in particular, the following hypothesis is examined: 
 
H1: Firms with high earnings quality have lower cost of equity capital than firms with 
low earnings quality.  
 
In terms of information asymmetry, there are few empirical studies investigate the 
association between earnings quality and information asymmetry and those produce 
mixed results (e.g., Jayaraman, 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Ascioglu et al., 2012). 
Also, all of them use US data and focus on accruals quality as a unique proxy of earnings 
quality. Consequently, the following hypothesis is examined. 
 
H2: Firms with high earnings quality have lower information asymmetry than firms with 
low earnings quality.  
 
Moving to analysts’ information environment, the hypotheses are influenced by two 
streams of literature. The first stream of literature examines the association between 
accounting information quality and the number of financial analysts following a firm. For 
the first stream, the accounting literature focuses mainly on the association between 
analysts following and firm disclosure quality. Therefore, the main hypothesis is whether 
firms with high disclosure quality have a large number of analysts following (Bhushan, 
1989). The main question centres on whether there is an association between the number 
of analysts following a firm and disclosure quality. The main issue is the association 
between the providing of information by a firm, and the supply and demand of analysts' 
 114 
 
services (Bhushan, 1989). This association depends on the role of financial analysts in 
the capital market. Here, there are two opposing view. If the analysts act as information 
intermediaries between firms and investors, then high quality disclosure by the firm will 
consequently enhance the quality of services provided by analysts. As a result, this 
increases the demand for the analysts' services, and leads to an increase the number of 
analysts following that firm (Bhushan, 1989). However, if the analysts are considered to 
be primary information providers in competition with firms to provide directly accounting 
information to users i.e. investors, therefore, any increase in disclosure quality by a firm 
will reduce the demands for the analysts' reports. In this case, improved corporate 
disclosure leads to lower number of analysts following firms (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Empirically, previous studies provide mixed results on the association between the quality 
of accounting information and analysts following. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that 
firms with more informative disclosure policies have a greater number of analysts 
following. Also, both Healy et al. (1999) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) findings 
suggest a positive association between disclosure quality and analysts following. 
Conversely, Barth et al. (2001) and Lehavy (2009) find that poor quality of accounting 
information disclosed by a firm leads to larger number of analysts following that firm. 
This is because their reports are likely to become more valuable and in greater demand 
by investors. Further, in terms of earnings quality, Lobo et al. (2012) find a negative 
association between accruals quality and analysts following after controlling for operating 
uncertainty. Overall, the question of whether the quality of accounting information has a 
significant impact on financial analysts following is still unclear. In order to shed further 
light on this issue, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H3: Analysts following are higher for firms with high earnings quality than firms with 
low earnings quality.  
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The second stream of literature examines the association between accounting information 
quality, and analysts' forecasts dispersion and accuracy. The direction of the association 
between the quality of accounting information and analysts’ forecasts dispersion relies on 
whether the differences among analysts’ forecasts are because of the differences of 
information available by firms or the differences in the forecasting models that analysts 
use (giving different weights to information) (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). If analysts use 
a common forecasting model and receive the same accounting information with some 
private information from a firm, they will give less weight to private information if the 
quality of accounting information is high. This leads to a lower dispersion among analysts 
forecasts. However, if analysts use different forecasting models and have the same public 
and private accounting information, in that case, higher quality in accounting information 
may lead to different conclusions amongst analysts; thus, a higher dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts (Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  
Moving to analysts’ forecasts accuracy, the impact of the quality of accounting 
information on analysts’ forecasts accuracy seems to be clear, to the extent that high 
quality of accounting information provided by the firm will increase the informativeness 
about that firm (Hope, 2003a; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Therefore, the analysts will be 
more reliant on the financial information in the annual report. This will help the analyst 
to accurately predict the future earnings. Consequently, high quality of accounting 
information increases the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. 
Empirically, while there is an extensive literature on the dispersion and accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts, very few studies examine the impact of earnings quality on analysts’ 
forecasts dispersion and accuracy (e.g., Lobo et al., 2012; Eames and Glover, 2003), with 
the majority focusing on the impact of disclosure quality (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; 
Barron et al., 1999; Hope, 2003a; Irani and Karamanou, 2003; Vanstraelen et al., 2003).  
In terms of earnings quality, Lobo et al. (2012) investigate the association between 
accruals quality and both analysts' forecasts dispersion and accuracy. They find that firms 
with lower accruals quality have larger analysts’ forecast errors and high forecasts 
dispersion. However, Eames and Glover (2003) test the association between earnings 
predictability and analysts' forecasts error and find no significant association. Therefore, 
these findings provide evidence that earnings quality is a multifaceted construct and the 
use of different proxies of earnings quality leads to different results. Overall, there are 
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mixed empirical results for the association between earnings quality and financial 
analysts' forecasts dispersion and accuracy. Therefore, the researcher tests the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H4: The dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is lower for firms with high earnings quality 
than firms with low earnings quality.  
H5: The accuracy of analysts' forecasts is greater for firms with high earnings quality 
than firms with low earnings quality.  
 
The models, used to examine the association between earnings quality and the three 
capital market aspects, do not distinguish between the innate and discretionary 
components of earnings quality. The innate component reflects the uncertainty due to 
intrinsic economic fundamentals such as operating environment and business models of 
the firm. However, the discretionary component arises from the financial reporting 
process, which includes: the managerial decisions; the information systems quality which 
support the financial reporting in the firm, corporate governance activities and the 
financial reporting standards e.g., IFRS or US GAAP (Francis et al., 2004; Francis et al., 
2005). The earnings management literature suggests a difference between the imprecision 
of earnings quality that arises from both components. Prior literature that isolates earnings 
quality into the innate and discretionary components, tests the association between these 
components and the cost of equity capital. For example, Francis et al. (2005) follow the 
lead of the earnings management literature and examine whether the innate and 
discretionary components of accruals have different effects on the cost of equity capital 
using a sample of US companies. They find that, when compared to the discretionary 
component, the innate component has a larger impact on the cost of equity capital. 
However, Gray et al. (2009) re-examine the same association in the Australian market 
and find that the association between total accruals quality and cost of equity capital is 
driven by the innate component, with no evidence that the discretionary component 
affects the cost of equity capital. Also, there are few studies that test the impact of these 
components on information asymmetry. Consequently, the following two hypotheses 
examine whether the effects of each earnings quality component is the same on either 
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information asymmetry or the cost of equity capital in the UK market, especially after the 
adoption of IFRS (considered to be a factor shaping the discretionary component). 
Specifically, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
H6: Both innate and discretionary components have the same impact on the cost of equity 
capital. 
H7: Both innate and discretionary components have the same impact on information 
asymmetry. 
 
Although, previous studies, e.g., Leuz et al. (2003), document that earnings management 
potentially plays an important role in explaining the ability of stock market participants, 
e.g., analysts, to forecast future earnings, there are few studies that examine the 
association between the components of earnings quality and analysts’ information 
environment. To add to the literature, the researcher examines whether the impact of the 
innate and discretionary components are the same on analysts’ information environment 
proxies. The following hypotheses are examined: 
 
H8: Both innate and discretionary components have the same impact on financial 
analysts following. 
H9: Both innate and discretionary components have the same impact on financial 
analysts’ dispersion. 
H10: Both innate and discretionary components have the same impact on financial 
analysts’ accuracy. 
 
Prior studies investigate earnings quality proxies in environment characterised by a 
sudden downturn brought on by a financial crisis. For example, Graham et al. (2000) 
investigate the association between earnings quality and market prices in Thailand in the 
period before and after the 1997 devaluation of the baht. They find a changing in the value 
relevance of firms after the crisis and this changing in associated with the volatility of 
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foreign exchange gains and losses by these firms. Davis-Friday et al. (2006) find that 
value relevance changed during the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. Choi et al. (2011) test the effects of the Asian financial crisis in earnings quality 
of nine Asian countries. They indicate that the loss of investor confidence and the 
increased use of opportunistic earnings management by the firms are due to breakdown 
of the credibility of discretionary earnings component. However, the impact on the 
information value of the innate earnings components was insignificant. Moreover, they 
conclude that the strength of a country's institutional infrastructure is associated with the 
deterioration in the information value of the discretionary earnings component. Recently, 
Filip and Raffournier (2014) investigate the impact of the financial crisis in 2008 and 
2009 on earnings quality of European firms by using the means of earnings management. 
They use a sample of 16 EU countries for the period 2006–2009. They conclude that 
earnings management has decreased significantly in the crisis years compared with the 
previous years but this trend is not the same for all the countries in the sample. Iatridis 
and Dimitras (2013) examine the impact of the financial crisis in 2008-2009 on earnings 
manipulation and value relevance of firms in five different countries, Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and Greece. They find that three countries of the sample, Portugal, Italy and 
Greece, tend to engage more in earnings management in their effort to increase their lower 
profitability and liquidity, and accommodate their higher debt and growth. Ireland 
exhibits less evidence of earnings manipulation, whereas the findings for Spain are to 
some extent conflicting. Kousenidis et al. (2013) use the same countries as previous study 
of  Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) and investigate the impact of financial crisis on seven 
earnings quality proxies which are earnings management, persistence, predictability, 
smoothness, value relevance, timeliness and conditional conservatism. They find that 
most of earnings quality proxies improved during the crisis. On the other hand, earnings 
quality reduced in the presence of incentives of earnings management. 
Using the financial crisis as a natural quasi-experiment, Francis et al. (2013) test the 
association between conservatism and shareholder value. They find that there is a 
significant positive association between conservatism and shareholder value during the 
crisis. To sum up, based on prior studies, there are mixed results on the role of the crisis 
on the quality of earnings. To add to the literature, the researcher examines whether the 
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financial crisis affects the association between earnings quality and both information 
asymmetry and the cost of equity capital. The following hypotheses are examined: 
 
 H11: Financial crisis has a significant effect on the association between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity capital. 
H12: Financial crisis has a significant effect on the association between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry. 
6.3 Research Methodology 
Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 55) define the research methodology as regarding "the overall 
approach to the research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and 
analysis of the data". There are two types of research methodology which are widely 
regarded as being essential to make distinctions; these are the qualitative versus the 
quantitative research methodology (Bailey, 1978). The qualitative research methodology 
was first developed for the social sciences studies in order to allow researchers to study 
social and cultural phenomena. Thereafter, the quantitative research methodology was 
developed primarily to study the natural phenomena in the natural sciences. Quantitative 
research deals with data that can be counted, frequently making use of statistical tests of 
numbers in order to summarise and examine the information (Locke et al., 2010). In 
addition to the two latter research methodology approaches, there is another methodology 
approach called “triangulation”. The triangulation approach refers to the use of different 
sources of data and different research methods to examine the same phenomenon in a 
research. This helps in reducing bias in data sources, and methods. For instance, the use 
of interviews and questionnaires methods together to test the research hypotheses (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). 
The choice between the three approaches depends on different criteria such as the 
objectives of the research, the hypotheses of the research and the nature of population that 
is being studied (Mariampolski, 2001). The quantitative research methodology is adopted 
for this study in order to collect and analyse data due to the objectives, the hypotheses 
and the nature of the population of this study. 
 120 
 
In chapter four, the researcher discusses the suitable paradigm and the theoretical 
framework of this study. To continue, the researcher divides the research methodology 
section into the following four additional sub-sections as follows. The first section 
determines the measurement of earnings quality proxies, capital market aspects and 
control variables. Sample selection is the second step to do analysis then data collection 
for the sample firms from databases then insert them into a statistical computer package. 
In the third section, a univariate analysis is performed in order to report the descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the multivariate analysis. Descriptive statistics present 
the mean, median, and standard deviation values of the variables for earnings quality 
proxies, capital market aspects and some firms' characteristics variables. Finally, different 
multivariate regressions are used to empirically test the hypotheses of this research. 
STATA computer software package is used to test the different hypotheses.  
6.3.1 Earnings quality measurement 
According to previous studies, earnings quality is a multifaceted concept and represents 
different angles (Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Walker, 2013). The researcher 
focuses on four earnings quality proxies: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness, which are namely, the accounting-based earnings 
quality proxies (see Francis et al., 2004). These proxies demonstrate different angles of 
earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Walker, 2013). In particular, 
accruals quality proxy reflects to what extent working capital accruals map into last-
period, current, and next-period cash flow from operations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
Therefore, the notion of using accruals quality as a proxy of earnings quality is based on 
the better this mapping explains the accruals, the lower is the residual from a regression 
based on these cash flows and the higher is the earnings quality. Moving to earnings 
persistence, it reflects to what extent there are stable, sustainable and less volatile earnings 
that is valued by investors (Francis et al., 2004; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). 
Therefore, the notion of using earnings persistence as a proxy of earnings quality is based 
on the view that more sustainable earnings are of higher earnings quality. Similar to 
earnings persistence, earnings predictability reflects to what extent the current earnings 
are used to predict future earnings. Therefore, the idea of using earnings predictability as 
a proxy of earnings quality is predicated on the view that an earnings number, which is 
likely to repeat itself is of high quality. Consequently, both earnings persistence and 
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predictability are viewed as desired proxies of earnings because it helps increasing the 
precision of earnings forecasts.  
As a proxy of earnings quality, it is unclear whether earnings smoothness represents high 
or low earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013). The common view 
suggests that earnings smoothness reflects the notion that managers use their private 
information about future earnings to smooth out transitory fluctuations earnings. Thus, 
they attain a more representative (normalized) reported earnings number. Therefore, 
current earnings that are more representative of future earnings, are of higher quality; 
consequently, smoother earnings point out higher quality earnings (Francis et al., 2006; 
Rountree et al., 2008). The next sub-sections discuss in details the measuring of each 
proxy of the accounting-based earnings quality proxies.  
6.3.1.1 Accruals quality 
Accruals quality (AQ) is defined as "the extent to which accruals map into cash flow 
realizations. This notion of accruals quality operationalize as the standard deviation of 
the residuals from firm-specific regressions of working capital accruals on last-year, 
current, and one-year-ahead cash flow from operations" (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, 
p.53). The measure of AQ is based on the model of Francis et al. (2005). This model is 
based on the modification of McNichols (2002) on Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach 
to estimate accruals quality. Specifically, the accruals quality proxy is based on the model 
of Dechow and Dichev (2002), along with the addition of two key variables from the 
modified Jones model, i.e., change in revenues and current property, plant and equipment 
(PPE): 
 
ܶܥܣ௝.௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௝ ൅ ߚଵ,௝
ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ିଵ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶ,௝
ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧
൅ ߚଷ,௝ ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ାଵܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚସ,௝
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚହ,௝
ܲܲܧ௝,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧
൅ ݒ௝,௧	
Equation (6-1) 
Where: 
ܶܥܣ௝.௧ ൌ 	∆ܥܣ௝,௧ െ	∆ܥܮ௝,௧ െ ∆ܥܽݏ ௝݄,௧ ൅ 	∆ܵܶܦܧܤ ௝ܶ,௧= total current accruals in year t. 
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧= average total assets of a firm in year t and t-1. 
ܥܨ ௝ܱ.௧ ൌ	operating cash flow of a firm in year t. 
∆ܥܣ௝,௧= change in current assets of a firm between year t-1 and year t. 
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∆ܥܮ௝,௧= change in current liabilities of a firm between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܥܽݏ ௝݄,௧= change in cash of a firm between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܵܶܦܧܤ ௝ܶ,௧= change in debt in current liabilities of a firm between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧= change in revenues of a firm between year t-1 and year t. 
ܲܲܧ௝,௧= gross PPE of a firm in year t. 
The Equation (6-1) is estimated for each of the 14 industry sectors with at least 12 firms 
in year t. Firm- and year-specific residuals which are consider to be the foundation for the 
accruals quality proxy are estimated on an annual cross-sectional basis: ܣܳ௝ ൌ 	ߪ	ሺݒ௝,௧ሻ 
is the standard deviation of the residuals of a firm, computed over year t-4 to t, large 
standard deviations of residuals indicating low/poor accruals quality. Nevertheless, if a 
firm has steady high residuals for a period of time, the standard deviation of these 
residuals will be small; hence this firm enjoys comparatively high accruals quality as a 
result of low uncertainty about its accruals. Whilst  the accruals of such firm has a poor 
mapping into cash flows,  this is an expected phenomenon, and does not have to be a 
motive for an uncertainty problem (Francis et al., 2005). 
6.3.1.2 Earnings persistence 
Earnings persistence refers to the earnings sustainability. Miller and Rock (1985) define 
earnings persistence as the present value of the change in anticipated future earnings 
because of current unexpected earnings. This study follows prior literature and measures 
earning persistence as the slope coefficient from regressing the current earnings on 
previous earnings (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2005): 
 ܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧ ൌ 	∅଴,௝ ൅ ∅ଵ,௝ ∗ ܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧ିଵ ൅ ݒ௝,௧ Equation (6-2) 
Where: 
Earn୨,୲ = net income before extraordinary items of a firm in year t. 
Earn୨,୲ିଵ = net income before extraordinary items of a firm in year t-1. 
Equation (6-2) is estimated for each firm-year by using maximum likelihood estimation 
and rolling ten-year windows. This measure is based on the slope coefficient estimate 
(∅ଵ) from Equation (6-2). Firms with higher value of ∅ଵ have higher earnings persistence, 
hence higher earnings quality, while lower value of ∅ଵ have higher transitory earnings, 
hence lower earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004). 
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6.3.1.3 Earnings predictability  
Lipe (1990) defines earnings predictability as the ability of preceding earnings to predict 
future earnings. This study measures earnings predictability as the square root of the 
estimated error variance from the equation of earnings persistence as do Francis et al. 
(2004): 
 ܲݎ݁ ௝݀,௧ ൌ ටߪଶሺݒො௝,௧ሻ Equation (6-3) 
Where: 
Predୡ,୲= earnings predictability of a firm in year t, calculated as the square root of the 
error variance from earnings persistence Equation (6-2).  
σଶሺvො୨,୲ሻ= the error variance of a firm in year t calculated from the earnings persistence 
equation. Thus, the higher (lower) of the square root of the estimated error variance, 
indicates the lower (higher) of predictability and lower (higher) of earnings quality.  
6.3.1.4 Earnings smoothness 
Investors usually search for gradually growing earnings with low volatility; this is 
because their expected return in this case will be positive. This earnings pattern is called 
earnings smoothness. This study measures earnings smoothness as the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the earnings of a firm, to its standard deviation of cash flow 
operations, both deflated by beginning total assets (Francis et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003; 
Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002). 
 ܵ݉݋݋ݐ ௝݄,௧ ൌ ߪሺܧܽݎ ௝݊,௧/ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵሻߪሺܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧/ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௝,௧ିଵሻ Equation (6-4) 
Where: 
Smoothୡ,୲ = earnings smoothness of a firm in year t. 
σ = standard deviation of a firm calculated over rolling ten-year windows. 
Earn୨,୲ = net income before extraordinary items of a firm in year t. 
CFO୨,୲ = operating cash flows of a firm in year t.  
According to Equation (6-4), smoothness is considered as a ratio of earnings variability 
to cash flow variability. Leuz et al. (2003) document that the earnings variability should 
be less than the cash flow variability. Hence, firms with higher values of earnings 
smoothness have lower earnings quality. 
In order to compare coefficient estimates across earnings quality proxies, the researcher 
ranks each proxy each year, and forms deciles. Firms in the bottom decile (decile 10) 
have the largest values of the proxy, whilst firms in the top decile (decile 1) have the 
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lowest values of the proxy. Given the definitions of the proxy measures, this ordering 
places firms with the worst (best) proxy outcome in the bottom (top) deciles. Earnings 
persistence is re-signed to be in the same direction as other three earnings quality proxies. 
Using the decile rank of each proxy instead of its raw value alleviates the effects of 
extreme observations (Francis et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005). 
6.3.2 The cost of equity capital measurement 
This study uses two different approaches to measure the cost of equity capital: earnings-
price ratios and the implied (ex-ante) measures of the cost of equity capital that are 
derived from the dividend valuation model.  
6.3.2.1  Earnings-price ratios 
Penman (2007) uses the price-earnings ratio as an inverse measure of the cost of equity 
capital in order to examine whether higher earnings quality leads to a higher price-
earnings ratio. In particular, this study examines the association between each earnings 
quality proxy and industry adjusted earnings–price ratios (IndEP). This is because the use 
of earnings–price ratios helps to manage concerns about the impact of small values of 
earnings on the denominator (Francis et al., 2005), and the addition of industry-
adjustment follows Alford (1992) who concludes that the use of industry sectors work 
well for choosing firms that are similar in terms of both growth and risk (Francis et al., 
2005). 
In order to calculate IndEP, it first calculates the median of earnings-price ratios for all 
firms in each of the 14 industry sectors15 which merely have positive earnings in the 
current year. Thereafter, the ܫ݊݀ܧܲ of each firm is calculated as the difference between 
the earnings-price ratio of the firm and the median earnings-price ratio of the same 
industry in the same year. If investors place lower multiples as a result of lower earnings 
quality, larger IndEP values of those earnings that have lower quality is expected.  
                                                 
15 There is a current year requirement of five positive earnings firms in each industry sector at the current 
year. 
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6.3.2.2 Implied cost of equity capital proxies 
The cost of equity capital is a forward-looking concept based on expected cash flows, so 
it is not directly observable (Singleton-Green, 2014). Therefore, this thesis extends the 
literature by computing the expected cost of equity capital through the application of 
recent methods of accounting and finance literature. These methods estimate the cost of 
equity capital as an implied rate of return of a valuation model utilising financial analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts and stock prices. The researcher uses four ex-ante measures 
that are derived from the classic dividend valuation model. These are, namely:  the Price 
Earnings Growth ratio model (PEG) (Easton, 2004); the modified PEG model (Easton, 
2004);  the economy-wide growth model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005); and the 
modified economy-wide growth model (Gode and Mohanram, 2003), In addition,  in 
order to reduce biases and measurement errors in the regression analysis (Hail and Leuz, 
2006), the researcher uses the average of the former four proxies as a proxy for the cost 
of equity capital. 
Easton (2004) introduced the PEG method in order to measure the cost of equity capital. 
The PEG model (rPEG) represents the classic dividend valuation model, because it 
assumes that abnormal earnings growth is zero and then the expected dividends in year  t 
+ 1 are also zero. Easton (2004) documents that the discounted dividend model could be 
simplified in the following equation, Equation (6-5), which he further uses to estimate the 
cost of equity capital. The reason beyond using Easton (2004) model as alternative proxy 
of the cost of equity capital, that Botosan et al. (2011) conclude that rPEG dominate the 
other models through embedding their associations with the firm-specific risk factors. 
Also, after adding the future realised return model and the impact of analysts forecast 
bias, they find that both analyses support the validity of rPEG, because, as predicted by 
theory, it has a strong association with both firm-specific risk and future realised returns. 
Also, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) conclude that two proxies, which they consider to be, 
rDIV and rPEG, are consistently and predictably associated with five firm-specific risk 
factors i.e., market risk, leverage risk, information risk, residual risk and growth. 
 ݎ௉ாீ ൌ ඨܧሺ݁݌ݏ௧ାଶሻ െ ܧሺ݁݌ݏ௧ାଵሻ௧ܲ Equation (6-5) 
 
 126 
 
Where: 
݁݌ݏ௧= the consensus analyst forecasts of earnings per share at the period t; ௧ܲ= price of 
the share at the period t. 
Also Easton (2004) shows a modified version of the PEG proxy as follows.  
 ݎெ௉ாீ ൌ ܣ ൅ ඥܣଶ ൅ ሺܧሺ݁݌ݏ௧ାଶሻ െ ሺܧሺ݁݌ݏ௧ାଵሻሻ/ ௧ܲ	 Equation (6-6) 
Where, 
ܣ ൌ ܧሺ݀݌ݏଵሻ/2 ଴ܲ 
E(݀݌ݏ) represents forecasted dividends.  
Turning to the economy-wide growth model, which Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
introduced as a proxy of the cost of equity capital, this model depends on a number of 
assumptions on the classic dividend valuation model. These are, namely, the market’s 
anticipations of short-term earnings and abnormal earnings that reflect the timeframe of 
forecasted earnings (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). This proxy places an emphasis on 
abnormal earnings growth with no clean surplus accounting; this is a common 
requirement by previous models (e.g., Ohlson, 1995). The ݎை௃ே model differs from a 
traditional residual income model by determining EPS, instead of book value per share 
(PVPS), as the main forecasting benchmark; this is much easier to apply empirically. 
 
ݎை௃ே
ൌ ܣ
൅	ඩܣଶ ൅ ൬݁݌ݏ௧ାଵ
௧ܲ
൰ ൈ ቐ
݁݌ݏ௧ାଷ െ ݁݌ݏ௧ାଶ݁݌ݏ௧ାଶ ൅
݁݌ݏ௧ାହ െ ݁݌ݏ௧ାସ݁݌ݏ௧ାସ
2 െ ሺߛ െ 1ሻቑ 
Equation 
(6-7) 
Where: 
ܣ ൌ 12	൬ߛ െ 1 ൅
݀݌ݏ௧ାଵ
௧ܲ
൰ 	and	 
݁݌ݏ௧= earnings per share at the period t. ݀݌ݏ௧= dividends per share at the period t. ߛ = the risk-free rate less three percent, whilst the three percent represents economy-wide 
growth. 
From the economy-wide growth model, Gode and Mohanram (2003) developed a new 
version which is as follows: 
  ீݎ ெ ൌ ܣ ൅	ඨܣଶ ൅ ൬݁݌ݏ௧ାଵ௧ܲ ൰ ൈ ൜
݁݌ݏ௧ାଶ െ ݁݌ݏ௧ାଵ
݁݌ݏ௧ାଵ െ ሺߛ െ 1ሻൠ Equation (6-8) 
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Finally, the mean of the four proxies of the cost of equity capital as follows: 
 ݎெ௘௔௡ ൌ	 The average of  ݎ௉ாீ, ݎெ௉ாீ, ݎை௃ே, ீݎ ெ Equation (6-9) 
6.3.3 Information asymmetry measurement 
In accounting literature, information asymmetry is often measured by the bid-ask spread 
on the share price, which reflects the risk in holding the stocks of the firms, if other things 
being equal. Improved the quality of accounting information should decrease both 
uncertainties surrounding the firm’s prospects and any advantages that insiders may have 
through holding private information. These changes should allow market makers to 
decrease their bid-ask spreads (Singleton-Green, 2014). This study follows 
microstructure literature in measuring information asymmetry by using the bid-ask spread 
proxy (Huang and Stoll, 1996).  Specifically, information asymmetry is measured by 
using the percentage quoted spread; this is the raw spread (ask – bid) deflated by the 
midpoint of the bid and ask quotes: 
 ܲ݁ܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܳݑ݋ݐ݁݀ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൌ ሺܣܵܭ െ ܤܫܦሻሺܣܵܭ ൅ ܤܫܦሻ/2 ൈ 100	 Equation (6-10) 
Also, the percentage effective spread proxy is used as a sensitivity measure for 
information asymmetry, this is multiplying the price twice minus the midpoint of the bid-
ask spread deflated by the midpoint of bid-ask spread: 
 
%݂݂݁݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ ൌ 2หܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁௧ െ ܯ݅݀ܲ݋݅݊ݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧หܯ݅݀ܲ݋݅݊ݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝௧ ൈ 100 
Equation 
(6-11) 
This study is interested in examining the impact of earnings quality on information 
asymmetry generally rather than of at a particular announcement date. This is because; 
there is no exact date during the year to examine the most impact of earnings quality on 
investors. Although the financial information of the annual report is issued on specific 
days, it is difficult to define the date on which the financial information reached the stock 
market and impact on the investors’ decisions. Therefore, the closing-day of stock prices 
and bid and ask quotes are used to estimate daily percentage quoted and effective spread. 
Then, a monthly mean percentage quoted and effective spread are estimated by using the 
daily percentage and effective spread, then a yearly mean percentage quoted and effective 
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spread are estimated by using the twelve months of the fiscal year. These averages 
“annual” quoted and effective spread are used as proxies of information asymmetry.  
6.3.4 Analysts’ information environment measurement 
This study uses the number of analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and the 
analysts’ forecasts accuracy as proxies for analysts’ information environment. This is 
because they are more direct proxies of the impact of the quality of accounting 
information on analysts’ information environment compared to other analyst-related 
proxies such as stock recommendation or the frequency of analysts’ forecasts (Byard et 
al., 2011). This study measures analysts following as the maximum number of financial 
analysts forecasting annual earnings for a firm during the fiscal year t. In terms of 
financial analysts' dispersion, it measures by the standard deviation of financial analysts' 
forecasts in the fiscal year t deflated by stock price. Finally, financial analysts' accuracy 
is measured by the negative of the absolute value of the financial analysts' forecast error, 
deflated by stock price. The financial analysts' forecast errors are measured as the 
difference between the actual earnings per share and the median of forecasts by financial 
analysts of a firm in year t. The researcher uses the stock price as a dominator in analysts' 
dispersion and as measurement of accuracy in order to ease the comparisons across firms. 
Using the negative sign of absolute analyst's error for accuracy measurement is to 
represent the higher value since most analysts’ forecasts are accurate.  
Also, following Ali et al. (1992); Easterwood and Nutt (1999);  and Thomas and Zhang 
(2002), the outliers for financial analysts’ forecasts accuracy and dispersion are 
winsorised. For analysts’ forecasts accuracy, any observations that have forecasts error 
for a firm greater than the related share price are treated as outliers. For analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion, any observations that have forecasts dispersion of a firm greater than twenty 
percent were also winsorised from the sample. 
As mentioned in the information asymmetry measurement section, this study, also, is 
interested to examine the impact of earnings quality on financial analysts generally 
instead of at a particular announcement date. Therefore, the three dependent proxies of 
financial analysts are based on the annual analysts' forecasts of earnings made which are 
calculated as the average of the proxy over the twelve months of the specific year (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996). Finally, in order to mitigate the effects of the outliers, all variables 
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including earnings quality proxies and control variables are  winsorised to the 1 and 99 
percentiles (Francis et al., 2005).  
6.3.5 Control variables 
The control variables are classified into three groups regarding the dependent variable: 
the cost of equity capital, information asymmetry and the analysts’ information 
environment. 
6.3.5.1 Control variables of the cost of equity capital 
The hypothesised association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital is 
based on the assumption that other variables are held constant. Previous studies suggest 
four control variables that may affect the cost of equity capital: firm size, beta (CAPM), 
leverage and growth (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). Therefore, the researcher 
adds those variables to the regression model. This study measures firm size as a log of 
total assets in year t. Beta (CAPM) is calculated from 5-year rolling data acquired from 
firm-specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 
monthly observations. Leverage is measured as the total interest bearing debt divided by 
total assets in year t. Finally, growth is measured as a log of 1 plus the percentage change 
in the book value of equity over the preceding 5 years. The researcher expects positive 
associations between the cost of equity capital and both beta and leverage (Francis et al., 
2005; Gray et al., 2009). The researcher also expects negative associations between the 
cost of equity capital and both firm size and growth (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 
2009). 
6.3.5.2 Control variables of information asymmetry 
For information asymmetry, the researcher adds three control variables to the regression 
that may affect information asymmetry according to prior literature (e.g., Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Cohen, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2013). Those variables are: firm size, 
Trading volume and standard deviation of stock returns. The researcher expects a negative 
association between information symmetry and both firm size and trading volume, and a 
positive association between information asymmetry and standard deviation of stock 
returns (Stoll, 1978; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Cohen, 2003; 
Leuz, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2013). 
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6.3.5.3 Control variables of analysts’ information environment 
For analysts following regression, the researcher adds three variables to the regression 
which, according to the previous studies, may affect the analysts following. Those 
variables are: firm size, standard deviation of ROE and firm growth. Bhushan (1989) and 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find a positive association between analysts following and 
both  firm size and standard deviation of ROE. Cohen (2003) finds a significant positive 
association between firm’s growth and the number of analysts following such a firm. 
Moving to the analysts’ forecasts dispersion regression, the researcher adds four control 
variables that may affect analysts’ dispersion: the log of total number of analysts 
following a firm, firm size, standard deviation of ROE and earnings surprise. Previous 
studies suggest a negative association between analysts’ forecasts dispersion and firm 
size, because large firms are expected to have high quality disclosure, which in turn leads 
to greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy and less analysts’ forecasts dispersion. Also, since 
the opinion toward a single firm can be more diverse when more analysts’ follow the 
firm, they document a negative association between analysts’ forecasts dispersion and the 
log of number of analysts following. Moreover, previous studies suggest a positive 
association between analysts’ forecasts dispersion and standard deviation of ROE and 
earnings surprise, because more performance may be more difficult to predict; thus, less 
accuracy and more dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; 
Cohen, 2003; Eames and Glover, 2003; Lobo et al., 2012; Jiao et al., 2012). Finally, the 
researcher adds four control variables for the regression of analysts’ forecasts accuracy: 
the log of number of analysts following, firm size, standard deviation of ROE and 
earnings surprise. Previous studies find a positive association between the analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy and both number of analysts following and firm size. Also, they find 
negative associations between analysts’ forecasts accuracy and both standard deviation 
of ROE and earnings surprise (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Cohen, 2003; Eames and 
Glover, 2003; Lobo et al., 2012; Jiao et al., 2012).  
6.3.6  Sample and data 
Table 6-1 presents the sample construction process. The initial sample of this study covers 
all non-financial firms listed on the London stock exchange during the period from 2005 
to 2011. Two databases are used to collect data: firstly, the DataStream database, which 
offered by Thomson Reuters, secondly, the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
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(1/B/E/S). This database was developed by the Lynch, Jones and Ryan brokerage house 
during the 1970s and represents the most comprehensive dataset in the earnings estimates 
industry. It provides earnings expectation data over a 30-year period for 35,000 firms 
worldwide. Both databases have excellent reputations for historical data and, amongst the 
practitioner and academic communities, are well-known for their high quality and depth. 
The DataStream database is used for earnings quality proxies, earnings-price ratio (the 
cost of equity capital main proxy), information asymmetry and the number of analysts 
following. The I/B/E/S Database is used for analysts’ forecasts dispersion, analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy and the implied cost of equity capital proxies (robustness tests).  
Following the literature review, this study excludes the financial institutions from the 
sample because their financial reporting processes are unlikely to conform to other 
industries. Financial institutions, as regulated industries, use industry specific accounting 
rules and therefore differ in their incentives to earnings quality (Peasnell et al., 2005). 
There is regulatory monitoring of financial institutions that is related explicitly to 
accounting data. A consequence of such regulations is that it creates incentives for firms 
to manage their income statements and balance sheet variables in ways which are of 
interest to regulators (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Despite the overall quality of the two databases, there are numbers of missing and 
inconsistencies observations. In addition, this sample is restricted to two restrictions: (1) 
each firm requires at least seven consecutive years of data because accruals quality proxy 
is calculated as the standard deviation of five consecutive annual residuals. In addition, 
there is a need for both lead and lag cash flows in the regression of accruals quality (see 
Equation (6-1)). (2) Further, it is required that data on all four proxies of earnings quality 
are available for each firm-year. In total, there are 8,175 firm-year observations 
representing 28% of all companies which date is available in the DataStream. The number 
of firms each year ranges between 1,074 and 1,224.  
Table 6-2 represents the industry composition of the sample observations. The industry 
membership is defined by ICBSSN returns stating the name of the ICB industry under which 
the equity is classified. The FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) hierarchy 
provides eighteen industries, which can be used for the identification of macroeconomic 
opportunities for investment and trading decisions as given by the DataStream Database. Four 
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industries are excluded, namely, Banks and Financial Services, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Utilities. There are still fourteen industries as shown in Table 6-2.  
Table 6-1: The sample construction process 
 Firm-year observations Distinct firms Percentage 
Total Population 29,030 4,346 100% 
Missing Observations 20,855 2,641 71.8% 
EQ proxies ' observations 8,175 1,705 28.2% 
Table 6-2: the number of firms per industry for each year 
Industry Number of Firms 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total % 
Automobiles & Parts 9 9 10 8 7 7 6 56 0.7% 
Basic Resources 38 44 52 66 78 99 116 493 6.0% 
Chemicals 20 21 22 22 20 23 23 151 1.8% 
Construction & Materials 43 42 40 37 36 38 37 273 3.3% 
Food & Beverage 41 41 37 39 39 39 40 276 3.4% 
Health Care 74 79 99 104 113 102 96 667 8.2% 
Industrial Goods & Services 296 314 316 324 324 311 299 2,184 26.7% 
Media 81 91 92 95 98 92 87 636 7.8% 
Oil & Gas 31 38 51 65 74 85 90 434 5.3% 
Personal & Household 78 74 72 69 62 59 59 473 5.8% 
Retail 84 88 83 75 70 64 56 520 6.4% 
Technology 163 165 184 188 186 172 157 1,215 14.9% 
Telecommunications 19 18 21 24 26 23 24 155 1.9% 
Travel & Leisure 97 96 94 91 91 91 82 642 7.9% 
Total 1074 1120 1173 1207 1224 1205 1172 8175 100% 
6.3.7 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6-3 reports, for the pooled sample, the descriptive statistics on earnings quality, the 
three capital market aspects and firms characteristics. Mean and median values of AQ are 
0.084 and 0.059 respectively; as a benchmark, Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and 
median values of 0.028 and 0.020, respectively. For persistence, the mean and median are 
0.316 and 0.287; as a benchmark, Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and median values 
of 0.482 and 0.520 respectively. For predictability, the mean and median are 0.736 and 
0.074 respectively. In comparison, Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and median values 
of earnings predictability as 0.876 and 0.536 respectively. Finally, the mean and median 
of earnings smoothness are 1.23 and 1.03 respectively. However, Francis et al. (2004) 
provide mean and median values of earnings smoothness as 0.640 and 0.578. These 
results indicate that, in the UK, the quality of earnings is less than the quality of earnings 
in the US. This finding provides initial evidence that that US GAAP is better than IFRS 
in terms of earnings quality, especially for earnings smoothness. In this regard, the results 
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show a double average for the UK sample compared to the US sample in the study of 
Francis et al. (2004). 
Moving to dependent variables, it reports the mean and the median of IndEP are 0.036 
and 0.009 respectively. For information asymmetry, the mean and median are 7.22% and 
4.18% respectively. Bhattacharya et al. (2011) document mean and median of bid-ask 
spread in the US at 29% and 17% respectively, which indicate that the spread in US are 
narrower than the UK which is consistent with the study of Schwartz (1991). For analysts’ 
information environment proxies, the mean and median of number of analysts following 
a firm are 6 and 3 respectively. Lang et al. (2003) document that the median of analysts 
following in UK market is around 4, Also, Mouselli and Hussainey (2014) document that 
the mean (median) of analysts following in UK market are around 10 (9). One explanation 
for a lower median number in the sample is the downturn in the financial industry during 
the period covered by the sample. Also, previous studies in the US indicate mean 
(median) analysts following to be around 13 (9) as shown in the study of Lobo et al. 
(2012) or 17(16) as the study of Lang and Lundholm (1996). For analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion, the mean and median are 0.82 and 0.36 respectively. For analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy, the mean and median are -0.46 and -0.04 respectively. Moreover, it reports 
summary information on selected financial variables. The mean of total assets are about 
£1,400 million and the median of total assets are about £62 million; the mean revenues 
are about £1,000 million and the median revenues are about £53 million.  
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Table 6-3: Descriptive statistics on earnings quality, capital market aspects and 
firm characteristics, 2005-2011 
Variable n Mean Standard Deviation 25% Median 75% 
AQ  8175 0.0838 0.0783 0.0354 0.0586 0.103 
Persistence 8175 0.316 0.465 -0.0029 0.287 0.61 
Predictability 8175 0.736 3.841 0.0302 0.074 0.188 
Smoothness 8175 1.233 0.846 0.708 1.034 1.466 
IndEP 5203 0.0357 0.0906 -0.0111 0.0088 0.0463 
Information Asymmetry 6627 7.219 8.07 1.003 4.181 10.13 
Following 5008 6.072 6.655 1 3 9 
Dispersion 3344 0.82 0.015 0.14 0.36 0.78 
Accuracy 4701 -0.46 0.0229 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 
Total Assets (£mils) 6985 1400 4900 14 62 360 
Market Value (£mils) 7906 748.6 2900 9.28 38.56 217.9 
Revenue (£mils) 6985 1000 3200 10 53 370 
ROA 6973 -0.036 0.252 -0.0516 0.0347 0.0798 
EP Ratio 5203 0.0988 0.0934 0.0495 0.0704 0.111 
Size 6985 11.27 2.379 9.575 11.03 12.8 
Beta 7950 0.889 0.687 0.413 0.821 1.287 
Leverage 6963 0.182 0.201 0.0071 0.137 0.277 
Growth 6287 0.577 1.294 -0.111 0.449 1.133 
BTM 6936 -0.514 0.993 -1.079 -0.494 0.0953 
Trading volume 7613 10.21 2.498 8.68 10.28 11.9 
σሺReturnሻ 7037 48.02 29.8 27.86 39.88 58.67 
SURP 6961 0.187 0.556 0.013 0.044 0.133 
NegEarn 8175 3.301 2.988 0 3 6 
OperCycle 5413 4.819 0.835 4.357 4.812 5.215 
σሺCFOሻ 8175 42 150 1.2 3.7 15 
σሺSalesሻ 8175 220 680 3.6 16 87 
Sample description and variable definitions: The sample contains firms with data on all four earnings 
proxies in a given year t, the total sample = 8,175 firm-year observations over 2005-2011 (14 industries). 
IndEP is the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the median earnings–price ratio of its industry. Information 
Asymmetry = the percentage quoted spread; this is measured as the difference between the annual mean of 
Ask price and Bid price deflated by Spread multiplied by 100. Following = the maximum number of 
financial analysts forecasting annual earnings for a firm during the fiscal year t. Dispersion = the standard 
deviation of financial analysts' forecasts in the fiscal year t deflated by stock price multiplied by 100. 
Accuracy = the negative of the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings per share and 
the median of forecasts by financial analysts, deflated by stock price of a firm in year t multiplied by 100.  
Total Assets = total assets in millions in year t. Revenue = net revenues in millions in year t.  ROA = Return 
on Assets in year t. EP Ratio = Earnings / Price in year t. Size = log of total assets in year t; Leverage = 
total interest bearing debt deflated by total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the changing percentage 
in the book value of equity over the past 5 years; The 5-year rolling pre-estimated Beta obtained from firm-
specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly returns for 
this estimation; BTM = Book to market ratio in year t. Market value = market value of equity in year t. 
σሺReturnሻ= standard deviation of stock returns over the preceding 10 years of a firm. Trading volume: 
total trading volume of a firm in year t. SURP = earnings surprise which calculated as the absolute value of 
the difference between the earnings per share for year t and t-1, deflated by stock price at the beginning of 
year t. σሺReturnሻ = standard deviation of stock returns over the preceding 10 years of a firm. σሺCFOሻ = the 
standard deviation of operating cash flow of a firm computed over the preceding 10 years, σሺSalesሻ = the 
standard deviation of net revenue of a firm computed over the preceding 10 years, OperCycle = the log of 
operating cycle of a firm in year t, NegEarn = the number of years that a firm reported net income < 0 out 
of the preceding 10 years. 
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Table 6-4 reports the correlations between the decile ranking of the four earnings quality 
proxies. The results show statistically significant positive correlations across all four 
earnings measures. However, whilst all correlations are significant at the 1% level, none 
can be considered to be particularly high, with the highest being between smoothness and 
predictability at 0.35, whilst accruals quality is instead most highly correlated with 
persistence, but only then at 0.05. This finding, indicative of the notion that the four 
earnings quality proxies are not substitutes for each other, is consistent with prior studies 
that also document similarly low correlations (Francis et al., 2004; Bowen et al., 2008; 
Dechow et al., 2010). Whilst such low correlations may point to noise in the measurement 
of earnings quality they would seem also to suggest there are some significant differences 
in the underlying notion of earnings quality captured by each measure (Dichev et al., 
2013). However, irrespective of this, they give a reason to expect that the four earnings 
quality measures may differentially affect the capital market, and thus, this finding 
strengthens the importance of the current study. 
Table 6-4: Correlation among earnings quality proxies 
 AQ Persistence Predictability Smoothness 
AQ 1.00  
<.0001  
Persistence 0.05 1.00  
<.0001 <.0001  
Predictability 0.03 0.21 1.00  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
Smoothness 0.02 0.23 0.35 1.00 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
The total sample = 8,175 firm-year observations over 2005-2011 (14 industries). Pearson correlations are 
used. Significance levels are shown in italics. 
  
6.3.8 Multivariate analysis 
Using a univariate analysis only may not be enough especially for complex data sets. 
Therefore, multivariate analysis is deemed to be more robust than a univariate analysis in 
detecting significant relationships between the dependent and independent variables on 
the grounds of its ability to control for the interrelationships between the independent 
variables. Multivariate analysis allows not only the examination of the collective impact 
of such variables but, also, the determination of which variables are best at explaining 
variations in the dependent variable (Gujarati, 2003).  A significant relationship in a 
multivariate regression analysis implies that a specific independent variable has a 
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significant relationship with the dependent variable once the impact of other variables, 
which affect the dependent variables are controlled in the statistical model including one 
dependent variable and more than one independent variable. Additional and sometimes 
even contradictory results may be found through using multivariate analysis. Therefore, 
the results of the multivariate regression are given greater consideration in this study. This 
study uses three different multivariate regression methods: Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regression, Newey and West (1987) pooled regression and panel data with fixed and 
random effects regression. 
6.3.8.1 Fama and MacBeth regression 
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973) method, the researcher evaluates the models based 
on independent variables for each of the seven years in the sample, then calculates the 
coefficients as the mean values of yearly coefficients. The t-statistic is calculated as 
ሺ̅ݔ	/ሺ௦ೣ√௡ሻ, where the x's are the regression coefficients for the individual year, ݏ௫ is the 
standard deviation of the regression coefficients across the years, and n is the number of 
years.  As occurred in previous studies (e.g., Francis et al., 2005), the Fama-MacBeth 
analysis is performed for the full sample in terms of the period from 2005 to 2011. There 
are two advantages of adopting this approach as follows. Firstly, from an economic 
standpoint, the estimation of the regression equation on an annual basis addresses the 
potential serial correlation problem encountered in the data. Secondly, there may be 
information to be gained from the time-series pattern of the coefficients. By exploring the 
nature and strength of the relationship over time, the researcher can depict time-related 
changes on a systematic basis.  For comparison purposes, the models are estimated by 
using Newey and West (1987) pooled regressions for the entire sample in the period from 
2005 to 2011.  
6.3.8.2 Newey and West (1987) pooled regression  
This study uses a pooled regression (constant coefficients model) over the seven-year test 
period (2005-2011) in order to examine the association between earnings quality and 
different aspects of capital market. Compared to a cross-sectional approach, the main 
advantage of a pooled data is that it allows the researcher far greater flexibility in 
modelling differences in behaviour across firms (Greene, 2012). Also, pooled data can 
improve the identification of significant relationships and the effects of measurement 
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measuring effects; basically, these cannot be observed in both pure cross-sectional or pure 
time-series data (Gujarati, 2003). By combining the time series of cross-section 
observations, pooled data increase the sample size considerably and give more 
informative data, more variability among cross-sections and over time, less collinearity 
among variables, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency (Gujarati, 2003, p. 637).  
6.3.8.3 Panel data with fixed and random effects 
In the last decade, the interest in panel data analysis has increased significantly (Greene, 
2012). Such interest is driven mainly by the rich environment for the development of 
estimation techniques and theoretical results. Panel data is used in this study as a 
robustness test. Panel data analysis has primary advantages and disadvantages in relative 
to cross-sectional and time series analysis.  
The main advantage of panel data analysis compared to cross-sectional analysis, is it gives 
the researcher more flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across individuals. 
The researcher can pool individual time series across a number of units (e.g., firms) and 
analyse them simultaneously, because of the nature of this data (i.e., repeated 
observations over the same unit over a number of periods). As a result, the researchers 
can develop more complicated and realistic models in relative to either a single cross-
section or a single time series. In addition, panel data estimators do not clarify only why 
individual units behave differently but, also, it enables them to carry out analysis 
pertaining to why individual units behave differently during different periods. Panel 
datasets are normally larger than cross-sectional or time series datasets, and the 
explanatory variables vary over at least two dimensions (e.g., individuals and time) rather 
than one. Consequently, estimators based on panel data are likely to be more accurate 
than from other sources (Verbeek, 2012). Verbeek and Nijman (1992) do a 
comprehensive analysis to choose among a pure panel data, a pure cross-section and a 
combination of these two data sources. They suggest that, when exogenous variables are 
included in the model and one is interested in the parameters, which measure the effects 
of these variables, typically a panel dataset would yield more efficient estimators than a 
series of cross-sections with the same number of observations. Another advantage of 
panel data is that it reduces identification problems. With panel data, it is possible to 
control for some types of omitted variables. In the case of a fixed effects estimator, the 
omitted variables that differ between cases, are controlled but are constant over time. On 
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the other hand, a random effects model controls for variables that vary which are different 
in each cases and  over time (Hsiao, 2003).  
However, the disadvantage of panel data can be summarised into the following points. 
Firstly, because observing the same units over time is repeated, it is usually no longer 
appropriate to assume that different observations are independent. This may complicate 
the analysis, particularly in nonlinear and dynamic models. Secondly, panel data suffer 
generally from the missing observation problem. However, Verbeek and Nijman (1992, 
p. 681) argued that 'missing observations are a rule rather than an exception in panel 
datasets'. 
There are two types of panel data analysis are used in this research; these are the fixed 
and random effects models. The fixed effects model is simply a linear regression model 
in which the intercept varies over the individual units (e.g., firms) but still assume that 
the slope coefficients are constant through units. This model is estimated by introducing 
dummy variables to account for the individual (firm) effect (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 
2010). It allows the researcher to use the changes in variables over time to estimate the 
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. However, there may be 
frequent instances when the fixed effects model has too many cross-sectional units. 
Consequently, there is a need for many dummy variables within its specification. It is 
accepted that too many dummy variables may have an impact upon the number of degrees 
of freedom and therefore on the statistical tests. Moreover, a model with many such 
variables may be plagued with multicollinearity; this increases the standard errors and 
thereby reduces the statistical power necessary to test parameters. 
A random effect model is considered to be an alternative approach to the fixed effects 
model; the random effects model, assumes that the constant of an individual cross-
sectional unit is a random drawing from more larger population with a constant mean 
value (Gujarati, 2003). Then, the individual intercept is considered to be a deviation from 
this constant mean value. Wooldridge (2010) argues that the ideal random effects 
assumptions include all the fixed effects assumptions plus the additional requirement that 
the constant is independent of all explanatory variables. One advantage of the random 
effects model over the fixed effects model is that it is economical in degrees of freedom 
(Gujarati, 2003).  
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In order to determine whether a fixed or a random effects model is more appropriate, a 
Hausman test is performed. Fundamentally, this test investigates whether there is a 
correlation between constant independent variables. This is because the fixed effects 
model produces consistent results when constant and independent variable are correlated, 
but the random effects model produces inconsistent result. A statistically significant 
difference (i.e., the existence of a correlation between constant and dependent variable) 
is interpreted as evidence against the random effects model. 
6.3.8.4 Regression Assumptions 
Based on earnings quality literature, the OLS regression is the most common method to 
test the statistical association between earnings quality and the three capital market 
aspects. It is important to check that the data have met the assumptions underlying OLS 
regression, to assure that the results are not distorted. These assumptions are normality, 
homogeneity of variance (homoscedasticity) linearity and no multicollinearity (Field, 
2005). 
6.3.8.4.1 The normality of residuals 
The residuals (or error term) of the model are assumed to be normally distributed and 
have a mean of zero. This means that the difference between the fitted model and the 
observed data is close to zero. Lack of a normal distribution in the residuals does not 
affect coefficients or standard error of estimate (SEE), but it can affect confidence 
intervals and significance tests (especially for small samples). Residuals are measured by 
the difference between the observed value of the dependant variable and the value 
predicted by the regression line, and can be positive (when a case is above the line of best 
fit) or negative (when a case is below the line of best fit). 
The researcher examines the assumption of normality using the Stata program as follows: 
first, the regression is conducted, then the researcher runs the predict command to 
generate the residuals of the regression model. Then, the researcher runs the Kdensity 
command to create a Kernal density plot with the normal option. Figure 6-1 shows the 
kernel density plot of the main regressions of this thesis. It indicates that number of 
regressions have a normality problem. This normality could be ignored as Gujarati (2003) 
and Brooks (2008) document, if the sample size is reasonably large.  
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Figure 6-1: A kernel density plot 
6.3.8.4.2 Heteroskedasticity 
Any variance in the error term (residuals) is assumed to be constant and random for all 
values of the independent variables. If the variance of the residuals is non constant then 
the residual variance is called "heteroscedastic." The Breusch-Pagan and White tests are 
used to check the heteroskedasticity. The researcher uses the commands of hettest and 
imtest to run both tests. Table 6-5 indicates that the p-values are small, which leads to a 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the variance of residuals is homogenous. To solve 
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this problem, the researcher uses the Newey and West (1987) standard error pooled 
regression to control the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation effects (Francis et al., 
2005). 
Table 6-5: Heteroskedasticity tests 
Regression The Breusch-Pagan The White test Chi2 p-value Chi2 p-value 
IndEP 16.13 0.0001 140.21 0.0000 
InfoAsymmetry 1273.44 0.0000 1434.76 0.0000 
Following 875.91 0.0000 736.81 0.0000 
Dispersion 1200.18 0.0000 191.98 0.0000 
Accuracy 12633.68 0.0000 546.31 0.0000 
6.3.8.4.3 Linearity   
There is no assumption that the independent variables (IVs) in the model are normally 
distributed, but there is an assumption of multivariate normality, which means that the 
dependant variable (DV) has a linear relationship with each of the IVs in the model. This 
can be tested using scatterplots of the DV against each of the IVs before modelling takes 
place. Modelling a non-linear relationship using a linear model may lead to mis-
interpretation and limit the generalizability of the model. The researcher performs qqplot 
test to check the linearity of the data and finds that the data indicates a linear relationship. 
6.3.8.4.4 Multicollinearity of independent variables 
While it is assumed that there will be a linear relationship between the DV and the IVs, it 
is assumed that there will be no perfect linear relationship between any of the IVs. Where 
there is a strong correlation between two independent variables, we have multicollinearity 
in the model. This essentially means two predictors are included that measure the same 
thing. Where this occurs, it cannot get a unique estimate of the regression coefficients 
because there are an infinite number of coefficients that may work equally as well (see 
Field, 2005, p. 174). This means that variables which have a significant effect on the DV 
may appear to be non-significant in the model because their effect is being confounded 
by another IV. The researcher examines the assumption of no multicollinearity of IV 
using the Stata programme. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) is calculated to 
quantify the severity of multicollinearity in each regression analyses. VIFs above ten are 
thought to indicate severe multicollinearity problems (Field, 2005). Table 6-6 provides 
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the values of VIF. The results show none of the VIFs are above three, which suggests that 
multicollinearity does not pose a problem to the regression analyses.  
Table 6-6: The VIF values 
Variable name VIF values IndEP InfoAsymmetry Following Dispersion Accuracy 
Size 1.39 2.46 1.22 2.80 1.25 
Leverage 1.20     
Beta 1.05     
Growth 1.04  1.03   
Trading volume  1.94    
σሺReturnሻ  1.24    
σሺROEሻ   1.07 1.03 1.05 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ    2.09  
SURP    1.03 1.02 
AQ 1.20 1.29  1.20 1.25 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter is classified into two main sections: firstly, to identify the different 
hypotheses that are test in this study. Secondly, the research methodology that follows to 
test these hypotheses. The research methodology section begins by giving a definition of 
research methodology as “The overall approach to the research process, from the 
theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of the data" Collis and Hussey 
(2009, p. 55). Then, it moves on discussing the different approaches of research 
methodology and which approach is appropriate for this study. The quantitative 
approaches is used in this study, which help in dealing with data that can be counted, and 
make frequent use of statistical tests of numbers to summarise and examine the 
information (Locke et al., 2010). Then, the researcher discusses the different proxies that 
used to measure the main variables of the model. It begins with earnings quality proxies 
such as accruals quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness. Moving to the cost 
of equity capital which is measured by using the industry-adjusted earnings price ratio 
(IndEP) and implied cost of equity capital models (ex-ante measures). Also the 
information asymmetry proxy, which depends on the bid-ask spread proxy. Finally, it 
discussed the proxies that used to measure analysts following, analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion and analysts’ forecasts accuracy. 
The sample size is discussed in the chapter, which is 8,175 firm-year observations with 
the number of firms each year ranging from 1,074 to 1,224 per year. Then, the researcher 
discusses the descriptive statistics of the whole sample by giving information about 
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earnings quality proxies, the cost of equity capital, information asymmetry, analysts’ 
information environment and firms’ characteristics such as the total assets, market value, 
net revenue and ROA. Finally, it discusses the different regression models that used to 
test the main models, for example, Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, Newey and 
West (1987) pooled regression and panel data with fixed and random effects regression. 
The next chapter is the start of the main empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 7:  Empirical Results: the Association between Earnings 
Quality and the Cost of Equity Capital 
7.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of earnings quality on the cost 
of equity capital to explain the variations in economic outcomes. The main reason of 
using the cost of equity capital instead of the cost of debt is related to the characteristics 
of the UK market. The fact that the UK is considered to be a common-law country with 
active stock markets, a diverse base of investors, strong investor protection mechanisms, 
a strong reliance on equity finance more than debt finance and investor-oriented financial 
reporting. Therefore, the main users of accounting information in the UK are investors. 
Thus, the accounting information is typically geared towards meeting the needs of these 
users (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Dunne et al., 2008; Iatridis, 2010). 
Therefore, the researcher focuses on the cost of equity capital as a summary indicator of 
investor resource allocation decisions. In particular, it tests the extent to which what is 
reported to be the higher of four earnings quality proxies known as accounting-based 
earnings quality proxies: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability 
and earnings smoothness (Francis et al., 2004), are associated with a lower cost of equity 
capital. In addition, it investigates the association between earnings quality and the cost 
of equity capital in the financial crisis period. Finally, this chapter aims to investigate the 
association between the cost of equity capital and the both component of earnings quality, 
the innate and discretionary component. 
7.2 A univariate Analysis 
A univariate analysis of the IndEP is conducted across quintiles sorted on the each EQ 
proxies from the lowest to the highest. Table 7-1, panel (A) represents information on the 
difference between the mean of the cost of equity capital and the low and the high earnings 
quality quintiles. It reports that firms with low earnings quality quintile (Q10) have a 
significant larger mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ compared to high earnings quality quintile (Q1), except 
the proxy of earnings smoothness which the result indicates no significant difference 
between the two said quintiles. In terms of accruals quality, the difference between mean 
ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the two quintiles (Q10 and Q1) is 0.039 and significantly different from 
zero (t-statistic 5.66). In terms of persistence, the difference between mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values 
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of the two said quintiles is 0.015 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 2.95). 
In terms of predictability, the difference between mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the two said 
quintiles is 0.050 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 6.21). Finally, for 
smoothness, the difference between mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the two said quintiles is -
0.0064 and not significantly different from zero (t-statistic 1.20). 
7.2.1 Correlations among variables 
Table 7-1, panel (B) reports the correlations among IndEP, earnings quality proxies, and 
control variables. The results show significant positive correlations among the four 
earnings quality proxies with high correlations among predictability, persistence and 
smoothness. For IndEP, the results show significant positive correlations between IndEP 
and all earnings quality proxies, beta and leverage. In addition, the results show 
significant negative correlation between IndEP and firm size which is consistent with 
literature (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). However, there is no significant 
correlation between IndEP and firm growth. The correlations among earnings quality 
proxies and control variables range between 0.4% and 46.5% which is an indicator that 
the correlations are relatively low indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to be an 
issue in the multivariate regressions. 
Table 7-1: Univariate analyses of IndEP on earnings quality proxies  
Panel A: Mean IndEP values by each EQ quintiles 
 High    Low Diff t-stat Q1 Q3 Q5 Q7 Q10 Q10-Q1 
AQ 
IndEP 0.0239 0.0289 0.0341 0.0392 0.0631 0.0392 5.66*** 
Persistence 
IndEP 0.0215 0.0346 0.0365 0.0361 0.0367 0.0152 2.95*** 
Predictability 
IndEP 0.0243 0.0318 0.0273 0.0316 0.0741 0.0498 6.21*** 
Smoothness 
IndEP 0.0409 0.0252 0.0325 0.0384 0.0345 -0.0064 1.20 
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Panel B: Correlation among earnings quality proxies 
  IndEP AQ Persist Predict Smooth Beta Size Leverage
IndEP 1        
AQ 0.09 1       
 <.0001        
Persist 0.0662 0.0818 1      
 <.0001 <.0001       
Predict 0.0973 0.034 0.1084 1     
 <.0001 0.0021 <.0001      
Smooth 0.0321 0.0612 0.193 0.2696 1    
 0.0206 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001     
Beta 0.0486 0.0048 -0.0051 0.1058 0.0597 1   
 0.0005 0.6658 0.6462 <.0001 <.0001    
Size -0.0747 -0.4656 -0.1625 0.3085 -0.1112 0.1585 1  
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
Leverage 0.12 -0.0394 0.015 0.1857 0.0374 0.0257 0.1645 1 
 <.0001 0.0010 0.2122 <.0001 <.0001 0.0344 <.0001  
Growth 0.0206 0.0624 -0.1027 -0.1756 -0.1561 -0.0009 0.0784 0.1357 
 0.1793 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9410 <.0001 <.0001 
The sample consists of 4,214 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011 (14 
industries). IndEP is the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the median earnings–price ratio of its industry. 
Size = log of total assets in year t; Leverage = total interest bearing debt deflated by total assets in year t; 
Growth = log of 1 plus the changing percentage in the book value of equity over the past 5 years; The 5-
year rolling pre-estimated Beta obtained from firm-specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it 
requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly returns for this estimation.  
Panel (A) shows the mean industry-adjusted earnings–price ratio (IndEP) for each EQ proxy quintile. The 
column labelled Diff (Q10-Q1) show the difference in the mean values of IndEP between the low/poor 
(Q10) and high (Q1) earnings quality quintiles, plus t-statistics test of whether the difference is zero. 
Panel (B) shows the correlations among IndEP, earnings quality proxies and control variables. 
Pearson correlations are reported. Significance levels are shown in italics. 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1.  
7.3 Multivariate Analyses 
Multivariate tests are performed to test the association between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital. The analyses use IndEP ratio as a cost of equity proxy, control 
variables, and four earnings quality proxies: accruals quality, persistence, predictability 
and smoothness. The control variables are beta, firm size, leverage and growth (e.g., 
Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). The associations between the cost of equity capital 
and each earnings quality proxies are examined for each year t, in addition to control 
variables.  
 
ܫ݊݀ܧ ௝ܲ,௧ ൌ 	 ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵܤ݁ݐ ௝ܽ,௧ ൅ ߲ଶܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߲ଷܩݎ݋ݓݐ ௝݄,௧
൅ ߲ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௝,௧ ൅ ߲ହܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߜ௝,௧	 Equation (7-1) 
Where: 
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ܤ݁ݐܽ is the five years rolling pre-estimated beta acquired from CAPM estimates using 
monthly data; it involves no less than 20 monthly returns for each firm to do this 
estimation; 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ is log of total assets of a firm in year t, 
ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ is the log of one plus the firm’s growth in book value of equity over the preceding 
5 years; 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ is interest-bearing debt of a firm deflated by total assets in year t; 
ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞  is the decile rank of a firm value of the kth earnings quality proxy in year t, 
ܭ ∈ ሼܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ, ܲ݁ݎݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿ݁, ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ, ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄݊݁ݏݏሽ. 
According to literature, a positive coefficient on the decile rank earnings quality is 
expected, indicating that investors attach higher risk assessments to stocks with less 
favourable (i.e., larger) values of each earnings quality proxy thus higher cost of equity 
capital. For control variables, positive coefficients for CAPM beta and leverage are 
expected, and negative coefficients for firm size and growth,  Moreover, to alleviate 
concerns about cross-sectional dependencies in the sample, Equation (7-1) is estimated 
for each of the 7 years in the sample by using the time-series standard errors regressions 
which introduced by Fama and MacBeth (1973).   
Table 7-2, panel (A) provides both the mean of the yearly coefficients and statistical 
significance as a result of estimating Equation (7-1) after adding each earnings quality 
proxies separately to the model. Turning first to predictability, which has the first largest 
effects on the cost of equity capital, the results indicate a mean coefficient estimate of 
0.0035 (t-statistic =6.46). This finding suggests that firms with low earnings predictability 
have higher cost of equity capital compared to firms with high earnings predictability. 
The second largest cost of equity capital effect is observed for accruals quality, the results 
indicate a mean estimate of coefficient 0.0024 (t-statistic = 5.45). This finding suggests 
that firms with low accruals quality have higher cost of equity capital relative to firms 
with the high accruals quality. The third largest effect is observed for persistence, where 
the mean estimate of coefficient 0.0014 (t-statistic=3.19). Finally, the results indicate 
significant association between earnings smoothness and the cost of equity, where the 
mean estimate of coefficient 0.0008 (t-statistic = 2.95). Economically, the results indicate 
that firms with high earnings predictability enjoy a 315 (coefficient 0.0035 times 9 decile 
differences) basis point lower cost of equity capital compared to firms with low earnings 
predictability. For accruals quality, the results indicate a 216 difference basis point 
between firms with high and low accruals quality. For persistence, the results indicate a 
126 difference basis point between firms with high and low earnings persistence. Finally 
for smoothness, the results indicate a 72 difference basis point between firms with high 
and low earnings smoothness. 
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These results are interpreted as an indicator that as the quality of earnings declines, the 
amount that investors are ready to pay for a pound of earnings is declined as well, 
implying a higher cost of equity capital for such firms. Thus, it supports the first 
hypothesis (H1), Also, it supports both the capital needs theory and decision usefulness 
theory. In terms of control variables, the results indicate that ܫ݊݀ܧܲ is negatively 
associated with both Growth16 and Size, consistent with prior literature, firms with high 
growth have lower earnings–price ratios and big firms have lower cost of equity capital 
than the small firms because it is less risky than the small firms. Finally, the results 
indicate a positive association between IndEP and both Beta17 and Leverage which is 
consistent with literature review. 
Further, Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression is used, which controls 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation effects, to assess the sensitivity of  the previous 
results.  Panel (B) of Table 7-2 reports the coefficient estimate and statistical significance 
of each earnings quality pooled-regression for the same sample. The pooled results are 
similar to the results of mean annual regressions of Fama and MacBeth (1973), reported 
in Panel (A) of Table 7-2, except the following points: (1) the association between IndEP 
and smoothness becomes not significant, which consistent with the view of Leuz et al. 
(2003) that earnings smoothness indicates lower earnings quality, which means that 
investors in the UK do not  reward smoother earnings streams with reduced costs of equity 
capital as investors in the US according to Francis et al. (2004). (2) R2 for all the four 
models has declined from 7.5% averagely to 2.5% averagely. (3) The associations 
between IndEP and both Beta and Growth become significant. (4) The effect of 
persistence has significant larger effect than accruals quality on the cost of equity capital.  
Continuing to increase the goodness of fit of the model, the characteristics of the data 
during the period from 2005 to 2011 are studied, and find that the mean of cost of equity 
capital is suddenly increased in years 2008 and 2009. Therefore, the model is re-tested 
after adding the financial crisis as a control variable (see next section: the financial crisis). 
                                                 
16 The negative relationship between Growth and IndEP is insignificant at 10% significant level except in 
AQ regression, which is significant at 5% significant level. 
17 The positive relationship between Beta and IndEP is insignificant at 10% significant level. 
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Table 7-2: Multivariate analyses of IndEP on earnings quality proxies  
Panel A: Means annual regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), 
and control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 
 (1.16) (1.18) (1.11) (1.19) 
Size -0.0055** -0.0061** -0.0078*** -0.0065** 
 (-2.24) (-2.39) (-2.83) (-2.50) 
Growth -0.0021** -0.00073 0.00035 -0.0010 
 (-2.11) (-0.84) (0.37) (-1.05) 
Leverage 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
 (2.76) (2.66) (2.72) (2.74) 
AQ 0.0024***    
 (5.45)    
Persistence  0.0014***   
  (3.19)   
Predictability   0.0035***  
   (6.46)  
Smoothness    0.00080** 
    (2.23) 
Constant 0.061** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 
 (2.49) (2.65) (2.88) (2.95) 
N 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 
R2 0.076 0.075 0.087 0.072 
Panel B: Pooled regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and 
control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.0096*** 0.011*** 
 (3.92) (3.90) (3.46) (3.96) 
Size -0.0042*** -0.0045*** -0.0065*** -0.0050*** 
 (-6.26) (-6.78) (-9.60) (-7.56) 
Growth 0.0021 0.0035*** 0.0046*** 0.0030*** 
 (1.44) (2.31) (3.13) (2.03) 
Leverage 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (7.12) (6.63) (7.04) (7.03) 
AQ 0.0017***    
 (2.93)    
Persistence  0.0018***   
  (3.82)   
Predictability   0.0040***  
   (7.12)  
Smoothness    0.00070 
    (1.51) 
Constant 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
 (5.44) (6.15) (8.05) (7.48) 
N 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 
adj. R2 0.026 0.027 0.036 0.024 
The sample consists of 4,214 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011 (14 
industries). IndEP is the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the median earnings–price ratio of its industry. 
Size = log of total assets in year t; Leverage = total interest bearing debt deflated by total assets in year t; 
Growth = log of 1 plus the changing percentage in the book value of equity over the past 5 years; The 5-
year rolling pre-estimated Beta obtained from firm-specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it 
requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly returns for this estimation.  
Panel (A) shows the mean annual regressions of IndEP on the decile rank value of each EQ proxy plus 
control variables. t-statistics in parentheses and italic, and based on the time series standard errors of the 
seven coefficient estimates. Panel (B) shows the pooled regressions of IndEP on the decile rank value of 
each EQ proxy plus control variables. *** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1.  
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7.4 The Financial Crisis 
In general terms, a financial crisis can be defined as an interruption to the normal 
functioning of financial markets. At the beginning of 2008, capital markets around the 
world suffered from a global financial crisis, following the collapse of the US sub-prime 
mortgage market. The crisis formulates for European firms an economic environment that 
is characterised by declining the GDP, reducing the industry output, less spending from 
the common public and a lack of liquidity for firms and individuals. The crisis had its 
consequences also in the UK where troubled mortgage providers or banks were rescued 
(Barth and Landsman, 2010; Iqbal and Kume, 2013; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Bowen 
and Khan, 2014; Trombetta and Imperatore, 2014). Prior literature argue that these 
markets are now on course to recovery, although the rate of this recovery is rather slow 
(Kantor and Holdsworth, 2010). Therefore, the questions that motivated the researcher 
are whether the earnings quality deteriorated due to the crisis. Also, whether the financial 
crisis affects the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. 
Figure 7-1 represents the mean of IndEP each year from 2005 to 2011. It shows that the 
mean of IndEP is increased steadily from pre-crisis years (2005, 2006 and 2007) to crisis 
years (2008 and 2009) then it decreased in the recovery years (2010 and 2011). According 
to this finding, the sample period (2005-2011) is classified into three classifications: ‘pre-
crisis’ for years 2005, 2006 and 2007, ‘crisis period’ for years 2008 and 2009, and 
‘recovery’ for years 2010 and 2011, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Filip and Raffournier, 2014). Therefore, the impact of 
financial crisis on the model of the cost of equity capital is tested by adding two control 
variables (dummy variables) to Equation (7-1) (results reported in Table 7-3). 
 
ܫ݊݀ܧ ௝ܲ,௧ ൌ 	 ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵܩݎ݋ݓݐ ௝݄,௧ ൅ ߲ଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௝,௧ ൅ ߲ଷܤ݁ݐ ௝ܽ,௧
൅ ߲ସܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߲ହܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߲଺ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௝,௧
൅ ߲଻ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௝,௧ ൅ ߜ௝,௧
Equation 
(7-2) 
Where: 
ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௝,௧ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2008 and 2009 and equals 
zero otherwise; 
ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௝,௧ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2010 and 2011 and 
equals zero otherwise. 
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Figure 7-1 : The mean of IndEP over years 2005-2011 
 
Table 7-3 reports that R2 is steadily increased from 2.5% averagely to 12% averagely, 
which suggests the explanation power of the model becomes much better after adding the 
financial crisis. Also, the impact of both dummy variables of financial crisis on the cost 
of equity capital is strongly significant. Moreover, the association between IndEP and 
smoothness remains insignificant. Finally, the order of largest effects among earnings 
quality proxies still the same, which earnings predictability has the largest effect then 
accruals quality then persistence and finally smoothness. 
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Table 7-3: Pooled regressions of IndEP on each earnings quality proxy (decile 
rank), financial crisis dummy variables and control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (5.10) (5.11) (4.68) (5.18) 
Size -0.0047*** -0.0051*** -0.0068*** -0.0055*** 
 (-7.07) (-7.74) (-10.1) (-8.45) 
Growth -0.0017 -0.00036 0.00060 -0.00083 
 (-1.18) (-0.25) (0.42) (-0.58) 
Leverage 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 
 (7.48) (7.01) (7.36) (7.39) 
Crisis 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
 (18.1) (18.0) (17.7) (18.0) 
Recovery 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (10.2) (10.1) (9.61) (10.1) 
AQ 0.0018***    
 (3.24)    
Persistence  0.0016***   
  (3.60)   
Predictability   0.0033***  
   (6.13)  
Smoothness    0.00053 
    (1.18) 
Constant 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
 (3.32) (4.24) (5.97) (5.49) 
N 4214 4214 4214 4214 
adj. R2 0.120 0.120 0.126 0.118 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
See Table 7-1 for variable definitions. The sample contains 4,214 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. Crisis is 
a dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2008 and 2009 and the remaining years equal zero. Recovery is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2010 and 2011 and the remaining years equal zero. 
The interaction effects between earnings quality and financial crisis on the cost of equity 
capital is also examined, results reported in Table 7-4. The results indicate a significant 
negative association between earnings quality proxies and the cost of equity capital. Also, 
the results indicate that in the crisis the investors give more attention to the quality of 
earnings compared to pre-crisis for the cost of equity capital. For example, the slope 
coefficient of accruals quality before the crisis is 0.0026. In the crisis, the value of this 
slope coefficient had risen to 0.0136 (0.0026+0.011), which means that the sensitivity of 
the cost of equity capital to accruals quality was considerably higher (0.011) in the crisis 
compared to pre-crisis. Thus, the hypothesis (H11) is accepted. 
Finally, the association between the cost of equity capital and earnings quality in the 
financial crisis period only (year 2008 and 2009) is examined (results reported in Table 
7-5). The results indicate significant associations between IndEP and all earnings quality 
proxies except earnings smoothness, with largest effects for both earnings predictability 
and persistence. This finding suggest that in the financial crisis, investors give more 
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attention to earnings sustainability and the change in expected future earnings, compared 
to the attention for the association between earnings and cash flow of firms. Also, the 
results indicate increases in the coefficient of Beta compared to the pooled regression for 
the whole sample (2005-2011), which indicates that investors in the crisis period gives 
more attention to the changes in the whole stock market. 
Table 7-4: Pooled regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (decile 
rank), the interaction between earnings quality and financial crisis, and control 
variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (5.27) (4.62) (4.49) (5.17) 
Size -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -0.0070*** -0.0056*** 
 (-7.09) (-7.26) (-10.3) (-8.48) 
Growth -0.0016 0.00077 0.0011 -0.00046 
 (-1.13) (0.52) (0.78) (-0.32) 
Leverage 0.081*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 
 (7.73) (6.73) (7.30) (7.57) 
AQ 0.0026***    
 (4.66)    
AQ * Crisis 0.011***    
 (15.5)    
AQ * Recovery 0.0050***    
 (8.76)    
Persistence  0.0051***   
  (11.2)   
Persist * Crisis  0.0078***   
  (15.5)   
Persist * Recovery  0.0033***   
  (9.20)   
Predictability   0.0062***  
   (12.12)  
Predict * Crisis   0.0098***  
   (16.4)  
Predict * Recovery   0.0043***  
   (8.32)  
Smoothness    0.0035*** 
    (7.32) 
Smooth * Crisis    0.010*** 
    (15.6) 
Smooth * Recovery    0.0042*** 
    (8.13) 
Constant 0.055*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 
 (5.94) (9.66) (9.30) (8.39) 
N 4214 4214 4214 4214 
adj. R2 0.110 0.088 0.117 0.103 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
See Table 7-1 for variable definitions. The sample contains 4,214 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. 
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Table 7-5: Pooled regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (decile rank) 
in the financial crisis, and control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (7.00) (6.92) (6.78) (6.94) 
Size -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.012*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.58) (-8.44) (-7.22) 
Growth -0.0036 -0.0014 -0.00019 -0.0021 
 (-1.10) (-0.41) (-0.058) (-0.65) 
Leverage 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 
 (3.84) (3.53) (3.77) (3.81) 
AQ 0.0024*    
 (1.72)    
Persistence  0.0028***   
  (2.42)   
Predictability   0.0056***  
   (4.11)  
Smoothness    0.0016 
    (1.43) 
Constant 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (5.87) (5.88) (7.66) (7.24) 
N 1237 1237 1237 1237 
adj. R2 0.082 0.084 0.093 0.081 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
See Table 7-1 for variable definitions. The sample contains 1,237 firm-year observations over t = 2008-2009. 
7.5 Innate and Discretionary Earnings Quality Effects on the Cost of Equity 
Capital 
Following Francis et al. (2005), the two methods to disentangle between innate and 
discretionary earnings quality are used, those methods use summary indicators to 
compute the effects of operating environment and business model that represent the innate 
component: firm size, standard deviation of cash flows for preceding 10 years, standard 
deviation of revenues for preceding 10 years, length of operating cycle, and frequency of 
negative realised earnings for preceding 10 years. The first method uses the predicted 
values that estimated from regressing earnings quality proxy on these summary indicators 
to compute the innate portion of earnings quality proxy, and the residual from this 
regression represents the discretionary portion (see Equation (7-3)).  
 
ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൌ ߣ଴,௝ ൅ ߣଵ,௝ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߣଶ,௝ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௝,௧
൅ ߣଷ,௝ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߣସ,௝ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௝,௧
൅ ߣହ,௝ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௝,௧ ൅ ݒ௝,௧
Equation 
(7-3) 
Where: ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௝,௧ is the standard deviation of cash flow operations of a firm computed 
through the preceding 10 years,  
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ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௝,௧ is the standard deviation of firm c’s net revenue computed through the 
preceding 10 years,  
ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௝,௧ the log of the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory of a firm 
in year t,  
ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௝,௧ the number of years where reported net income before extraordinary items 
(NIBE) of a firm < 0 out of the preceding 10 years,  
The predicted value of ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௄  represents innate earnings quality, and the residual 
ሺݒ௝,௧ሻ represents discretionary earnings quality.  
The second method adds the summary indicators which represent the innate portion to 
the cost of equity capital tests as control variables. According to these regressions, the 
coefficient estimates of earnings quality is considered as the effect of discretionary 
portion on the cost of equity capital. Using the coefficient estimates acquired from the 
annual regressions of Equation (7-3), the innate earnings quality and discretionary 
earnings quality are calculated by using Method 1, When both innate and discretionary 
components are included, Table 7-6, panel (A) reports that the innate component 
coefficient is larger than the discretionary component coefficient by a factor of two for 
all earnings quality proxies and also exhibits stronger statistical significance than the 
discretionary coefficient. In economic terms, the largest effect overall earnings quality 
components is the innate accruals quality, which is increasing the cost of equity capital 
by 576 basis points between highest (low/poor) and lowest decile rank (high) of innate 
accruals quality firms, while the effect of discretionary accruals quality is 198 basis 
points. This finding suggests that investors assign to firms with low earnings quality that 
related to innate component, a higher cost of equity capital, compared to low earnings 
quality that related to discretionary component. Moreover, the results indicate significant 
association between IndEP and Innate portion of smoothness and an insignificant 
association between IndEP and discretionary portion of smoothness. The average 
goodness of fit of the means of the annual regressions is 8.8%. Under Method 2, Table 
7-6, panel (B) reports that discretionary earnings quality has a positive coefficient which 
is less significant and smaller than the coefficient on total earnings quality. The average 
goodness of fit of the annual-regressions is 9.5%.  
According to the results in panel (A-B) of Table 7-6, the null hypothesis (H6) of no 
differences between the effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality components 
on the cost of equity capital is rejected, supporting the opinion that innate portion of each 
earnings quality proxies has a larger impact than the discretionary portion on the cost of 
 156 
 
equity capital. This finding suggests that investors give greater weight to the innate 
component that driven from economic fundamentals, compared to the discretionary 
component that driven from management choices in the UK when determining the cost 
of equity capital of a firm. Also, this finding suggest the idea that applying IFRS in the 
UK increases the quality and precision of accounting information and reduces 
information asymmetry for both future cash flow and future earnings, thus the 
information risk that associated with discretionary earnings quality is reduced. 
Table 7-6: Means annual regression of IndEP on innate and discretionary earning 
quality components 
Panel A: Means annual regressions of IndEP on innate and discretionary earning quality 
proxy (decile rank), and control variables (Method 1) 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 
 (1.20) (1.16) (1.14) (1.19) 
Size -0.0014 -0.0053** -0.0067*** -0.0070*** 
 (-0.64) (-2.17) (-2.60) (-2.69) 
Growth -0.0020 -0.00052 -0.00048 -0.00091 
 (-1.57) (-0.74) (-0.54) (-0.95) 
Leverage 0.081*** 0.069** 0.075*** 0.073** 
 (2.76) (2.49) (2.58) (2.55) 
Method 1     
AQ (Innate) 0.0064***    
 (6.65)    
AQ (Disc.) 0.0022***    
 (3.67)    
Persistence (Innate)  0.0027***   
  (3.92)   
Persistence (Disc.)  0.0010**   
  (2.05)   
Predictability (Innate)   0.0059***  
   (4.78)  
Predictability (Disc.)   0.0037**  
   (2.23)  
Smoothness (Innate)    0.0022*** 
    (4.24) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    -0.000041 
    (-0.082) 
Constant -0.020 0.053** 0.038 0.081*** 
 (-1.13) (2.21) (1.32) (3.06) 
N 3527 3527 3527 3527 
R2 0.092 0.085 0.094 0.082 
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Panel B: Means annual regressions of IndEP on discretionary earning quality proxy (decile 
rank), and control variables (Method 2) 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 (1.19) (1.21) (1.19) (1.23) 
Size -0.0069* -0.0077* -0.0092** -0.0078* 
 (-2.07) (-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.21) 
Growth -0.0014 -0.00015 0.00060 -0.00062 
 (-1.17) (-0.17) (0.61) (-0.63) 
Leverage 0.078** 0.075** 0.076** 0.077** 
 (2.72) (2.68) (2.68) (2.71) 
σሺCFOሻ 0. 000027** 0. 000031*** 0. 000025** 0. 000030** 
 (3.33) (3.97) (3.25) (3.68) 
ߪሺSalesሻ 8.4e-10 1.1e-09 1.7e-09 8.2e-10 
 (0.38) (0.49) (0.82) (0.39) 
OperCycle -0.0041* -0.0036* -0.0039* -0.0036 
 (-2.03) (-1.95) (-2.15) (-1.92) 
NegEarn 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0022** 0.0033*** 
 (4.63) (4.73) (3.47) (3.91) 
Method 2     
AQ (Disc.) 0.0022**    
 (3.68)    
Persistence (Disc.)  0.0012*   
  (2.11)   
Predictability (Disc.)   0.0029***  
   (5.93)  
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.00014 
    (0.24) 
Constant 0.090** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (2.60) (2.77) (2.99) (2.86) 
N 3527 3527 3527 3527 
R2 0.099 0.098 0.104 0.095 
See Table 7-1 for variable definitions. 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 3,527 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011.  
7.6 Sensitivity Tests 
The main results of this chapter are generally robust to a number of sensitivity tests, 
including the following: First, in addition to IndEP, the researcher uses five other proxies 
of the cost of equity capital known as ex-ante measures derived from dividend valuation 
model; the Easton (2004) model (ݎ௉ாீ), the modified Easton (2004) model (ݎெ௉ாீ), the 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model (ݎ௢௝௡), the Gode and Mohanram (2003) model 
(ீݎ ெ), and  the mean for the four proxies (ݎ௉ாீ, ݎெ௉ாீ, ݎ௢௝௡, ீݎ ெ) in order to reduce biases 
and measurement errors in the regression analysis (Hail and Leuz, 2006). All of these 
proxies are used as alternatives to the IndEP.  
Equation (7-1) is re-tested by replacing IndEP with the five ex-ante measures of the cost 
of equity capital (results reported in Table 7-7, panel (A-B)). The same results are found 
with higher R2 for the five measures compared to IndEP, which suggests that this model 
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explain the variation in the cost of equity capital measured by the implied cost of equity 
capital models are better than IndEP. This result reinforces the conclusions drawn from 
the previous regressions.  
Second, the raw values of each earnings quality proxies is also used rather than the decile 
rank values of earnings quality proxies and do the same tests by using IndEP as a proxy 
for the cost of equity capital. The researcher finds the same results with significant 
association between IndEP and accruals quality, persistence and predictability, however, 
no significant association between earnings smoothness and IndEP (results reported in 
Table 7-7, Panel C). Fourth, panel regressions are used with fixed and random effects for 
IndEP. In addition, the researcher uses the Hausman test to differentiate between the fixed 
effects and the random effects model. The researcher tests the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the 
coefficients estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The results indicate a 
rejection of the null hypothesis; this suggests that fixed effects estimations are more 
appropriate than random effects estimations. Table 7-8 reports the results, and find 
significant negative associations between each earnings quality proxy and IndEP. The 
largest effect on the cost of equity capital is observed for predictability then accruals 
quality then persistence and smoothness. 
  
 
159
Table 7-7: Means annual regressions of ex-ante measures of the cost of equity capital on each earnings quality proxy (decile rank) 
Panel A: Means annual regressions of Easton model and Modified Easton model on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ݎ௉ாீ ݎ௉ாீ ݎ௉ாீ ݎ௉ாீ ݎெ௉ாீ ݎெ௉ாீ ݎெ௉ாீ ݎெ௉ாீ 
Beta 0.0025*** 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 
 (4.87) (5.54) (5.59) (5.13) (4.73) (5.32) (5.36) (4.91) 
Size -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** 
 (-5.87) (-6.85) (-6.80) (-6.80) (-5.94) (-6.87) (-6.77) (-6.78) 
Growth -0.00051* -0.00027 -0.00018 -0.00021 -0.00055* -0.00031 -0.00022 -0.00026 
 (-2.06) (-1.01) (-0.70) (-0.81) (-2.29) (-1.16) (-0.86) (-1.01) 
Leverage 0.0096*** 0.0090*** 0.0092*** 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0088*** 0.0090*** 0.0092*** 
 (4.34) (3.97) (4.04) (4.01) (4.67) (4.29) (4.34) (4.30) 
AQ 0.00061***    0.00061***    
 (8.74)    (10.4)    
Persistence  0.00023**    0.00024**   
  (2.94)    (2.54)   
Predictability   0.00036***    0.00037***  
   (4.35)    (4.20)  
Smoothness    0.00032***    0.00029*** 
    (5.54)    (6.14) 
Constant 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (7.59) (9.55) (9.32) (9.07) (7.61) (9.49) (9.17) (8.88) 
N 3795 3795 3795 3795 3781 3781 3781 3781 
R2 0.152 0.138 0.140 0.140 0.152 0.139 0.140 0.140 
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Panel B: Means annual regressions of the economy-wide growth model, the modified the economy-wide growth model and the mean of the four cot of equity 
capital proxies on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ݎ௢௝௡ ݎ௢௝௡ ݎ௢௝௡ ݎ௢௝௡ ீݎ ெ ீݎ ெ ீݎ ெ ீݎ ெ rMean rMean rMean rMean 
Beta 0.00030 0.00031 0.00031 0.00030 0.0020*** 0.0022*** 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0024*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 
 (1.40) (1.43) (1.53) (1.44) (4.21) (4.66) (4.70) (4.39) (4.44) (5.09) (5.02) (4.76) 
Size -0.00063*** -0.00068*** -0.00072*** -0.00069*** -0.0019*** -0.0022*** -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0024*** -0.0026*** -0.0024*** 
 (-4.73) (-4.91) (-4.57) (-4.93) (-5.51) (-6.27) (-6.09) (-6.23) (-6.28) (-7.37) (-7.10) (-7.24) 
Growth 0.000047 0.00012* 0.00011** 0.00012* -0.00051** -0.00028 -0.00023 -0.00025 -0.00051* -0.00026 -0.00017 -0.00022 
 (1.00) (2.44) (2.54) (2.35) (-2.45) (-1.15) (-0.97) (-1.10) (-2.08) (-0.96) (-0.68) (-0.86) 
Leverage 0.0025** 0.0023** 0.0024** 0.0024** 0.0082*** 0.0076*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0094*** 0.0087*** 0.0089*** 0.0091*** 
 (3.38) (3.21) (3.29) (3.11) (4.64) (4.26) (4.32) (4.28) (4.29) (4.09) (4.12) (4.17) 
AQ 0.00014***    0.00053***    0.00061***    
 (5.59)    (14.5)    (10.4)    
Persistence  0.000085**    0.00023*    0.00026**   
  (2.79)    (2.14)    (3.04)   
Predictability   0.000048    0.00031**    0.00038***  
   (1.16)    (3.02)    (4.49)  
Smoothness    0.000070*    0.00028***    0.00030*** 
    (1.96)    (5.73)    (5.43) 
Constant 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 
 (31.4) (31.1) (28.4) (29.4) (12.1) (14.8) (13.9) (14.1) (10.00) (12.9) (11.7) (11.8) 
N 3519 3519 3519 3519 3843 3843 3843 3843 4010 4010 4010 4010 
R2 0.111 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.150 0.139 0.139 0.140 0.154 0.140 0.142 0.141 
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Panel C: Means annual and pooled regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (Raw values), and control variables 
 Means annual regressions Pooled regressions 
IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (1.17) (1.17) (1.18) (1.18) (3.92) (3.89) (4.06) (4.00) 
Size -0.0058* -0.0061* -0.0064** -0.0065** -0.0043*** -0.0044*** -0.0049*** -0.0050*** 
 (-2.25) (-2.38) (-2.52) (-2.52) (-6.40) (-6.61) (-7.40) (-7.60) 
Growth -0.0021* -0.00074 -0.0010 -0.0012 0.0020 0.0036** 0.0028* 0.0029** 
 (-2.43) (-0.83) (-1.39) (-1.24) (1.34) (2.40) (1.93) (1.96) 
Leverage 0.078** 0.075** 0.075** 0.078** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 
 (2.78) (2.66) (2.76) (2.75) (7.11) (6.55) (6.91) (7.03) 
AQ 0.095***    0.087***    
 (6.13)    (2.72)    
Persistence  -0.0089**    -0.014***   
  (-2.91)    (-4.57)   
Predictability   0.0046**    0.0022**  
   (2.73)    (2.27)  
Smoothness    0.0014    0.0020 
    (1.61)    (1.21) 
Constant 0.070** 0.083** 0.082** 0.082** 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (2.56) (3.00) (3.03) (2.90) (6.13) (8.35) (8.24) (7.75) 
N 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 
R2 0.076 0.076 0.082 0.071 0.026 0.029 0.027 0.024 
See Table 7-1 for variable definitions. 
*** P-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample ranges between 3,519 and 4214 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011.  
  
 
162
Table 7-8: Fixed-random panel regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
Beta 0.014*** 0.0095*** 0.013*** 0.0093*** 0.012*** 0.0078*** 0.013*** 0.0093*** 
 (3.97) (3.69) (3.82) (3.63) (3.41) (3.07) (3.87) (3.64) 
Size 0.018*** -0.0037*** 0.020*** -0.0036*** 0.013*** -0.0061*** 0.019*** -0.0040*** 
 (3.96) (-3.35) (4.31) (-3.39) (2.75) (-5.68) (4.26) (-3.77) 
Growth -0.0044** 0.0017 -0.0042** 0.0025* -0.0023 0.0038*** -0.0042** 0.0022 
 (-2.07) (1.24) (-2.00) (1.77) (-1.09) (2.72) (-2.01) (1.60) 
Leverage 0.017 0.065*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.022 0.065*** 0.014 0.065*** 
 (0.80) (5.14) (0.60) (4.86) (1.01) (5.14) (0.67) (5.11) 
AQ 0.0018* 0.0007       
 (1.93) (1.08)       
Persistence   0.0015* 0.0018***     
   (1.91) (3.10)     
Predictability     0.0070*** 0.0051***   
     (5.40) (7.11)   
Smoothness       0.0018** 0.0010* 
       (1.99) (1.72) 
Constant -0.19*** 0.055*** -0.22*** 0.048*** -0.17*** 0.059*** -0.22*** 0.057*** 
 (-3.49) (4.02) (-4.08) (3.85) (-3.20) (5.08) (-4.06) (4.60) 
N 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 4214 
Hausman  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
See Table 7-1 for variable definitions. 
*** P-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 4,214 firm-year observations for t = 2005 to 2011.  
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7.7 Comparison with Francis et al. (2004) 
The current study shares a number of common features with Francis et al (2004) who use 
US data: (1) both studies sort firms into quintiles based on each earnings quality proxy 
and regress cost of equity capital measure on these quintiles. (2) Both studies use the same 
measures of persistence, predictability and smoothness. (3) Both studies use ex-ante 
measures as robustness measures for the cost of equity capital. However, there are number 
of differences in some others: (1) the current study uses accounting-based earnings quality 
proxies (four proxies) instead of the all proxies (seven proxies) that Francis et al (2004) 
used. (2) A different measure of accruals quality is used, which is the McNichols’ (2002) 
modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model, which includes two additional 
elements (PPE and change in revenues) and estimated cross-sectionally by industry rather 
than by using Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. (3) The current study uses different 
proxies to measure the cost of equity capital, realised return (IndEP) as a main measure 
of the cost of equity capital rather than ex-ante cost of equity capital measures that derived 
from value line analyst information.  
(4) The current study applies in different country (the UK) not the US. (5) The current 
study uses two additional control variables which are leverage and growth. Also, the 
control variable, size, is redefined (log of total assets, instead of log of market value). For 
accruals quality, the time period over which the rolling window variables are constructed 
are shortened from ten to five years, which is possible because the model is estimated 
cross-sectionally by industry, instead of using a firm-specific regression (Francis et al., 
2005). (6) Different results, the current study finds among the four proxies that 
predictability has the strongest effects on the cost of equity capital then accruals quality 
then persistence and finally smoothness (least consistent associations), while Francis et 
al. (2004) find no significant association between predictability and the cost of equity 
capital. Also, they find a significantly strong association between earnings smoothness 
and the cost of equity capital. (7) The current study adds financial crisis to the model and 
find steadily increasing in the explanation power (R2) of the model, with a significantly 
strong association between the financial crisis and the cost of equity capital. (8) The 
current study re-investigates the association between earnings quality and the cost of 
capital in the financial crisis period only, and finds that both earnings persistence and 
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predictability have largest impact on the cost of equity capital compared to accruals 
quality and smoothness. 
7.8 Summary 
The empirical results are consistent across estimation methods (annual regression and 
pooled regression), specifications of the four earnings quality proxies (decile and raw 
data), and proxies of the cost of equity capital (IndEP and the ex-ante measures). This 
study generally finds a statistically significant association between each earnings quality 
proxy considered separately and the cost of equity capital. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
(H1) is accepted, which suggests a negative association between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital. This finding supports the capital needs theory and decision 
usefulness theory. 
Moreover, the results show that predictability proxy explains more of the variation in 
estimates of the cost of equity, followed by accruals quality then persistence and finally 
smoothness, these results suggest that there are differences between IFRS and US GAAP 
in sense of the relative impact of earnings quality proxies on the cost of equity capital, 
especially, for earnings predictability which the current study finds a strong impact of 
earnings predictability on the cost of equity capital, however, Francis et al. (2004) do not 
find any significant impact of earnings predictability on the cost of equity capital. This 
finding is consistent with the study of Folsom et al. (2013), who find the principles-based 
standards i.e., IFRS are more informative, persistent and predictive of future earnings and 
cash flows than rules-based standards i.e., US GAAP. Another difference is the impact of 
earnings smoothness on the cost of equity capital. Results reported by Francis et al. (2004) 
suggest that capital market participants’ investors reward smoother earnings streams with 
reduced costs of equity capital, this finding is consistent with a view that earnings 
smoothness is desirable (at least in the eyes of investors) because it reflects higher quality 
financial reporting decisions. The current study’s findings, however, do not consistent 
with this notion, because there is no a significantly strong impact to earnings smoothness 
on the cost of equity capital, which may suggest the idea of Leuz et al. (2003) who 
document that earnings smoothness reflects the extent to which accounting standards and 
legal system allow managers to artificially reduce variability in earnings, presumably to 
obtain some capital market benefits associated with a smooth earnings stream. Under this 
view, smoother earnings would indicate lower earnings quality in the UK market. Also, 
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the results of earnings smoothness are consistent with the study of Jayaraman (2008) who 
conclude that earnings that are smoother than cash flow distort information and attract 
more informed investors which may lead to higher cost of equity capital. In addition, this 
conclusion become stronger in the financial crisis period, which the results indicate no 
significant association between earnings smoothness and the cost of equity capital.  
The interaction effects between earnings quality and financial crisis on the cost of equity 
capital is also examined. The results indicate that in the crisis the investors give more 
attention to the quality of earnings compared to pre-crisis in determining the price of cost 
of equity capital of firms. The association between the cost of equity capital and earnings 
quality through the financial crisis period (2008 and 2009 only) are examined, and finds 
a stronger significant impact to earnings persistence and predictability compared to the 
impact of accruals quality and smoothness. Also, it finds higher significant impact to Beta 
on the cost of equity capital in relative to the whole period regressions. These findings 
shed light about the influence of economic consequences on the association between 
accounting information and its users i.e., investors. The results suggest that the investors 
give more attention to sustainability of earnings rather than the association between 
earnings and cash flow. These results also, indicate the information that matter to the 
investor through the financial crisis in determining the price of cost of equity capital. 
Explaining this finding could be that when the economy is stable, because investment 
opportunities are numerous, investors are perhaps pay less attention to the quality of 
accounting information (Mitton, 2002). Conversely, a crisis could force investors to 
identify the weakness in the quality of accounting information that existed all along. This 
identification may lead to a ‘‘flight-to-quality’’ syndrome (e.g., Goh et al., 2015; Francis 
et al., 2012). Therefore, that will lead investors to either withdraw from the stock market 
completely, or move their investments to what they considers as firms with high quality 
accounting information (Francis et al., 2013; Francis et al., 2012). 
The current study also examines the separate impact of innate and discretionary earnings 
quality components on the cost of equity capital by using two different methods. The 
result suggests that the innate component of each earnings quality proxy has a larger 
impact on the cost of equity capital than the discretionary component. This result is 
consistent with the notion that information uncertainty that results from innate component 
is fundamental, compared to reporting uncertainty, which can easily shift from period to 
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another. Therefore, the hypothesis (H6) is rejected, which suggests that the innate and 
discretionary components have the same impact on the cost of equity capital. Moreover, 
the results suggest that the innate component of earnings smoothness has a significant 
impact on the cost of equity capital. However, the discretionary component has no 
significant impact on the cost of equity capital. This finding suggests that investors reward 
innate component by reducing the cost of equity capital. However, they do not reward the 
high discretionary component of earnings smoothness by reducing the cost of equity 
capital, they consider it as a type of earnings management. This finding consistent with 
the view of Ahrens (2009) who argue that earnings smoothness should be disentangle into 
two portions, first portion is the natural smoothness, which happens naturally from the 
effect of some production processes on earnings streams (the innate component), The 
second portion is intentional smoothness, which happens when some firms smooth 
earnings intentionally to benefit from the advantages of such an earnings stream (the 
discretionary component).  
To sum up, the findings of the current study support the importance of accounting 
information and financial reporting to the capital market participants, i.e., investors, and 
it has a capital market consequence i.e., the cost of equity capital.  
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Chapter 8:  Empirical Results: the Association between Earnings 
Quality and Information Asymmetry 
8.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of earnings quality on 
information asymmetry. Particularly, it tests the extent to which what is reported to be the 
higher of four earnings quality proxies known as accounting-based earnings quality 
proxies - accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness (Francis et al., 2004) - are associated with a lower information asymmetry 
measured by the bid-ask spread. In addition, during the period of crisis, it tests this 
association in order to determine whether the crisis has an impact on this association. 
Finally, this chapter aims to investigate the association between information asymmetry 
and the both component of earnings quality, the innate and discretionary component. 
8.2 A univariate Analysis 
The researcher conducted a univariate analysis of information asymmetry across quintiles 
and these were sorted on the each earnings quality proxies from the lowest to the highest. 
Table 8-1, panel (A) provides evidence of the association between information 
asymmetry and earnings quality proxies. These results indicate that the worst earnings 
quality firms have the highest information asymmetry, and, for the worst earnings quality 
quintile (Q10), the mean information asymmetry is significantly larger than the mean for 
the best earnings quality quintile (Q1). In terms of accruals quality, the difference in mean 
values between Q10 and Q1 is 9.24 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 
14.39). In terms of persistence, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is 5.39 
and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 10.02). For smoothness, the difference 
in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is 2.78 and is significantly different from zero (t-
statistic 5.24). Finally, in terms of predictability, the difference in mean values between 
Q10 and Q1 is 2.14 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 3.59). 
8.2.1 Correlations among variables 
Table 8-1 Panel (B) reports the correlations amongst the three aspects of variables: 
namely, information asymmetry; earnings quality proxies; and control variables. The first 
aspect represents the correlations between information asymmetry and earnings quality 
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proxies. In this respect, the results indicate that, among other earnings quality proxies, 
accruals quality has the strongest significant correlation with information asymmetry 
(31%) followed by persistence (15%), then predictability (12%) and, finally, smoothness 
(11%). 
Moving to the second aspect which represents the correlations between information 
asymmetry and control variables, the results indicate a strong negative correlation 
between information asymmetry and trading volume (-49%). Also, the results indicate a 
strong negative correlation between information asymmetry and firm size (-67%). 
However, the results indicate a significant positive correlation between information 
asymmetry and standard deviation of return (37%); these are consistent with previous 
studies (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Ascioglu et al., 2012). Moving to the third aspect 
which represents the correlation between earnings quality proxies and control variables, 
the results indicate that correlations between earnings quality and control variables range 
between 0.26% and 62%. This suggests that mutlicollinearity is perhaps insignificant 
between the control variables and earnings quality proxies. In addition, the results indicate 
that the strongest positive correlation is between firm size and trading volume (62%); this 
indicates that larger sized firms have higher volumes of trade. 
Table 8-1: Univariate analyses of information asymmetry on earnings quality 
proxies 
Panel A: Mean Values of information asymmetry by each EQ Quintiles 
 High    Low Diff t-stat Q1 Q3 Q5 Q7 Q10 Q10-Q1 
AQ 
InfoAsymmetry 4.11 4.84 6.21 7.92 12.25 9.24 14.39*** 
Persistence 
InfoAsymmetry 3.86 7.19 7.91 7.92 8.69 5.39 10.02*** 
Predictability 
InfoAsymmetry 8.72 8.64 5.75 4.40 10.37 2.14 3.59*** 
Smoothness 
InfoAsymmetry 5.90 6.58 6.79 8.51 8.19 2.78 5.24*** 
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Panel B: The correlation among information asymmetry, earnings quality proxies and 
control variables 
 Info Asymmetry AQ Persist Predict Smooth 
Trading 
Volume Size 
AQ 0.31       
<.0001       
Persistence 0.15 0.082      
<.0001 <.0001      
Predictability 0.12 0.034 0.108     
<.0001 0.0021 <.0001     
Smoothness 0.11 0.061 0.193 0.27    
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    
Trading 
Volume 
-0.49 -0.147 -0.072 -0.031 0.088   
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0066 <.0001   
Size -0.67 -0.466 -0.163 0.309 -0.111 0.622  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
σሺReturnሻ 0.37 0.224 0.121 -0.068 0.142 0.026 -0.351 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0285 <.0001 
The sample consists of 6,397 firm-year observations over the period 2005-2011 (14 industries). In panel 
(B), the reported data are as follows. ܫ݂݊݋ܣݏݕ݉݉݁ݐݎݕ is measured by using the percentage quoted spread; 
this is the raw spread (ask – bid) deflated by the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes. Trading volume is the 
total trading volume of a firm in year t. Size is the log of total assets in year t. σሺReturnሻ is the standard 
deviation of stock returns over a firm’s preceding 10 years.  
Pearson correlations are reported in panel (B). The p-value is listed in italics below each correlation. 
8.3 Multivariate Analyses 
Multivariate tests are carried out in order to examine the association among the 
information asymmetry, control variables and each earnings quality proxies: namely, 
accruals quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness. The control variables are 
firm size, trading volume and standard deviation of return.  
 
ܫ݂݊݋ܣݏݕ݉௝,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܶݎܸܽ݀݅݊݃݋݈ݑ݉݁௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧
൅ ߚଷߪሺܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚସܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	 Equation (8-1) 
Where: 
ܫ݂݊݋ܣݏݕ݉ is measured by using the percentage quoted spread, which is the raw spread 
(ask – bid) deflated by the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes. 
ܶݎܸܽ݀݅݊݃݋݈ݑ݉݁ is trading volume of a firm in year t; 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ is a log of total assets of a firm for year t 
ߪሺܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ሻ is the standard deviation of stock return calculated over the preceding 10 years. 
ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞  is the decile rank of firm’s value of the kth earnings quality proxy in year t, 
ܭ ∈ ሼܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ, ܲ݁ݎݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿ݁, ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ, ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄݊݁ݏݏሽ. 
According to the literature, there is an expectation of a positive coefficient on the each 
decile rank earnings quality. This indicates higher bid-ask spread for firms with less 
 170 
 
favourable (i.e., larger) values of each earnings quality proxy and, thus, higher 
information asymmetry for such firms. For control variables, there is an expectation of 
negative coefficients for size and trading volume, and a positive coefficient for standard 
deviation of return. Moreover, in order to alleviate concerns about cross-sectional 
dependencies in the sample, the researcher used Equation (8-1) to estimate each of the 7 
years in the sample. This equation used the time-series standard errors regressions 
introduced by Fama and MacBeth (1973).   
Table 8-2, panel (A) provides both the coefficients estimates and t-statistics as a result of 
estimating Equation (8-1) and after adding separately each earnings quality proxies to the 
model. The results indicate a significant positive association between earnings quality 
proxies and information asymmetry; this association indicates that, compared to firms 
with high earnings quality, firms, with low earnings quality, have a higher information 
asymmetry. By comparing the coefficients of earnings quality proxies, the results indicate 
that earnings smoothness has the largest impact on information asymmetry followed by 
persistence, then earnings predictability and, finally, accruals quality. This finding is  
contrary to the finding of the study of Jayaraman (2008) in which he found that earnings 
smoothness was  associated with higher rather than lower bid-ask spreads. For control 
variables, the results indicate a significant positive association between information 
asymmetry and standard deviation of return. Also, the results indicate a negative 
association between information asymmetry and both trading volume and firm size; these 
are consistent with  previous literature (Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Cohen, 2008). Finally, 
52% is the average of four models’ explanatory power of regressions. 
In order to control the effects of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the researcher 
used, also, Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression. Table 8-2, panel 
(B) provides the results; these are consistent with the time-series standard errors 
regression. Also, the order between earnings proxies still remains. Those findings are 
interpreted as investors paying attention to the quality of firms’ earnings before trading 
in such firms. Therefore, the hypothesis (H2) is accepted and suggests a negative 
association between the  firm’s reported quality of earnings and  that firm’s information 
asymmetry; this is consistent with theoretical framework of Easley and O'hara (2004) and 
signalling theory. 
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Table 8-2: Multivariate analyses of information asymmetry on earnings quality 
proxies 
Panel A: Mean-annual regression of information asymmetry on each earning quality proxy 
(Decile rank), and control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.72*** -0.71*** -0.68*** -0.74*** 
 (-8.47) (-8.54) (-9.21) (-8.69) 
Size -1.48*** -1.48*** -1.55*** -1.46*** 
 (-8.32) (-8.99) (-8.35) (-8.87) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (5.61) (5.55) (5.40) (5.52) 
AQ 0.059**    
 (2.39)    
Persistence  0.097***   
  (3.01)   
Predictability   0.061**  
   (2.41)  
Smoothness    0.13*** 
    (8.16) 
Constant 27.3*** 27.0*** 27.7*** 27.0*** 
 (9.04) (9.53) (9.40) (9.38) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 
adj. R2 0.523 0.524 0.523 0.524 
Panel B: Pooled regressions of information asymmetry on each earning quality proxy (Decile 
rank), and control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.66*** -0.73*** 
 (-15.1) (-15.1) (-13.9) (-15.6) 
Size -1.56*** -1.58*** -1.65*** -1.56*** 
 (-28.1) (-30.5) (-29.1) (-29.8) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 
 (17.4) (17.3) (17.1) (17.4) 
AQ 0.054*    
 (1.83)    
Persistence  0.095***   
  (3.94)   
Predictability   0.072**  
   (2.49)  
Smoothness    0.13*** 
    (5.34) 
Constant 28.5*** 28.5*** 29.0*** 28.4*** 
 (49.8) (55.9) (59.9) (56.4) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 
adj. R2 0.494 0.495 0.495 0.496 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
See Table (8-1) for variable definitions. The sample consists of 6,397 firm-year observations and covering the 
years from 2005 to 2011.  
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8.3.1 The financial crisis 
Figure 8-1 presents the mean of information asymmetry in each year from 2005 to 2011. 
The figure shows that the mean of information asymmetry increased sharply from the pre-
crisis years (2005, 2006 and 2007) to the first year of the period of crisis (2008), and then 
levelled off. There was a dip by the end of the crisis period, and then a further reduction 
at the beginning of the recovery years (2010). In 2009, there was a slight fall in average 
levels of information asymmetry. According to this finding, the research separates the 
sample period (2005-2011) into three classifications: ‘pre-crisis’ for the years 2005, 2006, 
2007, ‘crisis period’ for years 2008, 2009  and “recovery” for the years 2010 and 2011. 
Therefore, the researcher tests the impact of financial crisis on the model of information 
asymmetry by using two methods. Firstly, two control variables (dummy variables) for 
the crisis are added to Equation (8-1) (results reported in Table 8-3). 
 
ܫ݂݊݋ܣݏݕ݉௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܶݎܸܽ݀݅݊݃݋݈ݑ݉݁௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߚଷܵݐܴ݀݁ݐ௝,௧
൅ ߚସܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߚହܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௝,௧ 
Equation 
(8-2) 
Where: 
ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௝,௧ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2008 and 2009 and equals 
zero otherwise. 
ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௝,௧ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2010 and 2011 and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Figure 8-1 : The mean of information asymmetry over years 2005-2011 
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Table 8-3: Pooled regressions of information asymmetry on each earnings quality 
proxy (decile rank), financial crisis dummy variables and control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.69*** -0.68*** -0.64*** -0.72*** 
 (-14.7) (-14.7) (-13.4) (-15.2) 
Size -1.57*** -1.60*** -1.67*** -1.57*** 
 (-27.7) (-29.9) (-28.5) (-29.3) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (14.8) (14.6) (14.3) (14.7) 
Crisis 0.49** 0.50** 0.52** 0.51** 
 (2.42) (2.51) (2.57) (2.52) 
Recovery -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.80*** -0.81*** 
 (-5.00) (-4.96) (-4.86) (-4.96) 
AQ 0.058**    
 (1.97)    
Persistence  0.098***   
  (4.08)   
Predictability   0.076***  
   (2.61)  
Smoothness    0.13*** 
    (5.46) 
Constant 28.8*** 28.7*** 29.3*** 28.7*** 
 (50.1) (56.2) (60.1) (56.6) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 
adj. R2 0.498 0.499 0.498 0.500 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
See Table (8-1) for variable definitions. The sample contains 6,397 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. Crisis 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2008 and 2009 and the remaining years equal zero. Recovery is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the years are 2010 and 2011 and the remaining years equal zero. 
According to Table 8-3, the results indicate a significant positive association between 
information asymmetry and financial crisis. This indicates, also, a high bid-ask spread 
throughout the financial crisis when compared to the “pre-crisis” period (2005, 2006 and 
2007). Also there is a significant positive association between each earnings quality proxy 
and information asymmetry; this is consistent with the main pooled regression reported 
in Table 8-2 panel (B). Finally, the order of largest effect between earnings quality proxies 
on information asymmetry still remains. 
Secondly, the interaction effects between the financial crisis and earnings quality proxies 
are added to the Equation (8-1) in order to determine the impact of the financial crisis on 
the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry in the UK. Table 
8-4 reports the results which indicate that within the crisis period, the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry was stronger than before the crisis. 
However, in the recovery period (2010 and 2011) and compared with the pre-crisis period, 
there was a less significant association between earnings quality proxies and information 
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asymmetry. This finding suggests that, in the financial crisis, investors paid more 
attention to quality of earnings; this finding is consistent with the results of the previous 
empirical chapter. Therefore, the hypothesis (H12) is accepted. 
Table 8-4: Pooled regressions of information asymmetry on each earning quality 
proxy (decile rank), the interaction between earnings quality and crisis, and 
control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry
Information 
Asymmetry
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry
Trading Volume -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.65*** -0.72*** 
 (-14.7) (-14.6) (-13.4) (-15.3) 
Size -1.58*** -1.60*** -1.67*** -1.57*** 
 (-28.2) (-30.1) (-28.2) (-29.3) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 
 (15.2) (15.0) (14.5) (15.3) 
AQ 0.070**    
 (2.14)    
AQ * Crisis 0.083**    
 (2.43)    
AQ * Recovery -0.14***    
 (-4.98)    
Persistence  0.11***   
  (3.91)   
Persist * Crisis  0.077**   
  (2.29)   
Persist * Recovery  -0.15***   
  (-5.36)   
Predictability   0.070**  
   (2.29)  
Predict * Crisis   0.083***  
   (2.63)  
Predict * Recovery   -0.068***  
   (-2.60)  
Smoothness    0.15*** 
    (5.42) 
Smooth * Crisis    0.063* 
    (1.90) 
Smooth * Recovery    -0.14*** 
    (-5.19) 
Constant 28.7*** 28.7*** 29.2*** 28.5*** 
 (49.4) (54.8) (57.5) (54.9) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 
adj. R2 0.499 0.499 0.496 0.500 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
See Table (8-1) for variable definitions. The sample contains 6,397 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011 
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Finally, the association between information asymmetry and earnings quality only in the 
period of the financial crisis (year 2008 and 2009) is examined. Table 8-5 reports, with 
the exception of accruals quality, significant associations between information 
asymmetry and earnings quality proxies.  
Table 8-5: Means annual regressions of information asymmetry on each earning 
quality proxy (decile rank) in the financial crisis, and control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.70*** -0.82*** 
 (-8.68) (-8.61) (-7.49) (-9.08) 
Size -1.98*** -2.00*** -2.14*** -1.96*** 
 (-18.1) (-19.9) (-19.1) (-19.4) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 
 (6.87) (6.55) (6.33) (6.75) 
AQ 0.047    
 (0.76)    
Persistence  0.15***   
  (3.00)   
Predictability   0.17***  
   (2.81)  
Smoothness    0.17*** 
    (3.43) 
Constant 36.1*** 35.6*** 36.6*** 35.7*** 
 (33.0) (39.2) (42.2) (39.6) 
N 1873 1873 1873 1873 
adj. R2 0.527 0.529 0.529 0.529 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
See Table (8-1) for variable definitions. The sample consists of 1,873 firm-year observations over t = 2008-2009. 
8.3.2 Innate versus discretionary earnings quality 
As per the previous chapter, the researcher uses two methods to disentangle the innate 
and the discretionary earnings quality components and in order to investigate the impact 
of both components on information asymmetry. Table 8-6 reports a significant positive 
association between information asymmetry and the innate component of each earnings 
quality proxy. However, there is no significant association between the discretionary 
component of each earnings quality proxy and information asymmetry. Moreover, on the 
one hand, the coefficients of innate component are larger than the coefficients of the 
discretionary component of earnings quality proxies. In economic terms, the largest effect 
of innate earnings predictability reduces information asymmetry by 540 basis points (60 
by 9 difference decile rank) between the highest and lowest decile rank of innate accruals 
quality firms. On the other hand, the effect of discretionary accruals quality is 55 basis 
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points. This finding suggests that, when compared to low earnings quality related to the 
discretionary component, investors assign a higher information asymmetry to firms with 
low earnings quality related to the innate component. This result may explain, also, the 
reason why, compared to other proxies, the association between total accruals quality and 
information asymmetry appears weak in the main tests (significant at 5% and10%). The 
four regressions’ average goodness of fit is 53%.  
Under Method 2, Table 8-6 panel (B) reports that, with the exception of accruals quality, 
discretionary earnings quality has positive coefficients for the four regressions. However, 
these coefficients are insignificant and smaller than the coefficients of total earnings 
quality. The four regressions’ average goodness of fit is 56%. 
According to the results in Table 8-6 panels A and B, the null hypothesis (H7) of there 
being no differences between the effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality 
components on information asymmetry is rejected. This supports the opinion that the 
innate component of each earnings quality proxies has a significantly larger impact than 
the discretionary component on information asymmetry. This result suggests that, in the 
UK and when compared to the discretionary component driven by management choices, 
investors attach greater weight to the innate component driven by economic 
fundamentals.  
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Table 8-6: The mean-annuals regression regressions of information asymmetry on 
both innate and discretionary components of each earning quality proxy 
Panel A: Mean-annuals regression regressions of information asymmetry on both innate and 
discretionary components of each earning quality proxy, and control variables (Method1) 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.77*** -0.67*** -0.81*** -0.76*** 
 (-9.93) (-10.6) (-12.9) (-11.2) 
Size -0.73*** -1.40*** -1.15*** -1.33*** 
 (-6.00) (-8.10) (-7.44) (-8.20) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 
 (5.23) (5.75) (5.11) (5.60) 
AQ (Innate) 0.60***    
 (8.85)    
AQ (Disc.) 0.062    
 (1.69)    
Persistence (Innate)  0.12***   
  (4.31)   
Persistence (Disc.)  0.039   
  (1.40)   
Predictability (Innate)   0.32***  
   (7.26)  
Predictability (Disc.)   -0.020  
   (-0.56)  
Smoothness (Innate)    0.19*** 
    (7.23) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.10*** 
    (7.46) 
Constant 15.9*** 25.2*** 23.4*** 24.9*** 
 (7.23) (9.03) (9.43) (9.09) 
N 4960 4960 4960 4960 
adj. R2 0.534 0.525 0.533 0.528 
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Panel B Mean-annual regressions of information asymmetry on discretionary earning 
quality, and control variables (Method2) 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.78*** -0.78*** 
 (-10.3) (-10.9) (-11.9) (-11.0) 
Size -1.67*** -1.68*** -1.65*** -1.68*** 
 (-8.95) (-8.68) (-7.86) (-8.91) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (5.94) (5.94) (5.92) (5.96) 
σሺCFOሻ 0.0040*** 0.0043*** 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
 (5.46) (5.32) (5.72) (5.39) 
σሺSalesሻ 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 
 (17.1) (18.8) (17.5) (18.3) 
OperCycle -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 
 (-1.47) (-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.40) 
NegEarn 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 
 (5.04) (4.62) (5.40) (3.79) 
AQ (Disc.) -0.0083    
 (-0.20)    
Persistence (Disc.)  0.041   
  (1.41)   
Predictability (Disc.)   -0.018  
   (-0.83)  
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.11*** 
    (8.42) 
Constant 30.5*** 29.9*** 30.4*** 30.2*** 
 (9.17) (8.76) (8.72) (8.76) 
N 4960 4960 4960 4960 
adj. R2 0.559 0.561 0.559 0.560 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 4,960 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.  
σሺCFOሻ = the standard deviation of operating cash flow of a firm computed over the preceding 10 years; 
σሺSalesሻ = the standard deviation of net revenue of a firm computed over the preceding 10 years; 
OperCycle = the log of operating cycle of a firm in year t; NegEarn = the number of years that a firm 
reported net income < 0 out of the preceding 10 years. 
8.4 Sensitivity Tests 
A number of sensitivity tests are examined: Firstly, in addition to the percentage quoted 
spread, the researcher uses the percentage effective spread as a second measure for the 
information asymmetry and reinvestigate the association between information asymmetry 
and earnings quality proxies (Table 8-7, panel A and B report the results). The results 
indicate a significantly negative association between information asymmetry and each 
earnings quality proxy; this indicates that with the exception of earning persistence, firms 
with high earnings quality have lower percentage effective spreads than firms with low 
earnings quality. However, the average of R2 declined by 8%. Secondly, the decile rank 
of earnings quality is replaced with the raw values of earnings quality proxies (Table 8-8 
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reports the results). The results indicate a significant association between each earnings 
quality proxy and information asymmetry.  
Thirdly, although the researcher uses standard specifications from the market 
microstructure literature, there is a concern regarding whether those used regressions 
control properly the differences in the firm’s characteristics. One suggestion could be the 
addition of industry effects as control variables since, perhaps, firms in the same industry 
exhibit similar firm characteristics. Therefore, the researcher creates fourteen industry 
dummies based on the industry classification in Table 6-2. The addition of those dummies 
to the main models does not change materially the relative coefficients or the t-statistics 
of the information asymmetry main regressions. The results indicate a significant positive 
association between each earnings quality proxy and information asymmetry (Table 8-9 
reports the results). 
Fourthly, the fixed and random effects panel data models are used (Table 8-10 reports the 
results). According to the fixed-effects, the results indicate significant associations 
between information asymmetry and all earnings quality proxies except earnings 
persistence. According to the random-effects, the results indicate significant associations 
between information asymmetry and both earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness. Based on the Hausman test, the fixed effects estimations are more 
appropriate than random effects estimations. 
8.5 Summary  
Although few studies examine the associations between information asymmetry and 
earnings quality, empirical evidence on this issue is controversial. From a broad sample 
of UK listed firms, the researcher documents that an important adverse consequence of 
low earnings quality is higher information asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread. 
This is consistent with the theoretical framework of Easley and O'hara (2004). The results 
indicate, also, that earnings smoothness has the largest negative impact across all earnings 
quality proxies on information asymmetry, This finding is contrary to the finding of the 
study of Jayaraman (2008) as he finds a significant positive association between earnings 
smoothness and bid-ask spreads.  
As for the financial crisis, this study tests the association between information asymmetry 
and earnings quality proxy during only the period of crisis (2008 and 2009). With the 
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exception of accruals quality, the researcher finds significant associations between 
information asymmetry and all earnings quality proxies. Also, the researcher tests the 
interaction effects of the financial crisis and earnings quality on information asymmetry. 
The results indicate that, within the crisis period and when compared to the pre-crisis 
period, there is a stronger association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry. However, during the period of recovery, there is a less significant association.  
Furthermore, this study divides earnings quality into two components, namely the innate 
and discretionary components, and tests whether each component has the same impact on 
information asymmetry. The results indicate that the innate component has a stronger 
impact on information asymmetry than the discretionary component. This finding 
suggests that investors attach greater weight to the innate component driven by economic 
fundamentals, compared to the discretionary component driven by management choices 
in the UK. These results are robust to alternative model specifications. 
Table 8-7: The regressions of information asymmetry (percentage effective spread) 
on earning quality proxies, and control variables 
Panel A: Mean-annual regressions of information asymmetry (percentage effective spread) 
on earning quality proxies, and control variables 
 %Effective 
Spread 
%Effective 
Spread 
%Effective 
Spread 
%Effective 
Spread 
Trading Volume -1.28*** -1.22*** -0.83*** -1.27*** 
 (-6.39) (-6.18) (-5.44) (-6.08) 
Size 1.51*** 1.31*** 0.67** 1.35*** 
 (4.56) (4.43) (2.93) (4.40) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (5.69) (5.55) (5.63) (5.65) 
AQ 0.32***    
 (4.88)    
Persistence  0.065   
  (1.04)   
Predictability   0.84***  
   (6.58)  
Smoothness    0.16** 
    (3.39) 
Constant -6.07** -3.08 -3.57 -3.55* 
 (-2.81) (-1.85) (-1.88) (-2.13) 
N 6396 6396 6396 6396 
adj. R2 0.071 0.069 0.094 0.069 
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Panel B: Pooled regressions of information asymmetry (percentage effective spread) on 
earning quality proxies, and control variables 
 %Effective 
Spread 
%Effective 
Spread 
%Effective 
Spread 
%Effective 
Spread 
Trading Volume -0.94*** -0.88*** -0.45*** -0.93*** 
 (-8.23) (-7.85) (-4.25) (-8.06) 
Size 1.03*** 0.81*** 0.088 0.85*** 
 (8.27) (7.14) (0.70) (7.37) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 
 (9.66) (9.77) (8.90) (9.78) 
AQ 0.36***    
 (5.11)    
Persistence  0.098   
  (1.63)   
Predictability   0.94***  
   (11.7)  
Smoothness    0.18*** 
    (2.87) 
Constant -2.20* 0.96 0.68 0.63 
 (-1.79) (0.83) (0.65) (0.57) 
N 6396 6396 6396 6396 
adj. R2 0.035 0.031 0.062 0.032 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 6,396 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011. 
Table 8-8: Pooled regressions of information asymmetry on each earning quality 
proxy (raw data), and control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.71*** -0.69*** -0.66*** -0.72*** 
 (-15.4) (-15.1) (-14.3) (-15.5) 
Size -1.53*** -1.58*** -1.61*** -1.57*** 
 (-27.5) (-30.5) (-31.1) (-30.3) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (17.2) (17.3) (16.9) (17.3) 
AQ 4.01***    
 (3.10)    
Persistence  -0.52***   
  (-3.46)   
Predictability   0.11***  
   (3.43)  
Smoothness    0.48*** 
    (4.92) 
Constant 28.3*** 29.1*** 29.0*** 28.6*** 
 (52.2) (59.7) (59.4) (57.8) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 
adj. R2 0.495 0.495 0.496 0.496 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 6,397 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.  
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Table 8-9: Pooled regressions of information asymmetry on earning quality 
proxies, plus industry dummy variables and control variables 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Trading Volume -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.57*** -0.63*** 
 (-12.6) (-12.6) (-11.6) (-13.1) 
Size -1.66*** -1.67*** -1.73*** -1.65*** 
 (-28.7) (-30.2) (-28.8) (-29.9) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (18.1) (18.1) (17.8) (18.1) 
2.industry -2.34** -2.22** -2.25** -2.13** 
 (-2.29) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.09) 
3.industry -1.67 -1.51 -1.53 -1.43 
 (-1.56) (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.34) 
4.industry 0.65 0.83 0.76 0.95 
 (0.61) (0.79) (0.72) (0.90) 
5.industry -0.77 -0.64 -0.69 -0.56 
 (-0.73) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-0.53) 
6.industry -1.82* -1.60 -1.70* -1.60 
 (-1.77) (-1.56) (-1.66) (-1.56) 
7.industry -0.96 -0.78 -0.88 -0.72 
 (-0.96) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.72) 
8.industry 1.08 1.24 1.19 1.23 
 (1.05) (1.21) (1.15) (1.20) 
9.industry -2.30** -2.15** -2.18** -2.02** 
 (-2.23) (-2.10) (-2.13) (-1.97) 
10.industry 0.096 0.32 0.19 0.44 
 (0.092) (0.31) (0.18) (0.42) 
11.industry -0.98 -0.75 -0.86 -0.64 
 (-0.96) (-0.73) (-0.84) (-0.63) 
12.industry -1.58 -1.33 -1.46 -1.33 
 (-1.56) (-1.32) (-1.45) (-1.33) 
13.industry 0.95 1.20 1.09 1.28 
 (0.79) (1.01) (0.91) (1.08) 
14.industry 0.052 0.21 0.15 0.25 
 (0.051) (0.20) (0.15) (0.24) 
AQ 0.039*    
 (1.61)    
Persistence  0.087***   
  (3.61)   
Predictability   0.057**  
   (1.97)  
Smoothness    0.12*** 
    (4.88) 
Constant 29.4*** 29.1*** 29.7*** 29.0*** 
 (26.2) (25.8) (26.9) (26.0) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 
adj. R2 0.508 0.509 0.508 0.510 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 6,397 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.   
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Table 8-10: Fixed-random panel regressions of information asymmetry on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables. 
 Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
Trading Volume -0.53*** -0.60*** -0.53*** -0.60*** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.54*** -0.63*** 
 (-7.30) (-11.7) (-7.34) (-11.8) (-7.18) (-11.0) (-7.44) (-12.2) 
Size -0.87*** -1.74*** -0.85*** -1.73*** -0.92*** -1.81*** -0.82*** -1.70*** 
 (-6.81) (-26.4) (-6.66) (-27.1) (-7.26) (-27.3) (-6.44) (-26.7) 
σሺReturnሻ 0.019*** 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 
 (7.63) (12.7) (7.68) (12.6) (6.79) (12.2) (7.47) (12.4) 
AQ 0.076** 0.013       
 (2.21) (0.43)       
Persistence   0.018 0.014     
   (0.61) (0.52)     
Predictability     0.32*** 0.16***   
     (6.17) (4.30)   
Smoothness       0.100*** 0.12*** 
       (2.68) (3.85) 
Constant 21.6*** 31.4*** 21.1*** 31.2*** 20.1*** 31.1*** 20.2*** 30.6*** 
 (13.9) (41.3) (13.6) (43.6) (13.1) (45.1) (13.0) (43.3) 
N 6397 6397 6397 6397 6397 6397 6397 6397 
Overall R2 0.4741 0.4845 0.4782 0.4851 0.4432 0.4848 0.4829 0.4870 
Hausman  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 6,397 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.  
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Chapter 9:  Empirical Results: the Association between Earnings 
Quality and Analysts’ Information Environment 
9.1 Introduction 
Financial analysts have been widely studied in the literature. They are considered as a 
primary participant in the capital markets (e.g., Schipper, 1991; Fogarty and Rogers, 
2005; Matsumoto et al., 2011). Their reports are widely used by other capital market 
participants (Lys and Sohn, 1990; Womack, 1996; Cox and Kleiman, 2002). Prior studies 
suggest that analysts play an important role in enhancing the usefulness and 
informativeness of accounting information by providing analyses of this information to 
users i.e., investors. From the other side, high financial information quality is supposed 
to develop the capital market efficiency and financial analysts should be interested in high 
accounting information quality (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2012b). Also, analysts’ 
information environment is a more direct proxy of the usefulness of earnings information, 
which is an important qualitative characteristic of the quality of accounting information. 
Investor responsiveness studies, however, suffer from the limitation that they infer 
earnings quality from share price movements, which also reflect other information than 
earnings. Analysts’ information environment, on the contrary,  are related to the use of 
reported earnings information without confounding the use of this information with 
following trading decisions (Jiao et al., 2012). Therefore, this chapter aims to examine 
the association between four earnings quality proxies known as accounting-based 
earnings quality proxies and three proxies of analysts’ information environment which 
are analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts accuracy to 
test the impact of the quality of accounting information on decision usefulness of 
sophisticated users.  
9.2 A univariate Analysis 
A univariate analysis of information asymmetry across quintiles is conducted and is 
sorted on the each earnings quality proxies from the lowest to the highest. Evidences on 
the association between the three proxies of analysts’ information environment and each 
earnings quality proxy are provided in Table 8-1. These evidences are classified into three 
categories. First, financial analysts following, the result indicates that the high earnings 
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quality firms have the highest number of analysts following, and the mean of analysts 
following for the worst earnings quality quintile (Q10) is significantly smaller than the 
mean for the best earnings quality quintile (Q1), except earnings smoothness. In terms of 
accruals quality, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is -7.84 and is 
significantly different from zero (t-statistic 17.10). In terms of persistence, the difference 
in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is -3.96 and is significantly different from zero (t-
statistic 9.33). For predictability, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is -
3.56 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 8.58). However, In terms of 
smoothness, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is -0.08 and is not 
significantly different from zero (t-statistic 0.20). 
Second, the analysts’ forecasts dispersion, the result indicates that the high earnings 
quality firms have the lowest dispersion across analysts’ forecasts, and the mean of 
analysts’ forecasts dispersion for the worst earnings quality quintile (Q10) is significantly 
larger than the mean for the best earnings quality quintile (Q1), except earnings 
predictability. In terms of accruals quality, the difference in mean values between Q10 
and Q1 is 0.90 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 5.60). In terms of 
persistence, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is 0.39 and is significantly 
different from zero (t-statistic 4.25). For smoothness, the difference in mean values 
between Q10 and Q1 is 0.52 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 4.77). 
However, In terms of predictability, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 
is -0.04 and is not significantly different from zero (t-statistic -0.18). 
Third, the analysts’ forecasts accuracy, the result indicates that the high earnings quality 
firms have more accurate analysts’ forecasts than firms with low earnings quality, and the 
mean of analysts’ forecasts accuracy for the worst earnings quality quintile (Q10) is 
significantly smaller than the mean for the best earnings quality quintile (Q1), except 
earnings persistence. In terms of accruals quality, the difference in mean values between 
Q10 and Q1 is -0.76 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 4.85). In terms of 
predictability, the difference in mean values between Q10 and Q1 is -3.41 and is 
significantly different from zero (t-statistic 9.41). For smoothness, the difference in mean 
values between Q10 and Q1 is -0.56 and is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 
3.42). However, In terms of persistence, the difference in mean values between Q10 and 
Q1 is -0.12 and is not significantly different from zero (t-statistic 0.92). 
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Table 9-1: Mean Values of analysts’ information environment proxies by each EQ 
proxies Quintiles 
 High    Low Diff t-stat Q1 Q3 Q5 Q7 Q10 Q10-Q1 
AQ 
following 10.03 8.00 6.59 4.43 2.19 -7.84 -17.10*** 
Persistence 
following 8.95 5.93 6.19 5.00 4.99 - 3.96 -9.33*** 
Predictability 
following 3.06 4.16 6.08 7.71 6.61 -3.56 -8.58*** 
Smoothness 
following 5.59 6.89 6.39 5.39 5.67 0.08 0.20 
AQ 
Dispersion 0.55 0.67 0.76 0.92 1.45 0.90 5.60*** 
Persistence 
Dispersion 0.48 0.90 0.83 0.96 0.88 0.39 4.25*** 
Predictability 
Dispersion 1.23 0.83 0.67 0.66 1.19 -0.04 -0.18 
Smoothness 
Dispersion 0.57 0.66 0.84 0.84 1.09 0.52 4.77*** 
AQ 
Accuracy -0.13 -0.30 -0.26 -0.60 -0.89 -0.76 -4.85*** 
Persistence 
Accuracy -0.39 -0.28 -0.44 -0.61 -0.51 -0.12 -0.92 
Predictability 
 Accuracy -0.25 -0.17 -0.14 -0.19 -3.66 -3.41 -9.41*** 
Smoothness 
Accuracy -0.27 -0.25 -0.43 -0.75 -0.84 -0.56 -3.42*** 
The sample size ranges between 3,267 and 4,637 firm-year observations over the period 2005-2011 (14 
industries). 
9.2.1 Correlations among variables 
Table 9-2 reports the correlations among the three aspects of variables: dependent 
variables, independent variables and control variables. For the first aspect that represent 
the correlations among the dependent variables show higher negative correlation between 
number of analysts following and analysts' forecasts dispersion than the correlation 
between analysts following and analysts’ forecasts accuracy. Moving to the second aspect 
that represents the correlations among the earnings quality proxies, the results indicate 
correlations among the earnings quality are less than 1 which suggest the notion that the 
four earnings proxies measure different aspects of earnings quality. Moreover, the 
correlations among dependent variables and earnings quality proxies indicate that there 
are significant correlations range between 4% and 31% among them. For the third aspect, 
the table reports that the correlations among the control variables are ranging between 5% 
and 22%. Also, correlations among earnings quality and control variables are ranging 
between 3% and 45%, which suggest that mutlicollinearity is perhaps not significant 
among the control variables and earnings quality proxies. Finally, the closest correlation 
is between analysts following and firm size (80%).  
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Table 9-2: The correlation among earnings quality proxies and analysts’ information environment proxies 
  Following Dispersion Accuracy AQ Persistence Predictability Smoothness Size Growth σሺROEሻ 
Following 
                    
                    
Dispersion 
-0.175                   
0.0000                   
Accuracy 
0.0919 -0.0778                 
0.0000 0.0000                 
AQ 
-0.3115 0.1503 -0.1183               
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000               
Persistence 
-0.177 0.058 -0.0448 0.0721             
0.0000 0.0008 0.0021 0.0000             
Predictability 
-0.2602 0.0145 -0.1772 0.0342 0.1155           
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.002 0.0000           
Smoothness 
-0.0412 0.1013 -0.0725 0.0682 0.1859 0.2672         
0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000         
Size 
0.8057 -0.2484 0.1199 -0.4538 -0.1577 0.3146 -0.1127       
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
Growth 
-0.0472 -0.0529 0.0538 0.0593 -0.1008 -0.1719 -0.1545 0.0784     
0.0015 0.0033 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
σሺROEሻ -0.1004 0.0917 -0.0651 0.2366 0.0686 0.0658 0.1669 -0.2231 0.1013   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
SURP 
0.0776 0.0324 -0.5207 0.0297 0.0541 0.3505 0.0826 0.0387 -0.0159 0.0529 
0.0000 0.0628 0.0000 0.0132 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.2074 0.0000 
The sample size ranges between 3,267 and 4,637 firm-year observations over the period 2005-2011 (14 industries). Pearson correlations are used. The p-value is listed in italics below each correlation. 
Size = log of total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the changing percentage in the book value of equity over the past 5 years. SURP = earnings surprise which calculated as the absolute 
value of the difference between the earnings per share for year t and t-1, deflated by stock price at the beginning of year t. σሺROEሻ = standard deviation of returns on equity calculated over the preceding 
10 years of a firm.
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9.3 Multivariate analyses 
9.3.1 Earnings quality and analysts following 
In this section, the researcher discusses the results of the main tests that investigate the 
associations between number of analysts following and four earnings quality proxies 
considered individually: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability 
and earnings smoothness. The control variables are firm size, growth and standard 
deviation of ROE, which represents performance variability of firms. The associations 
between financial analysts following and each earnings quality proxy are examined, in 
addition to control variables for the period 2005-2011 by using the following model.  
 
ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵݐ݀ ܴܱܧ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܩݎ݋ݓݐ ௝݄,௧
൅ ߚସܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߝ௝,௧ 
Equation (9-1) 
Where: 
ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ is the number of analysts following a firm in year t, ܵ݅ݖ݁ is log of total 
assets of a firm for year t; ܵݐܴܱ݀ܧ is the standard deviation of returns on equity (ROE) 
calculated over the preceding 10 years; ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ is the log of one plus the firm’s growth 
in book value of equity over the preceding 5 years; ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞  is the decile rank of 
firm’s value of the kth earnings quality proxy in year t, ܭ ∈
ሼܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ, ܲ݁ݎݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿ݁, ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ, ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄݊݁ݏݏሽ. 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression is used, which controls for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation effects. A negative coefficient on the earnings 
quality decile rank is expected, indicating that firms with higher earnings quality have a 
larger number of analysts following. Table 9-3 provides both the coefficients estimates 
and statistical significance as a result of estimating Equation (9-1) after adding each 
earnings quality proxy separately to the model. The results indicate a significant negative 
association between financial analysts following and all earnings quality proxies except 
earnings smoothness which inconsistent with the study of Previts et al. (1994) who 
document that analysts prefer to follow firms with smooth earnings. These results 
therefore indicate that firms with high earnings quality have a larger number of analysts 
following.  
Comparing the coefficients of earnings quality proxies, the researcher finds that 
predictability has the largest impact on the analysts following followed by persistence, 
accruals quality and finally smoothness which is consistent with previous evidence that 
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financial analysts are primarily concerned with sustainable and predictable earnings 
(Barker and Imam, 2008). This suggests that financial analysts play an important role as 
intermediaries among firms and investors rather than as primary information providers 
competing the firms to introduce information directly to investors; thus, the researcher 
finds an evidence to accept the (H3) hypothesis and suggests a positive association 
between the quality of earnings reported by a firm and the number of analysts following 
that firm. This finding supports the theory of decision usefulness. 
For the control variables, the results indicate a significant positive association between 
analysts following and firm size, which is consistent with the literature that reported upon 
by Bhushan (1989) and Lang and Lundholm (1996), who provide evidence that analysts 
perhaps follow the larger firms. On the other hand, there is a significant positive association 
between analysts following and the standard deviation of ROE which runs counter to the 
results of Bhushan (1989) who suggests that analysts follow firms with low variability in 
their performance. Moreover, there is a significant negative association between the number 
of analysts following and growth. Finally, the average of the explanatory powers of the four 
models of regression is around 66%, which is higher than previous studies, e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) documents an average R2 around 38%. 
Table 9-3: Pooled regressions of financial analysts following on each earning 
quality proxy, and control variables 
 ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ 
Size 2.54*** 2.48*** 2.63*** 2.52*** 
 (68.5) (71.2) (69.0) (71.7) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0033*** 0.0039*** 0.0047*** 0.0037*** 
 (5.28) (6.17) (7.45) (5.73) 
Growth -0.23*** -0.28*** -0.33*** -0.23*** 
 (-5.33) (-6.53) (-7.32) (-5.23) 
AQ -0.053**    
 (2.29)    
Persistence  -0.20***   
  (-9.48)   
Predictability   -0.23***  
   (-9.63)  
Smoothness    -0.028 
    (-1.33) 
Constant -24.6*** -22.5*** -24.2*** -23.8*** 
 (-51.5) (-53.7) (-60.3) (-57.0) 
N 4537 4537 4537 4537 
adj. R2 0.659 0.666 0.665 0.659 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics.  
The sample consists of 4,537 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.  
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9.3.2 Earnings quality and analysts’ forecasts dispersion 
In the second test, the association between earnings quality and dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts is examined. Analysts following, firm size, standard deviation of ROE and 
earnings surprise are used as control variables. The researcher examines the associations 
between the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and each earnings quality proxy by using 
the Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression as used in Equation (9-1). 
 
ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ݅݋݊௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧
൅ ߚଷߪሺܴܱܧሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚସܷܴܵ ௝ܲ,௧ ൅ ߚହܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	 Equation (9-2)
Where: 
ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ is the standard deviation of financial analysts' forecasts in the fiscal year t, 
deflated by stock price multiplied by 100. 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ is log of total number of analysts following a firm in year t. 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ is log of total assets of a firm for year t. 
σሺROEሻ is the standard deviation of ROE calculated over the preceding 10 years. 
ܷܴܵܲ is the absolute value of the difference between the earnings per share for year t and 
t-1, deflated by stock price at the beginning of year t. 
ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞  is the decile rank of firm’s value of the kth earnings quality proxy in year t, 
ܭ ∈ ሼܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ, ܲ݁ݎݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿ݁, ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐܾ݈݅݅݅ݐݕ, ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄݊݁ݏݏሽ. 
Table 9-4 reports the results of the test indicate a significant positive association between 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and all earnings quality proxies, indicating that firms 
with higher earnings quality have lower analysts’ forecasts dispersion among analysts’ 
(higher analysts' consensus) compared to firms with low earnings quality. Analysts’ 
forecasts dispersion reflects the uncertainty among analysts; it also reflects to what extent 
the analysts depend on private or public information in their valuation models. Therefore, 
this finding suggests that analysts depend more on public information than private 
information for firms with high earnings quality. Thus, hypothesis (H4) is accepted. Also, 
it supports the theory of decision usefulness.   
Comparing the coefficients of earnings quality proxies, it finds that earnings smoothness 
has the largest impact on the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, accruals quality, then 
predictability and finally persistence. This finding suggests that financial analysts give 
more attention to accounting-based information in their forecasts valuation models.  
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For the control variables, the results indicate a positive association between dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts and the number of analysts following but not significant. Also, the 
results indicate a significant positive association between dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
and performance variability, indicating that firms with high performance variability have 
lower analysts’ consensus. The association between dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and 
earnings surprise is also positive, indicating firms with larger earnings surprise have 
higher analysts’ forecasts dispersion. There is also a negative significant association 
between dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and firm size indicating larger firms have lower 
analysts’ forecasts dispersion. Finally, the average explanation power of the regressions’ 
models is around 7% which is lower than prior literature e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
document an average explanatory power around 38%. 
Table 9-4: Pooled regressions of analysts’ forecasts dispersion on each earning 
quality proxy, and control variables 
 Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ -0.0036 0.014 0.019 0.0062 
(-0.075) (0.29) (0.39) (0.13) 
Size -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.19*** 
 (-6.74) (-7.75) (-8.04) (-7.68) 
σሺROEሻ 0.00099** 0.0011** 0.00096** 0.00087** 
 (2.33) (2.51) (2.20) (2.08) 
SURP 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.18** 0.23*** 
 (2.95) (2.97) (2.14) (2.87) 
AQ 0.037***    
 (3.28)    
Persistence  0.014*   
  (1.67)   
Predictability   0.036**  
   (2.54)  
Smoothness    0.047*** 
    (5.31) 
Constant 2.76*** 3.12*** 3.25*** 2.94*** 
 (9.73) (11.4) (12.1) (11.0) 
N 3267 3267 3267 3267 
adj. R2 0.072 0.070 0.072 0.077 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 3,267 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.  
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9.3.3 Earnings quality and analysts’ forecasts accuracy 
In this section, the association between analysts' forecasts accuracy and earnings quality 
proxies is examined in addition to control variables. 
 
ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧
൅ ߚଷߪሺܴܱܧሻ௝,௧ ൅ ߚସܷܴܵ ௝ܲ,௧ ൅ ߚହܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	 Equation (9-3)
Where: 
ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ is the negative of the absolute value of the financial analysts' forecast error, 
deflated by stock price of a firm in year t. 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ is log of total number of analysts following a firm in year t. 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ is log of total assets of a firm for year t. 
σሺROEሻ is the standard deviation of ROE calculated over the preceding 10 years. 
ܷܴܵܲ is the absolute value of the difference between the earnings per share for year t and 
t-1, deflated by stock price at the beginning of year t. 
ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௝,௧௞  is the decile rank of firm's value of the kth earnings quality proxy in year t, 
ܭ ∈ ሼܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ, ܲ݁ݎݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿ݁, ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ, ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄݊݁ݏݏሽ. 
Table 9-5 reports the results that indicate a significant negative association between 
analysts' forecasts accuracy and both accruals quality and earnings predictability, and no 
significant association between analysts’ forecasts accuracy and both earnings persistence 
and smoothness. This finding suggests that earnings quality is a key determinant of 
analysts’ forecasts accuracy. Thus, there is evidence to accept the hypothesis (H5) and to 
support the decision usefulness theory.  
Comparing the coefficient of earnings quality proxies, the results indicate that earnings 
predictability has the largest effects on analysts' forecasts accuracy then accruals quality. 
This finding suggests that firms with high earnings predictability and high accruals 
quality lead to greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy. However, financial analysts use both 
earnings persistence and smoothness in their forecasts model but the information seems 
does not add value. 
Moving to control variables, the results indicate a positive association between analysts' 
forecasts accuracy and analysts following, indicating firms with high number of analysts 
following have greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy. The results also indicate a positive 
association between analysts' forecasts accuracy and firm size, indicating larger firms 
have greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy. However, there are negative associations 
between analysts' forecasts accuracy and both standard deviation of ROE and earnings 
surprise, which consistent with literature. Finally, the results indicate that this model 
explains significant portion of analysts’ forecasts accuracy variation with an average R2 
around 28%, which is near to previous studies e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1996) document 
an average R2 around 38%. 
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Table 9-5: Pooled regressions of financial analysts’ forecasts accuracy on each 
earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables 
 Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
(3.67) (3.84) (3.07) (3.64) 
Size 0.066*** 0.081*** 0.11*** 0.082*** 
 (3.13) (3.91) (4.19) (3.94) 
σሺROEሻ -0.00045* -0.00057** -0.00041* -0.00059** 
 (-1.85) (-2.28) (-1.74) (-2.29) 
SURP -2.24*** -2.25*** -2.17*** -2.25*** 
 (-8.32) (-8.33) (-7.72) (-8.31) 
AQ -0.029***    
 (-3.12)    
Persistence  0.010   
  (1.36)   
Predictability   -0.037**  
   (-2.19)  
Smoothness    0.0073 
    (0.93) 
Constant -0.77*** -1.15*** -1.18*** -1.13*** 
 (-3.37) (-5.14) (-5.12) (-5.09) 
N 4122 4122 4122 4122 
adj. R2 0.283 0.282 0.284 0.282 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample contains 4,637 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011.  
9.4 Innate Versus Discretionary Earnings Quality 
Following the previous chapters, seven and eight, two methods are used to disentangle 
between the innate and the discretionary earnings quality components and investigate the 
impact of both components on the three proxies of analysts’ information environment: 
analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts accuracy. 
9.4.1 The association between analysts following and both components of earnings 
quality 
Table 9-6, panel (A) reports that both innate and discretionary components have 
significant impact on financial analysts following except the discretionary component for 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness. In addition, the innate component 
coefficient is larger than the discretionary component coefficient and exhibits stronger 
statistical significance than the discretionary coefficient. This finding suggests that the 
innate component of earnings quality has a larger impact on analysts following than the 
discretionary component. The average goodness of fit of the four regressions is 67%. 
Under Method 2, Table 9-6, panel (B) reports that discretionary earnings quality has a 
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negative significant coefficient for earnings predictability and persistence. There are, 
however, insignificant associations for accruals quality and smoothness. The average 
goodness of fit of the four regressions is 68.5%.  
Table 9-6, panel (A-B), points towards rejecting the null hypothesis (H7) of no differences 
between the effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality components on financial 
analysts following, supporting the argument that the innate portion of each earnings 
quality proxy has a larger impact than the discretionary portion on the number of analysts 
following. This finding suggests that analysts in the UK give greater weight to the innate 
component, influenced by economic fundamentals, than the discretionary component 
influenced by management choices.  
Table 9-6: Pooled regressions of financial analysts following on both innate and 
discretionary components of each earning quality proxy, and control variables 
Panel A: Pooled regressions of financial analysts following on both innate and discretionary 
components of each earning quality proxy, and control variables (Method1) 
 Following Following Following Following 
Size 2.72*** 2.47*** 2.61*** 2.61*** 
 (39.5) (64.5) (62.4) (68.8) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0021** 0.0050*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 
 (2.22) (5.07) (3.20) (3.43) 
Growth -0.18*** -0.26*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (-3.29) (-4.96) (-2.94) (-2.98) 
AQ (Innate) 0.13***    
 (2.62)    
AQ (Disc.) 0.11***    
 (4.63)    
Persistence (Innate)  -0.23***   
  (-9.36)   
Persistence (Disc.)  -0.14***   
  (-6.31)   
Predictability (Innate)   -0.09***  
   (4.50)  
Predictability (Disc.)   -0.0059  
   (-0.12)  
Smoothness (Innate)    -0.041* 
    (-1.84) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.011 
    (0.45) 
Constant -27.8*** -21.7*** -25.2*** -25.2*** 
 (-27.0) (-43.4) (-42.3) (-53.5) 
N 3701 3701 3701 3701 
adj. R2 0.673 0.681 0.671 0.671 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 3,701 firm-year observations covering the years 2005 to 2011.  
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Panel B: Pooled regressions of financial analysts following on discretionary earning quality, 
and control variables (Method2) 
 Following Following Following Following
Size 2.34*** 2.35*** 2.50*** 2.34*** 
 (46.9) (48.9) (48.1) (47.6) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0022** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0023** 
 (2.38) (2.66) (3.87) (2.47) 
Growth -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.26*** -0.15*** 
 (-2.95) (-3.71) (-4.81) (-2.81) 
σሺCFOሻ 0.0057*** 0.0055*** 0.0061*** 0.0057*** 
 (4.51) (4.24) (4.81) (4.53) 
σሺSalesሻ -0.00011 -0.00016 -0.00022 -0.00011 
 (-0.33) (-0.48) (-0.68) (-0.34) 
OperCycle -0.035 -0.050 -0.035 -0.030 
 (-0.41) (-0.59) (-0.42) (-0.35) 
NegEarn -0.0097 0.031 0.054** 0.0014 
 (-0.38) (1.26) (2.24) (0.055) 
AQ (Disc.) 0.030    
 (1.14)    
Persistence (Disc.)  -0.17***   
  (-7.18)   
Predictability (Disc.)   -0.25***  
   (-9.43)  
Smoothness (Disc.)    -0.0100 
    (-0.40) 
Constant -22.3*** -21.4*** -22.7*** -22.1*** 
 (-30.4) (-30.4) (-32.9) (-32.0) 
N 3701 3701 3701 3701 
adj. R2 0.684 0.689 0.691 0.684 
The sample consists of 3,701 firm-year observations covering the years 2005 to 2011. σሺCFOሻ is the 
standard deviation of cash flow operations of a firm computed through the preceding 10 years; σሺSalesሻ is 
the standard deviation of net revenue computed through the preceding 10 years of a firm; OperCycle is the 
log of operating cycle of a firm in year t; NegEarn is the number of years where a firm reported net income 
before extraordinary items (NIBE) < 0 out of the preceding 10 years.  
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
9.4.2 The association between analysts’ forecasts dispersion and both components of 
earnings quality 
According to Table 9-7, panel (A), the results indicate that the innate component of 
earnings quality has a negative significant impact on analysts’ forecasts dispersion 
however, the discretionary component has no significant impact on financial analysts’ 
forecasts dispersion except the discretionary component of accruals quality. Also, the 
innate component coefficient is larger than the discretionary component coefficient and 
also exhibits stronger statistical significance than the discretionary coefficient. This 
finding suggests that firms with low earnings quality due to the innate component, have 
higher analysts’ forecasts dispersion, compared to low earnings quality due to the 
discretionary component. The average goodness of fit of the four regressions is 9.5%. 
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Under Method 2, Table 9-7 Panel (B) reports that the discretionary earnings quality has 
no significant association with financial analysts’ forecasts dispersion for the four proxies 
of earnings quality. The average goodness of fit of the four regressions is 12%.  
The results reported in panel A and B of Table 9-7 point towards the rejection of the null 
hypothesis (H8) of no difference between the effects of innate and discretionary earnings 
quality components on financial analysts’ forecasts dispersion. Also, it suggests that 
innate portion of earnings quality has a dominant influence on analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion, while, the discretionary portion of earnings quality has no impact on analysts’ 
forecasts dispersion. 
Table 9-7: Pooled regressions of analysts’ forecasts dispersion on both innate and 
discretionary components of each earning quality proxy, and control variables 
Panel A: Pooled regressions of financial analysts’ forecasts dispersion on both innate and 
discretionary components of each earning quality proxy, and control variables (Method 1) 
 Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.059 0.044 0.076 0.025 
(1.08) (0.84) (1.43) (0.48) 
Size -0.012 -0.096*** -0.16*** -0.17*** 
 (-0.48) (-3.59) (-6.12) (-6.51) 
σሺROEሻ 0.00046 0.00045 0.000045 0.0000037 
 (1.04) (0.97) (0.099) (0.0080) 
SURP 0.18** 0.19** 0.15 0.20** 
 (2.18) (2.35) (1.59) (2.41) 
AQ (Innate) 0.19***    
 (8.18)    
AQ (Disc.) 0.025*    
 (1.72)    
Persistence (Innate)  0.12***   
  (8.12)   
Persistence (Disc.)  -0.011   
  (-1.29)   
Predictability (Innate)   0.14***  
   (5.14)  
Predictability (Disc.)   0.011  
   (0.40)  
Smoothness (Innate)    0.13*** 
    (9.79) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    -0.00095 
    (-0.095) 
Constant -0.13 1.39*** 1.95*** 2.21*** 
 (-0.39) (4.61) (6.08) (8.23) 
N 2744 2744 2744 2744 
adj. R2 0.094 0.092 0.108 0.109 
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Panel B: pooled regressions of financial analysts’ forecasts dispersion on discretionary 
earning quality proxy, and control variables (Method 2) 
 Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.052 0.049 0.059 0.054 
(0.95) (0.89) (1.08) (0.99) 
Size -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (-3.27) (-3.35) (-3.50) (-3.53) 
σሺROEሻ -0.00014 -0.00012 -0.00016 -0.00014 
 (-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.35) (-0.31) 
SURP 0.16* 0.16** 0.15* 0.16** 
 (1.96) (1.98) (1.68) (1.96) 
ߪሺܥܨܱሻ -0.00016 -0.00017 -0.00016 -0.00014 
 (-1.30) (-1.33) (-1.30) (-1.14) 
ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ 0.000055 0.000053 0.000061* 0.000056* 
 (1.61) (1.56) (1.74) (1.65) 
ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁ -0.0090 -0.0068 -0.0048 -0.0050 
 (-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.13) 
ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊ 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (8.85) (8.91) (8.55) (8.09) 
AQ (Disc.) 0.011    
 (0.92)    
Persistence (Disc.)  -0.0058   
  (-0.65)   
Predictability (Disc.)   0.0097  
   (0.65)  
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.0059 
    (0.57) 
Constant 1.76*** 1.85*** 1.90*** 1.85*** 
 (4.47) (4.81) (4.82) (4.80) 
N 2744 2744 2744 2744 
adj. R2 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample consists of 2,744 firm-year observations covering the years 2005 to 2011.  
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9.4.3 The association between analysts’ forecasts accuracy and both components of 
earnings quality 
As reported in Table 9-8 panel (A), the results indicate that both innate and discretionary 
components have significant impact on financial analysts’ forecasts accuracy except the 
discretionary accruals quality, however, the innate component coefficient is larger than 
the discretionary component coefficient and exhibits stronger statistical significance than 
the discretionary coefficient. This finding suggest that firms with low earnings quality 
due to the innate component of earnings quality, have lower analysts’ forecasts accuracy, 
compared to firms with low earnings quality due to the discretionary component of 
earnings quality.  
Moreover, the results indicate that the innate components of both earnings persistence 
and smoothness have significant positive associations with analysts’ forecasts accuracy, 
however, the discretionary components of both earnings persistence and smoothness have 
significant negative association with analysts’ forecasts accuracy, suggesting that low 
discretionary component of persistence or smoothness leads to greater accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts. This finding may explain why there is no significant association 
between analysts forecasts’ accuracy and both total earnings persistence and smoothness. 
Also, it shed light about how analysts look at the two portions of earnings persistence and 
smoothness. The average goodness of fit of the four regressions is 29%. Overall, these 
results provide evidence that analysts are not mislead by discretionary earnings quality, 
which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Kim and Schroeder, 1990). 
Under Method 2, Table 9-8 panel (B) reports that discretionary components of both 
earnings persistence and smoothness have significant negative association with analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy; however, the results indicate no significant association between 
analysts’ forecasts accuracy and both discretionary components of accruals quality and 
predictability. The average goodness of fit of the four regressions is 29%. The results 
reported in panel A and B of Table 9-8 point towards the rejection of the null hypothesis 
(H9) of no difference between the effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality 
components on analysts’ forecasts accuracy. This supports the opinion that innate portion 
of each earnings quality proxy has a larger impact than the discretionary portion on 
analysts’ forecasts accuracy. 
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Table 9-8: Pooled regressions of analysts’ forecasts accuracy on both innate and 
discretionary components of each earning quality proxy, and control variables 
Panel A: Pooled regressions of analysts’ forecasts accuracy on both innate and discretionary 
components of each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables (Method 1) 
 Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 
(2.60) (3.67) (2.77) (3.33) 
Size -0.0010 0.026 0.11*** 0.080*** 
 (-0.033) (1.07) (4.03) (3.43) 
σሺROEሻ -0.00079** -0.00073* -0.00030 -0.00057 
 (-1.97) (-1.74) (-0.73) (-1.40) 
SURP -2.17*** -2.17*** -1.87*** -2.18*** 
 (-7.86) (-7.93) (-6.48) (-8.00) 
AQ (Innate) -0.10***    
 (-3.96)    
AQ (Disc.) -0.021    
 (-1.54)    
Persistence (Innate)  -0.080***   
  (-5.94)   
Persistence (Disc.)  0.031***   
  (3.34)   
Predictability (Innate)   -0.22***  
   (-3.57)  
Predictability (Disc.)   -0.19***  
   (-2.86)  
Smoothness (Innate)    -0.077*** 
    (-6.36) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.048*** 
    (4.23) 
Constant 0.51 -0.25 0.75 -0.99*** 
 (1.21) (-0.93) (1.33) (-3.97) 
N 3404 3404 3404 3404 
adj. R2 0.285 0.289 0.302 0.295 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample contains 3,404 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011.  
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Panel B: Pooled regressions of financial analysts’ forecasts accuracy on discretionary 
earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables (Method 2) 
 Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
(3.20) (3.64) (2.86) (3.15) 
Size 0.0084 0.0039 0.030 0.0031 
 (0.29) (0.14) (0.85) (0.11) 
σሺROEሻ -0.00032 -0.00037 -0.00032 -0.00045 
 (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.79) (-1.08) 
SURP -2.15*** -2.16*** -2.13*** -2.16*** 
 (-7.89) (-7.91) (-7.44) (-7.93) 
ߪሺܥܨܱሻ 0.00043** 0.00047*** 0.00043*** 0.00048*** 
(2.51) (2.70) (2.60) (2.79) 
ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ -0.000012 -0.0000025 -0.000022 0.0000098 
(-0.32) (-0.067) (-0.56) (-0.27) 
ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁ 0.042 0.043 0.036 0.042 
(0.91) (0.93) (0.78) (0.91) 
ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊ -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.13*** 
(-5.12) (-5.46) (-5.31) (-5.57) 
AQ (Disc.) -0.018    
 (-1.62)    
Persistence (Disc.)  0.028***   
  (2.85)   
Predictability (Disc.)   -0.016  
   (-0.88)  
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.045*** 
    (3.90) 
Constant -0.17 -0.35 -0.39 -0.36 
 (-0.42) (-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.90) 
N 3404 3404 3404 3404 
adj. R2 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.297 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics. 
The sample contains 3,404 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011.  
9.5 Sensitivity Tests 
A number of sensitivity tests are conducted in respect of the results of three main tests 
(using Equation (9-1), Equation (9-2) and Equation (9-3)). First, the decile rank of 
earnings quality proxies is replaced with the raw values of earnings quality proxies and 
found the same results (see Table 9-9). Second, Tobit regression is used instead of Newey 
and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression and found the same results in terms of 
significance and magnitude (details not reported). Third, the fixed and random effects 
panel data models are used (see Table 9-10). The advantage of using these models is 
controlling unobservable firm-specific characteristics that may affect the dependent 
variable (analysts’ information environment proxies) (Wooldridge, 2010). Table 9-10 
reports the results for the association between earnings quality and analysts following, 
analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts accuracy respectively. According to 
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panel (A) of Table 9-10, it find significant associations between analysts following and 
both earnings persistence and earnings predictability but no significant associations 
between analysts following and both accruals quality and earnings smoothness in random 
model only, which is consistent with the results of main tests except for accruals quality. 
Moving to panel (B), the results indicate significant associations between analysts’ 
forecasts dispersion and all earnings quality proxies except for earnings persistence, 
which is consistent with the results of the main tests except earnings persistence. For 
panel (C), the results indicate significant associations between analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy and both earnings persistence and predictability, but no significant association 
for both accruals quality and smoothness. Based on the Hausman tests of the three main 
tests, the fixed effects estimations are more appropriate than random effects estimations. 
9.6 Summary  
This study tests the association between earnings quality and analysts’ information 
environment. The results indicate that there are significant positive associations between 
analysts following and earnings quality proxies except for the earnings smoothness 
measure. There are also significant negative associations between all our earnings quality 
proxies and analysts' forecasts dispersion. Moreover, there are significant positive 
associations between analysts' forecasts accuracy and two of earnings quality proxies - 
earnings predictability and accruals quality. The findings suggest that firms with higher 
earnings quality have larger analysts following, lower analysts’ forecasts dispersion and 
greater accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, the results indicate that earnings 
predictability has the largest impact across earnings quality proxies on analysts’ 
information environment, this finding suggests which of the earnings proxies matter most 
to analysts. Overall, these findings provide evidence that earnings quality has statistically 
and economically significant association with analysts’ information environment. Also, 
the results have provided evidence that analysts give more attention to the quality of the 
time-series behaviour of earnings, as measured by earnings predictability and earnings 
persistence, more than the relationship between earnings and cash flow as measured by 
accruals quality and smoothness. 
Further, the results indicate that the innate component of earnings quality has a larger 
impact on all analysts’ information environment proxies than the discretionary 
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component of earnings quality. This finding suggests that analysts give more attention 
and weight to the innate factors than the discretionary factors of earnings quality.  
Finally, the results indicate that firms with high discretionary component of earnings 
persistence and smoothness have lower analysts’ forecasts accuracy than firms with low 
discretionary component of earnings persistence and smoothness. This finding is 
consistent with the view of Leuz et al. (2003), who document that earnings smoothness 
reflects the extent to which accounting standards and legal system allow managers to 
artificially reduce variability in earnings, presumably to obtain some capital market 
benefits associated with a smooth earnings stream. Under this view, smoother earnings 
would indicate lower earnings quality in the UK market. 
Overall, these findings suggest that for those countries, which adopt IFRS and have strong 
enforcement regimes e.g., the UK, the high precision of earnings improves analysts’ 
information environment. 
Table 9-9: Pooled regressions of analysts’ information environment proxies on raw 
values of each earning quality proxy (decile rank) 
Panel A: Pooled regressions of financial analysts following on raw values of each earning 
quality proxy, and control variables 
 ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ ܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ 
Size 2.56*** 2.48*** 2.51*** 2.52*** 
 (70.5) (71.0) (71.7) (71.8) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0030*** 0.0039*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 
 (4.72) (6.20) (5.66) (5.77) 
Growth -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.22*** -0.23*** 
 (-5.64) (-6.38) (-5.12) (-5.26) 
AQ -4.55***    
 (-4.94)    
Persistence  1.10***   
  (8.37)   
Predictability   -0.049**  
   (-2.53)  
Smoothness    -0.12 
    (-1.47) 
Constant -24.8*** -24.0*** -24.0*** -23.9*** 
 (-56.9) (-59.7) (-59.6) (-57.8) 
N 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 
adj. R2 0.660 0.664 0.659 0.659 
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Panel B: Pooled regressions of analysts’ forecasts dispersion on raw values of each earning 
quality proxy, and control variables 
 Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ -0.000090 0.00018 -0.000022 0.000040 
 (-0.19) (0.36) (-0.046) (0.084) 
Size -0.0017*** -0.0020*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** 
 (-6.60) (-7.75) (-7.67) (-7.70) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0000089** 0.000011** 0.000011*** 0.0000093**
 (2.15) (2.48) (2.65) (2.21) 
SURP 0.0024*** 0.0025*** 0.0030*** 0.0023*** 
 (2.96) (2.98) (3.41) (2.88) 
AQ 0.024***    
 (2.68)    
Persistence  -0.0012**   
  (-2.28)   
Predictability   0.00028**  
   (-2.32)  
Smoothness    0.0016*** 
    (4.18) 
Constant 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 (9.54) (12.1) (11.9) (11.2) 
N 3,267 3,267 3,267 3,267 
adj. R2 0.074 0.070 0.070 0.075 
Panel C: Pooled regressions of analysts’ forecasts accuracy on raw values of each earning 
quality proxy, and control variables 
 Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 
 (3.76) (3.80) (3.44) (3.64) 
Size 0.00060*** 0.00081*** 0.00067*** 0.00081*** 
 (2.81) (3.91) (3.46) (3.93) 
σሺROEሻ -0.0000031 -0.0000057** -0.0000037* -0.0000058**
 (-1.23) (-2.31) (-1.68) (-2.29) 
SURP -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.022*** 
 (-8.32) (-8.34) (-5.62) (-8.32) 
AQ -0.022**    
 (-2.42)    
Persistence  -0.00069   
  (-1.33)   
Predictability   -0.0032***  
   (-4.16)  
Smoothness    0.00030 
    (1.02) 
Constant -0.0070*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** 
 (-2.94) (-4.96) (-4.54) (-5.10) 
N 4,122 4,122 4,122 4,122 
adj. R2 0.285 0.282 0.359 0.282 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics.  
The sample ranges between 3,267 and 4,537 firm-year observations and covering the years from 2005 to 2011.  
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Table 9-10: Fixed-random panel regressions of analysts’ information environment on each earning quality proxy (decile rank) 
Panel A: fixed-random panel regressions of financial analysts following on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables. 
 Following Following Following Following Following Following Following Following 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
Size 2.89*** 2.35*** 2.87*** 2.33*** 2.64*** 2.29*** 2.89*** 2.36*** 
 (25.3) (54.7) (25.2) (56.2) (23.2) (51.6) (25.5) (56.4) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0010 0.0027*** 0.0011 0.0029*** -0.00067 0.0021** 0.0012 0.0029*** 
 (0.76) (3.13) (0.79) (3.31) (-0.49) (2.42) (0.85) (3.26) 
Growth -0.13** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.0087 -0.085** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (-2.56) (-3.08) (-2.77) (-3.65) (-0.18) (-2.04) (-2.73) (-3.25) 
AQ -0.028 -0.0051       
 (-1.11) (-0.23)       
Persistence   -0.058*** -0.10***     
   (-2.68) (-5.52)     
Predictability     -0.40*** -0.12***   
     (11.1) (4.33)   
Smoothness       -0.050* -0.031 
       (-1.90) (-1.46) 
Constant -28.2*** -22.1*** -27.9*** -21.3*** -27.7*** -22.1*** -28.2*** -22.0*** 
 (-20.4) (-40.3) (-20.2) (-41.5) (-20.7) (-44.3) (-20.6) (-43.1) 
N 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 
Overall R2 0.6571 0.6586 0.6606 0.6642 0.6222 0.6495 0.6575 0.6587 
Hausman  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
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Panel B: fixed-random panel regressions of financial analysts’ dispersion on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables. 
 Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.11 0.12* 0.10 0.12* 0.072 0.11* 0.11 0.12** 
(1.46) (1.93) (1.40) (1.94) (0.95) (1.76) (1.48) (1.98) 
Size -0.16** -0.26*** -0.16** -0.28*** -0.18** -0.30*** -0.15** -0.28*** 
 (-2.14) (-7.72) (-2.21) (-8.31) (-2.44) (-8.74) (-2.03) (-8.27) 
σሺROEሻ -0.00036 0.00072 -0.00036 0.00077 -0.00051 0.00063 -0.00048 0.00056 
 (-0.54) (1.54) (-0.54) (1.64) (-0.75) (1.33) (-0.72) (1.20) 
SURP 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 
 (3.80) (3.96) (3.74) (3.91) (3.08) (3.09) (3.05) (3.32) 
AQ 0.028* 0.032**       
 (1.92) (2.56)       
Persistence   0.0033 0.0060     
   (0.27) (0.58)     
Predictability     0.056*** 0.045***   
     (2.66) (2.87)   
Smoothness       0.055*** 0.055*** 
       (3.75) (4.70) 
Constant 2.47*** 3.79*** 2.67*** 4.11*** 2.64*** 4.17*** 2.22** 3.83*** 
 (2.76) (9.85) (2.97) (11.3) (2.99) (11.6) (2.49) (10.5) 
N 3,267 3,267 3,267 3,267 3,267 3,267 3,267 3,267 
Overall R2 0.0661 0.0737 0.0617 0.0711 0.0564 0.0739 0.0650 0.0784 
Hausman  0.0470  0.0221  0.0108  0.0373 
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Panel C: fixed-random panel regressions of financial analysts Accuracy on each earning quality proxy (decile rank), and control variables. 
 Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ݅݊݃ሻ 0.078 0.11** 0.082 0.12** 0.081 0.11** 0.076 0.11** 
 (1.45) (2.36) (1.52) (2.56) (1.49) (2.42) (1.40) (2.36) 
Size 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 
 (2.81) (3.57) (2.99) (3.88) (2.78) (4.70) (2.67) (3.77) 
σሺROEሻ 0.0019*** 0.00067 0.0019*** 0.00063 0.0020*** 0.00088** 0.0019*** 0.00065 
 (3.25) (1.58) (3.23) (1.51) (3.33) (2.08) (3.28) (1.54) 
SURP -1.21*** -1.66*** -1.23*** -1.67*** -1.20*** -1.59*** -1.20*** -1.66*** 
 (-18.4) (-27.7) (-18.7) (-27.9) (-17.8) (-25.7) (-18.1) (-27.5) 
AQ -0.020 -0.0085       
 (1.56) (-0.74)       
Persistence   -0.036*** -0.031***     
   (3.24) (3.13)     
Predictability     -0.028* -0.066***   
     (-1.93) (-4.53)   
Smoothness       -0.0068 -0.00084 
       (-0.50) (0.075) 
Constant -2.72*** -1.60*** -2.95*** -1.91*** -2.51*** -1.73*** -2.46*** -1.70*** 
 (-3.40) (-4.51) (-3.69) (-5.64) (-3.18) (-5.25) (-3.09) (-5.03) 
N 4,122 4,122 4,122 4,122 4,122 4,122 4,122 4,122 
Overall R2 0.1996 0.2958 0.1973 0.2919 0.2137 0.2991 0.2077 0.2942 
Hausman  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italics 
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Chapter 10:  Summary and Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the thesis and draws out the major conclusions about the impact 
of earnings quality on capital market aspects in the UK. It presents the background of the 
study, summarises its objectives, and a presents a discussion of the major findings. The 
chapter identifies, also, the limitations of the main research and provides 
recommendations for future research. 
10.2 Summary of the Background 
This thesis focuses on how the precision of the financial information, which used to 
capture one or more of the relevant underlying valuation constructs, affects the 
participants’ assessments of the capital market. In this regard, the disclosure quality is 
used intensively in the literature as a construct of the overall quality of financial reporting; 
however, there are a number of caveat points of this construct. First, there is no agreed 
proxy to measure the overall disclosure quality because firms have many financial and 
non-financial attributes and no theoretical guidance on how to calculate a composite 
metric of disclosure quality (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). For example, prior studies use 
management forecasts (see Miller and Piotroski, 2000), metrics based on the AIMR 
database (see Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999), 
and self-constructed measures (see Botosan, 1997) as proxies for disclosure quality. 
However, each proxy has its limitations (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Second, it is difficult to measure the behaviour of a particular element such as accrual 
based earnings quality by testing the aggregate proxy of disclosure quality. Third, the 
proxy for disclosure quality that commonly used in empirical research, the AIMR score, 
has a number of limitations. AIMR scores are available for a very small and select subset 
of US firms (generally large firms with significant analysts following), and these scores 
are not available after 1996. Moreover, AIMR scores only represent analysts’ perception 
of voluntary disclosures (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). Other limitations of the AIMR score 
are detailed in the study of Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 426-427). Therefore, this study 
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focuses mainly on the precision of earnings, since the researcher considered this as a 
summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. 
In this regard, this thesis provides an overview of alternative definitions and measures of 
earnings quality along with a discussion of the choices in designing research on earnings 
quality. Throughout this study, the researcher focuses on a capital markets setting, as 
opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. The reason for this choice 
stems from the view that there are fundamental reasons why the capital market uses 
accounting information as a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. It is recognised that 
resource allocations are ex-ante decisions whilst contracting/stewardship assessments are 
ex-post evaluations of outcomes. It is accepted, also, that evidence on whether, how and 
to what extent earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is 
fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters are relevant to investors, 
analysts and others including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. For 
example, the demonstration of a link between earnings quality and the cost of equity 
indicates that accounting information has a basic economic role when decisions are made 
on capital allocations decision. The accounting literature begins only recently to 
document this role. 
The researcher classifies the previous literature into two main groups: Firstly, the 
previous literature that discusses the definitions and the different approaches to estimating 
the main variables, earnings quality proxies and the three capital market aspects. 
Secondly, this study discusses the previous literature that investigates the association 
between earnings quality and the three capital market aspects. Finally, this study discusses 
the association between earnings quality and IFRS and, in terms of earnings quality, shed 
light on the differences between IFRS and US GAAP. 
The first group of the literature, which is presented in chapters two and three, discusses 
the different definitions of earnings quality in the literature. The researcher concludes that 
high earnings quality ought to have four characteristics: firstly, earnings ought to 
faithfully represent current performance. Secondly, it ought to be an indicator for future 
earnings and performance. Thirdly, it ought to have a relationship with current and future 
operating cash flow. Fourthly, it ought to help users to make useful decisions. In addition, 
this study follows partially Francis et al.’s (2004) classification of earnings quality 
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proxies by splitting them into two main categories: accounting-based proxies and market-
based proxies. Typically, accounting-based proxies depend only on accounting 
information such as accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and 
earnings smoothness. Moving to market-based proxies, they depend typically on both 
accounting and market data such as value relevance, timeliness and conservatism. 
However, this thesis focuses only on accounting-based earnings quality proxies. 
Moving to capital market aspects, this thesis determines three capital market aspects 
affected by earnings quality; these are the cost of equity capital, information asymmetry 
and analysts’ information environment. The researcher discusses the definition of each 
one of these aspects and, also, the different approaches, which the previous literature uses 
to estimate these three aspects. For example, there are two approaches to estimate the cost 
of equity capital. Firstly, there is the ex-post cost of equity capital models which can be 
estimated by reference to market data such as price earnings ratio or realised returns. 
Secondly, there is the ex-ante cost of equity capital models, which can be estimated by 
reference to analysts’ forecasts by using either the residual income model or the dividend 
discount model. For information asymmetry, the researcher discusses the four 
approaches, used in the literature, to estimate information asymmetry: namely, analysts’ 
forecasts proxies; investments opportunity set proxies; stock return proxies; and market 
microstructure proxies. For analysts’ information environment, the researcher discusses 
the measures of analysts following, analysts’ forecasts dispersion and analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy. 
The second group of literature aims to discuss the previous studies which examine the 
association between earnings quality and the three aspects of capital market. Therefore, 
the researcher classifies these studies into five sub-groups. The first sub-group addresses 
the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital.  This is followed 
by a discussion of the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry 
and, next, the association between earnings quality and analysts’ information 
environment. Then, this study discusses the interaction between earnings quality and 
different aspects of capital market. Finally, in terms of the quality of earnings, it discusses 
the differences between IFRS and US GAAP.  
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According to the analyses of previous studies, the following conclusions could be 
reached: Firstly, most recent research on earnings quality uses one proxy for earnings 
quality; this is accruals quality. However, in this study, the researcher uses four earnings 
quality proxies known as accounting-based earnings quality proxies. These are; accrual 
quality; earnings persistence; earnings predictability; and earnings smoothness. The 
researcher discusses several proxies which accounting researcher have used as indicators 
of earnings quality. This discussion is by no means exhaustive. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine how any single proxy could capture adequately the different dimensions of 
earnings quality. The researcher calibrates the four proxies against three capital market 
aspects, namely: the cost of equity capital, which is a summary indicator of investor 
resource allocation decisions; information asymmetry; and analysts’ information 
environment. This is to learn which proxy is viewed by investors and analysts as 
conferring the greatest capital market advantage; as measured by a reduced cost of equity 
capital, decreased information asymmetry, a higher number of analysts following, a lower 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and more accurate analysts’ forecasts accuracy. 
Secondly, in the literature, there are few studies that examine the association between 
earnings quality and different proxies of analysts’ information environment. In addition, 
in the literature, there are controversies about the examination of the association between 
earnings quality and these proxies. Thirdly, the weight of the existing empirical evidence 
suggests, also, that the capital market aspects effect of earnings quality appears to be 
associated strongly with the innate component of earnings quality. However, the earnings 
quality effects, associated with the discretionary or reporting determinants, are less 
important.  
Fourthly, most previous studies, which focused on the effects of earnings quality on the 
aspects of capital market, had conducted in the US. This limits the generality of findings 
vis-à-vis contexts beyond the US. In this regard, there is somewhat mixed evidence on 
whether there are significant difference between the US GAAP and IFRS in terms of 
earnings quality, there are two standpoints as regards the differences between IFRS and 
DAS, and it is difficult to select which one has the upper hand. Theoretically, the 
application of principles-based standards provides a possible benefit of eliminating 
alternative accounting treatments for a transaction. The benefit of a single principle, 
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which reflects fundamental performance, leads to better information about the amount of 
earnings through reducing the opportunities for earnings management. However, a 
potential drawback is that principles-based standards prevent the manager from using the 
discretion allowed within the standards to give relevant information (Dechow et al., 
2010). Although, in the capital market, there are more advantages from using IFRS (Li, 
2010a), its opponents argue that IFRS give more discretion and less guidance and that the 
standards are less tested and less comprehensive than US GAAP. Consequently, there is 
more room for earnings management. To sum up, research evidence of whether IFRS 
adoption leads to improvement in the capital market is still mixed. On balance, the 
evidence suggests that there probably were improvement on the capital market, but that 
they were not experienced by all companies or in all countries. So, it is far from clear that 
the mixed results from these previous studies can be reconciled. All these findings point 
to the importance of this study.  
10.3 Summary of Research Objectives and Hypotheses 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the association between earnings quality 
and three capital market aspects in the UK. In particular, the researcher tests the extent to 
which what is reported to be the higher of four earnings quality proxies known as 
accounting-based earnings quality proxies (Francis et al. 2004), are associated with a 
lower cost of equity capital, lower information asymmetry, higher number of analysts 
following, lower dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and greater accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. This study aimed, also, to investigate the relative impact of the four earnings 
quality proxies on the three capital market aspects to determine which proxy matter most 
to investors and analysts. In addition it aims to determine whether the innate component, 
which is driven by economic fundamentals, and the discretionary component, which is 
driven by management choices, of each earnings quality proxy, impact similarly on the 
three aspects of capital market. Finally, the thesis was concerned with studying the impact 
of the financial crisis on the association between earnings quality and both the cost of 
equity capital and information asymmetry. 
Based on theory and consistent with previous studies (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Francis 
et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Jayaraman, 2008; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2011; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Lobo et al., 2012; Ascioglu et al., 2012), this 
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thesis investigates whether high earnings quality are associated with lower cost of equity 
capital, lower information asymmetry, higher number of analysts following, lower 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and more accurate analysts’ forecasts. In addition, this 
thesis investigates whether the innate and the discretionary component of earnings quality 
have the same impact on the cost of equity capital, information asymmetry, the number 
of analysts following, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. Finally, it tests the interaction effects of financial crisis and earnings quality on 
both the cost of equity capital and information asymmetry. 
10.4 Summary of Research Philosophy and Methodology 
Moving to discuss the research philosophy, the researcher regarded this research as being 
set within the positivistic (functionalist) paradigm. The functionalist paradigm represents 
a perspective which relates to the objectivist approach (realism, positivism, determinism 
and a preference for nomothetic method), and it is rooted firmly in the sociology of 
regulation (it is more conservative and tends towards preference for very gradual 
improvement as deemed appropriate rather than more radical change) (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979, p. 26). It is often “problem oriented” in approach, focused on providing 
practical solutions to practical problems and generating knowledge which can be put to 
use. In this context, different theories of accounting e.g., capital need theory, signalling 
theory and decision usefulness theory were used as explanatory theories to explain the 
association between earnings quality and capital market aspects. 
The sample of this thesis covers all UK non-financial firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange during the period from 2005 to 2011. The Thomson DataStream and I/B/E/S 
Databases are used to collect the observations for all variables. Following the literature 
review, this study excludes the financial institutions from the sample (Peasnell et al., 
2005; Francis et al., 2005), and uses The FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
hierarchy. It provides eighteen industries which could be used to identify macroeconomic 
opportunities for investment and trading decisions as given by the DataStream Database. 
Four industries are excluded which are Banks and Financial Services, Insurance, Real 
Estate and Utilities and there remains fourteen industries. In total, there are 8,175 firm-
year observations represents 28% of all the companies available in the DataStream. The 
number of distinct firms each year ranges from 1,074 to 1,224 per year. 
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10.5 Summary of the Empirical Results 
In terms of the cost of equity capital, this study generally finds a statistically significant 
negative association between each earnings proxy considered separately and the cost of 
equity capital. Also, the results show that the predictability proxy explains more of the 
variation in estimates of the cost of equity, followed by accruals quality then persistence 
and finally smoothness. These findings suggest that there are differences between IFRS 
and US GAAP in the sense of the impact of earnings quality proxies on the cost of equity 
capital, especially, for earnings predictability and earnings smoothness. This study finds 
a significantly strong impact of earnings predictability on the cost of equity capital, 
however, Francis et al. (2004), who conduct their study in the US, do not find any 
significant impact of earnings predictability on the cost of equity capital. This finding is 
consistent with the study of Folsom et al. (2013), who find that the principles-based 
standards i.e., IFRS are more informative, persistent and predictive of future earnings and 
cash flows than rules-based standards i.e., US GAAP. 
The second difference is the impact of earnings smoothness on the cost of equity capital. 
Results reported by Francis et al. (2004) suggest that capital market participant investors 
reward smoother earnings streams with reduced costs of equity capital, this finding is 
consistent with a view that earnings smoothness is desirable (at least in the eyes of 
investors) because it reflects higher quality financial reporting decisions. However, this 
study’s findings are not consistent with this notion, because there is no significantly 
strong impact to earnings smoothness on the cost of equity capital. This supports the view 
of Leuz et al. (2003) who document that earnings smoothness reflects the extent to which 
accounting standards and legal system allow managers to reduce artificially variability in 
earnings, presumably to obtain some capital market benefits associated with a smooth 
earnings stream. According to this view, smoother earnings would indicate lower 
earnings quality in the UK market. In this regard, Chen et al. (2010) and Capkun  et al. 
(2013) conclude that after the EU applied IFRS, firms became engaged in more earnings 
smoothness. In addition, this conclusion became stronger during the period of the 
financial crisis; the results of which indicate no significant association between earnings 
smoothness and the cost of equity capital. Also, the results of earnings smoothness is 
consistent with the study of Jayaraman (2008) who find a U-shaped association between 
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earnings smoothness and bid-ask spread. He concludes that earnings, which are smoother 
than cash flow, distort information and attract more informed investors; this may lead to 
higher cost of equity capital. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is accepted that there is 
a negative association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. This finding 
supports the capital needs theory and decision usefulness theory. These results are 
consistent across estimation methods (annual regression and pooled regression), 
specifications of the four earnings quality proxies (decile and raw data), and proxies of 
the cost of equity capital (IndEP and the ex-ante cost of equity capital measures). 
The interaction effects between earnings quality and financial crisis on the cost of equity 
capital is also examined. The results indicate that, during the period of the crisis as 
compared to pre-crisis, the investors pay more attention to the quality of earnings in 
determining the price of the cost of equity capital of firms. The association between the 
cost of equity capital and earnings quality is investigated, also, during the period of the 
financial crisis (2008 and 2009). It finds a significantly strong impact of earnings 
persistence and predictability when compared to the impact of accruals quality and 
smoothness. In addition, it finds a significantly larger impact to Beta on the cost of equity 
capital, relative to the full sample period regressions. These findings shed light on the 
influence of economic consequences on the association between accounting information 
and its users i.e., investors. The results suggest that the investors pay more attention to 
sustainability of earnings rather than the relationship between earnings and cash flow. 
Those results show, also, the information in determining the price of cost of equity capital 
which matters to the investors throughout the financial crisis. Therefore, the hypothesis 
(H10) is accepted.  
An explanation of this finding is that, when the economy is stable, investment 
opportunities are numerous. Consequently, investors a pay less attention perhaps to the 
quality of accounting information (Mitton, 2002). Conversely, a crisis could force 
investors to identify the weakness in the quality of accounting information which existed 
all along. This identification may lead to a ‘‘flight-to-quality’’ syndrome (e.g., Goh et al., 
2015; Francis et al., 2012). Therefore, such a syndrome will lead investors either to 
withdraw completely from the stock market or move their investments to what they 
 215 
 
 
 
consider to be firms with high quality accounting information (Francis et al., 2013; 
Francis et al., 2012). 
By using two different methods, this study examines, also, the separate impact of innate 
and discretionary earnings quality components on the cost of equity capital. It finds that 
the innate component of each earnings quality proxy has a larger impact on the cost of 
equity capital than the discretionary component. This result is consistent with the notion 
that information uncertainty, which results from the innate component is fundamental, 
compared to reporting uncertainty, which can shift easily from one period to another. 
Therefore, the hypothesis (H6) that the innate and discretionary components have the 
same impact on the cost of equity capital is rejected. Moreover, the results suggest that 
the innate component of earnings smoothness has a significant impact on the cost of 
equity capital. However, the discretionary component has no significant impact on the 
cost of equity capital. This finding suggests that investors reward the innate component 
by reducing the cost of equity capital. However, they do not reward the highly 
discretionary component of earnings smoothness by reducing the cost of equity capital; 
they consider it to be a type of earnings management. This finding is consistent with the 
view of Ahrens (2009) who argue that earnings smoothness ought to be split into two 
portions, the first portion is the natural smoothness, which happens naturally from the 
effect of some production processes on earnings streams (the innate component). The 
second portion is intentional smoothness, which happens when some firms smooth 
earnings intentionally to benefit from the advantages of such an earnings stream (the 
discretionary component). 
Moving to information asymmetry, the results indicate a significant negative association 
between earnings quality and information symmetry; therefore the hypothesis (H2) is 
accepted. Also, the results show that, when compared to other earnings quality proxies, 
earnings smoothness has the largest impact on information asymmetry. This finding is 
contrary to the finding of the study of Jayaraman (2008) since he finds a significantly 
positive association between earnings smoothness and bid-ask spreads. As for the 
financial crisis, this study test the association between information asymmetry and 
earnings quality proxy in only the period of the financial crisis (2008 and 2009), and finds 
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significant associations between information asymmetry and all earnings quality proxies 
except accruals quality.  
Comparing the results of the impact of earnings smoothness on information asymmetry 
and the cost of equity capital in this study, from the first while, could be controversial. 
However, the study of Lambert et al. (2012) is useful in this respect. Lambert et al. (2012) 
provide a comprehensive review of the literature and a key theoretical prediction for the 
association between information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital. In their 
framework, information asymmetry could affect the cost of capital only in imperfect 
competition. Therefore, in highly competitive equity markets, such as the UK, 
information quality may affect the cost of capital mainly by affecting the precision of 
investors’ information rather than information asymmetry. 
Moreover, the results show that the innate component of earnings quality has a significant 
impact on information asymmetry; however, with the exception of the discretionary 
component of earnings smoothness, the discretionary component has no significant 
impact on information asymmetry. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H7) is rejected. 
In terms of analysts’ information environment, the results indicate that there are 
significantly positive associations between analysts following and earnings quality 
proxies except in the case of the earnings quality proxy of earnings smoothness. There 
are significant negative associations between earnings quality proxies and the dispersion 
of analysts' forecasts. There are significant positive associations between the accuracy of 
the analysts' forecasts and both accruals quality and earnings predictability. The findings 
suggest that firms with higher earnings quality have more analysts following, lower 
analysts’ forecasts dispersion and greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy. Therefore, the 
hypotheses (H3, H4 and H5) are accepted. Moreover, the results indicate that earnings 
predictability has the largest impact across earnings quality proxies for both analysts’ 
following and forecasts accuracy regressions. This finding suggests which of the earnings 
proxies matter most to analysts. Overall, these findings provide evidence that earnings 
quality is an important determinant of analysts’ information environment. Also, the 
results provide evidence that financial analysts pay greater attention to the quality of the 
time-series behaviour of earnings, as measured by earnings predictability and persistence, 
than the association between earnings and cash flow as measured by accruals quality and 
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smoothness. Furthermore, the results indicate that the innate component of earnings 
quality has a larger impact on all financial analyst behaviour proxies (i.e., number of 
analysts following, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts) than the discretionary component of earnings quality. This finding suggests that 
analysts pay more attention and place greater weight on the innate factors than the 
discretionary factors of earnings quality. Therefore, the null hypotheses (H8, H9, H10) are 
rejected. 
In summary, the findings of this study support the importance of accounting information 
and financial reporting to the capital market participants, i.e., investors and analysts. In 
addition, they have a capital market consequences i.e., the cost of equity capital, 
information asymmetry and analysts’ information environment. Also, earnings have to be 
high quality and have a desirable impact on capital market aspects which must be 
sustainable, predict future earnings and have a high rating for accruals that are realised 
into cash flows. These findings support the capital needs theory, signalling theory and 
decision usefulness theory. 
Moreover, the findings of this study counter the argument of the limitation impact of 
accounting standards singly on the quality of earnings if the other factors are constant 
(e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
Especially, that the results of this study are different from the studies that conducted in 
the US, which used the same measures and proxies of dependent and independent 
variables (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005). However, in the literature, this 
question continues to be controversial and needs more detailed comparison between the 
two standards in order to determine the differences between them in terms of earnings 
quality. Finally, this study shed light on the effect of the financial crisis on the association 
between earnings quality and capital market aspects in a country with strong fiscal 
sustainability. It indicates, also, that during the period of the financial crisis there are 
stronger associations between earnings quality proxies and both information asymmetry 
and the cost of equity capital than the period before the crisis.  
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10.6 Research Implications 
The findings of this study could be beneficial to investors, analysts, regulators, standards 
setters, policy makers and managers who are interested in the quality of accounting 
information, and who would like to understand the economic consequences of public 
accounting information. In particular, retail investors seem to be the capital market 
stakeholder group which loses out the most from the low quality of earnings. Possibly 
more could be done to provide tools to enable retail investors to calculate measures of the 
quality of accounting information for the firms in which they invest. Also, more could be 
done to benchmark these indicators of earnings quality against other firms, especially 
since the retail investors represent around 18% of the UK market (Office for National 
Statistics, 2010). This study indicates that firms are motivated to publish high quality 
accounting information in order to reduce their cost of equity capital. Also, these findings 
give a clear view to firms of the meaning of high quality earnings; this meaning should 
capture the persistence and predictability of earnings with high quality of accruals. This 
study gives, also, information about the quality of earnings under IFRS in the common-
law system. This is important for accounting standard setting bodies, particularly, when 
they prepare to change or review the accounting standards and regulations.  
Moving to the financial crisis, this study is important for policy makers, investors and 
regulators. In particular, it helps policy makers in their preparation of defence 
mechanisms against a crisis. The findings of this study shed light on the impact of the 
severe financial crisis on the quality of accounting information in the UK. This study 
gives, also, insights to investors when setting their investment portfolios and strategies 
amidst crises or, generally, amidst conditions of uncertainty and volatility. In addition, 
this study is useful for accounting regulators when preparing accounting regulations 
which seek to reduce information asymmetry and earnings manipulation and increase the 
quality of accounting information during a crisis. 
Moreover, this study is useful to researchers who are examining IFRS’ consequences of 
earnings quality on the capital market. This study finds that high earnings quality leads 
to a lower cost of equity capital, lower information asymmetry, improve the financial 
analysts’ environment and enhance the ability of analysts to forecast future earnings.  
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An interesting implication of these findings is the quality of earnings under IFRS in the 
UK which is an important source of information for financial analysts. The high quality 
of current accounting information enhances the analysts’ ability to forecast the future 
earnings.  
10.7 Research Limitations 
The empirical results are subject to many caveats. Firstly, the measurement of earnings 
quality is difficult especially since earnings quality is multifaceted construct. This 
research attempts to address this issue by measuring earnings quality through using four 
proxies, known as accounting-ased earnings quality proxies, and making comparisons 
between them in order to determine which proxy matters most to users. Therefore there 
are other angles of earnings quality are not covered by this thesis such as the market-
based proxies, which assume that the function of earnings is to reflect economic income 
as shown by stock returns.   
Secondly, this research considers no interaction between information generates from the 
financial reporting process, and other information generates from other processes in the 
capital market. Most previous studies followed the same approach (e.g., Francis et al., 
2005; Francis et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2009).  
Thirdly, this research does not test the association between earnings quality and the three 
aspects of capital market from the viewpoint of the stewardship theory. This reflects the 
ex-post role of financial information by using that information to control and monitor the 
management’s use of capital (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Cascino et al., 2013). 
Fourthly, this study investigates the association between earnings quality and the 
analysts’ information environment in order to reflect the effects of earnings quality on the 
decision usefulness for equity valuation. However, the disadvantage of using the analysts’ 
information environment proxies is the required assumption that analysts are unbiased 
and expert forecasters, given that evidence on the validity of those assumptions is still 
unclear (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010).  
Fifthly, because it lay outside its scope, this study does not capture properly the potential 
simultaneity between earnings quality proxies and analysts’ information environment 
proxies. To be explicit, by using a simultaneous equation, future research could examine 
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these associations. Such a piece of research is particularly important in order to provide 
a better understanding of the interplay between the quality of accounting information and 
financial analysts. 
10.8 Future Research 
Future research would be interesting if: firstly, doing cross-country earnings quality 
studies among the European countries. In particular, investigating the association between 
earnings quality and aspects of capital market in countries with different governance and 
enforcement regimes, would shed further light on the factors which affect the quality of 
earnings, how it impacts the different aspects of capital market. 
Secondly, as mentioned, the concept of earnings quality remains quite vague and there is 
no consensus on it. Also, earnings quality proxies are not substitutes and that they 
measure different angles of earnings quality with a little overlap among each of them. 
Therefore, it would be interesting if future research uses both accounting-based earnings 
quality and market-based earnings quality, and compare between their impacts on the key 
aspects of capital market. Also, it would be useful using different models of the cost of 
equity capital; information asymmetry and the analysts’ information environment.  
Third, the intent in this study is to examine the capital market effects of earnings quality 
but to stimulate further research in this area. The researcher encourages the undertaking 
of research which examines the impact of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship 
settings. This would provide an answer to the question of what information do users, e.g., 
investors, use to assess stewardship. Compared to the decision usefulness role, the 
stewardship role of information receives less attention in the literature. Also, most of 
studies on stewardship are based on theoretical analyses (O'Connell, 2007; Cascino et al., 
2013).  
Fourthly, the researcher suggests that, in terms of earning quality, there should be in depth 
comparative study between the US (US GAAP) and the UK (IFRS). This could determine, 
in terms of the quality of earnings, whether there are differences between the two 
accounting systems in the common law countries. Also, the researcher suggests the 
undertaking of a comparison study, which examines the impact of earnings quality on 
aspects of capital market in pre-IFRS and post-IFRS in the UK. 
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Fifthly, the researcher suggests that, in terms of the association between earnings quality 
and the aspects of capital market, there should be in depth comparative study between 
large and small publicity traded firms. Based on previous studies, it is not clear that larger 
and smaller publicly traded firms are probably benefited to the same extent from high 
earnings quality. 
Sixthly, in terms of the financial crisis, the researcher suggests carrying out comparative 
studies between common law and code law countries in terms of the association between 
financial crisis and earnings quality. These could determine whether the distinctive 
characteristics between the two types of systems have its effect on this association.  
Seventhly, it is worthwhile carrying out an investigation of the potential simultaneity in 
the association between earnings quality proxies and analysts’ information environment. 
This type of research will provide a better understanding of the interplay between quality 
of earnings and the analysts’ information environment. 
Finally, using the triangulation approach would be useful. This could be done by adding 
the interview method with the quantitative methods. This might provide useful insights 
into the users’ views on earnings quality, and how they use it in their decision making.    
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